Investigation into recruitment irregularities and the actions of a civilian staff member – British Transport Police, June 2018
In November 2015 and May 2018, two different job roles were advertised as new vacancies within the British Transport Police (BTP) Legal Services directorate.
A candidate, who had worked previously with the panel chair at another company, was offered the first role before the process closed. The panel chair continued to be involved with the recruitment process despite the conflict of interest. Staff accounts contained discrepancies over whether the candidate attended relevant assessments and interview.
In the second recruitment process, an applicant passed the assessment and interview, but the outcome was delayed. Representations were made to senior managers that the role required a higher salary and change in responsibilities to attract a preferred candidate. The applicant who had passed the assessment at the lower pay grade was told she was unsuccessful.
The role was re-advertised at the higher rate and the preferred candidate applied. Before attending an interview, the professional standards team were notified through the confidential anonymous reporting system for a suspected failure to follow HR policy and procedure.
Following a referral, we declared an independent investigation in June 2018.
We obtained statements, conducted interviews, and gathered and analysed BTP policies and procedures to examine the actions of a senior member of BTP civilian staff during these two separate recruitment rounds. We also retrieved and analysed relevant correspondence between all parties involved in the recruitment process.
We completed our investigation in November 2020.
We concluded that the member of civilian staff had a case to answer for gross misconduct. We passed our report to BTP who agreed with our findings. We determined that the usual recruitment and application process had been circumvented and inappropriately interfered with, and managers were misled in the second recruitment process to secure a higher salary for a preferred candidate.
We also examined the actions of two BTP police officers who reviewed the recruitment process, prior to our independent investigation. Subsequently, the actions of a third officer were examined following their review of recruitment irregularities. One officer had a case to answer for misconduct resulting in management action. Individual learning was identified for all three officers.
In September 2021 a disciplinary panel dismissed the senior member of civilian staff without notice for gross misconduct.
We carefully considered whether there were any learning opportunities arising from the investigation. We make learning recommendations to improve policing and public confidence in the police complaints system and prevent a recurrence of similar incidents.
We consulted with BTP over key areas for improvement. This included a review of how staff are contacted when they make confidential reports through an internal system and certain working practices in relation to passing information between teams within the department .
We consulted with BTP over its recruitment policy and whether it was necessary for the force to make amendments . Additionally, we advised the implementation of a robust process for visitors to attend BTP premises. We also recommended BTP put in place mechanisms to monitor the deletion of documents or files from shared and personal computer drives .
IOPC reference
Recommendations
The IOPC recommends that British Transport Police reviews how it manages interactions with people who report wrongdoing through the internal CARS reporting system. This should include both how they are kept informed and their involvement in providing information to the investigation.
This follows an IOPC investigation in relation to a report made by way of the CARS system. The CARS system is used for members of BTP staff to make confidential reports about wrongdoing.
In this case, the people who reported wrongdoing had only limited contact with the Professional Standards Department Intelligence Unit (PSDIU). In the initial PSD investigation they were not treated as witnesses and did not have accounts taken from them. In the second PSD investigation a key witness had only minimal contact with the investigator and did not provide a formal MG11 statement. The initial CARS report raised a number of issues. There was a lack of explanation from the PSD to the reporters about what was going happen with certain issues that had been raised. The lack of engagement from the PSD was detrimental to the reporters’ confidence in the process and quality of the PSD investigation.
Do you accept the recommendation?
Yes
Accepted action:
The CARS system was an anonymous reporting system for information to be passed directly to Professional Standards. BTP have changed the system and relaunched a new anonymous reporting system named ‘Speak Up’. The new system had a high-profile launch and when reporting issues to PSD you are directed to a page containing virtual envelopes, you select a numbered envelope and submit your information. PSD have an ability to reply to those who submit information via the virtual envelope.
Where someone identifies themselves and no longer wishes to be anonymous, we deal with them as we would any witness. Our recent 2022 All People Survey indicated that 78% of the organisation understood what ‘Speak Up’ was and how to use it. Reports received via ‘Speak Up’ have increased by 40% in the past year.
