Recommendations - Metropolitan Police Service, July 2021
The identified learning relates to a serious injury while in custody in February 2021. The detainee had been arrested on suspicion of possession of Class A drugs. Two small packets of brown and white substances were found on the detainee. These packets had been seized by the arresting officer and were mislaid in custody. They were subsequently found and it is believed they had been erroneously binned by a member of cleaning staff while clearing rubbish from the custody area but were eventually recovered from the refuse bag.
IOPC reference
Recommendations
The IOPC recommends that the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) should conduct a formal review of the custody procedures regarding the safekeeping of seized evidence before it enters an evidential store. It is important that the procedures in place are sufficiently robust to ensure evidence can be properly tracked.
Do you accept the recommendation?
Yes
Accepted action:
The Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) Met Detention Command partially accepts this recommendation.
In 2019/2020 a formal review of some key risk areas was conducted. The review was named Met Search and was led by a Custody Inspector and overseen by the Met Detention Health and Safety lead. This initiative focussed on the risks posed by detainees, to include not only the threat of violence to self and others, but also the risk posed by improperly handled exhibits. Control measures were adopted across all MPS Custody Suites.
These included detainee medical and vulnerability triage, searching, weapons screening, intelligence checks at the point of detainee entry, designated search areas/boxes and a direction for more intrusive supervision of searching officers. In addition, all suites were instructed to ensure drop boxes were available.
These are intended to be used for the safe keeping of drugs/weapons etc. during the booking in procedure, to eliminate the risk of such articles being accessible to the detainee who could possibly use them to harm/self-harm. As with all detainee property, the drop boxes and their content remains the responsibility of the Custody Officer. Whilst the intended purpose of these boxes was not to address the circumstance of this recommendation, following this practice would have prevented the event described.
A formal review is therefore not deemed proportionate as a process is already in place, however, it would appear that this is not fully embedded and a reminder regarding directed practice is required. This will be achieved via the following course of action:
- Safety Briefing Slides were disseminated to Met Detention staff on 13th August 2021.
- An entry in the September 2021 issue of the Met Detention Newsletter.
- On 9th August 2021, an e-mail was sent to all Custody Managers directing them to ensure drop boxes are available and are used by Met Detention staff, and that their Basic Command Unit colleagues are aware of the boxes and their purpose. Custody Managers are also to ensure this is considered and recorded in their local risk assessments. A follow up e-mail will to be sent to Custody Managers on 6th September 2021 regarding these matters.
- A corporate risk assessment is to be updated at the next Met Detention Safety and Compliance Management Meeting scheduled for 10th September 2021.
It is noteworthy that drop boxes are checked for during annual health and safety inspections.
All other areas of property handling and tracking is set out in the MPS Met Detention policy and provides adequate protection. This involves documented audit trails both in paper and electronic forms.
The IOPC recommends that the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) should review the custody handover practices to ensure there is adequate monitoring of occupied cells during handover periods. We would recommend that as part of this, it is also ensured that there is a process in place for officers/ staff monitoring cells to also be given the handover information.
Do you accept the recommendation?
Yes
Accepted action:
The ‘MPS’ Met Detention have reviewed and accept this recommendation by the IOPC.
Met Det Senior Leadership Team (“SLT”) and Safety and Compliance Team has set clear expectation on handover conduct.
This has been communicated to staff via a number of mediums to include all staff emails, briefings, staff professional development and most recently in the February 2021 Command newsletter. However, a review of Met Detention Custody Policy and associated role profile documents, has revealed that this expectation is not adequately set out.
The expectation is that all cell buzzers must be responded to without delay, at all times. Policy around cell isolation recognises that the cell call buzzer system is the only way for a detainee to summons help in a medical emergency and as such any cell isolations must be authorised by a Custody Officer and adequately justified. Recent organisational learning following a public complaint was disseminated across Met Detention covering this exact issue as above (Feb 2021 newsletter). As the custody estate lacks uniformity, owing to the age of the suites, each Custody Manager/CSI was tasked with making arrangements with their team to ensure detainees were adequately monitored/catered for during handover periods and none were ignored in favour of the handover process. This may involve a physical visit or a cell intercom interaction to assess the nature of the assistance required depending on the equipment available. This recommendation has unveiled that our current handover policy states, “Where possible all other custody business should be paused to allow the handover to take place. If the handover takes place in or around the booking in area, the custody suite should be cleared of all other personnel. Custody officers and other custody staff, including the healthcare professional (if available), should carry out the handover together.” Custody business is a vague term and could be interpreted to mean answering call buzzers which is not in line with Senior Leadership expectation. As such a policy update needs to be considered to ensure this message is clear and that any absent staff members conducted checks are fully briefed where required. This will be the responsibility of the Grip Sergeant.