The IOPC recommends that British Transport Police considers working practices in the Professional Standards Department to consider and take action to address any issues with:
- how evidence relied on to form views and conclusion is detailed in investigation reports
- how supervisors provide input on investigators’ draft reports
- how investigators are expected to record policy decisions
- how witness statements and any conversations that are relevant to an investigation but not considered to be witness statements are captured
- how information is passed between the reactive team and PSDIU when work is transferred between them
During our investigation we found that there were various issues with the processes followed in PSD.
PSD Investigators’ Reports reviewed during the investigation did not identify the specific evidence that was being relied upon to express views and reach conclusions. This meant that appropriate authority delegates were not always provided with the fullest information to make their decisions. IOPC statutory guidance states in chapter 14 that both special procedures and non-special procedures investigations should include an accurate summary of the evidence and should attach or refer to any relevant documents.
Evidence obtained during the investigation showed that a supervisor amended a draft report provided to him with an opposing view. There was no record of the original author accepting those changes or a review of the evidence that supported that view meaning that the process that led to the final report was not transparent.
The investigation identified that PSD investigators were using different methods of recording policy decisions. One DI stated that all decisions are recorded on Centurion to negate the need for paper records while another had a formal policy book in which decisions were recorded. This can cause problems for overseeing the progress of the investigation and having a clear audit trail.
We were told during the investigation that it was common practice that where no formal witness statement is being taken, it is common practice to summarise the conversation within the Investigator’s Report and that at least one investigator believed there was no requirement to add it to the Centurion system. This could mean that the investigation does not have access to the full evidence provided by the witness or that evidence could be misrepresented within a report with no means of verifying it.
During the course of the PSD investigation, the PSDIU Appropriate Authority asked a DI to perform a limited review of facts that had been presented. On conclusion of this task, a short report was provided which indicated the original responses by the subject were incorrect and open to challenge. It has become apparent that this report was not shared with the DCI of the PSD reactive team, whose responsibility it was to arrange for the matter to be re-investigated and the issues in the report addressed.
Do you accept the recommendation?
Yes
Accepted action:
Below details action taken against each bullet point issue. It should be noted that this recommendation comes several years after the investigation, and systems and practices in BTP PSD are significantly different. The regulations have changed, and the expectation of a PSD investigation is significantly different.
The IOPC recommends that British Transport Police reviews the current practice of passing investigations between different teams within the Professional Standards Department and different appropriate authority delegates and sets out clear roles and responsibilities for all those involved in carrying out a PSD investigation.
During the investigation it became apparent that two separate DCIs were performing elements of the Appropriate Authority role as part of standard practice. The DCI of the PSDIU reviewed reports and decided whether the matter should be investigated by the reactive team. The severity assessment was then made by a DCI in the reactive team. Once the investigation was complete the final report was returned to the original DCI of PSDIU. The report did not go back through the DCI of the reactive team for supervision or quality assurance. There was a lack of meaningful supervision, and no quality assurance until the report returned to the original DCI who noted gaps in enquiries.
Do you accept the recommendation?
Yes
Accepted action:
We have updated the operating practices within BTP PSD and embedded these over the past 18 months. An investigation would now only be passed to another investigating officer in exceptional circumstances. The Appropriate Authority positions are now well established, as is our scheme of delegation, and we operate a system of the initial decision maker retaining responsibility for a given investigation prior to it coming to the head of PSD if GM for determination.
The IOPC recommends that British Transport Police reviews its recruitment policy in light of the issues raised in this investigation and makes amendments to address any areas for improvement. This should include:
- ensuring that the roles, responsibilities and lines of accountability of both the HR department and the hiring manager are clear and realistic
- clearly articulating when and how potential conflicts of interest should be considered, recorded and mitigated
- clear guidance on using external participants on interview panels including what (if any) vetting is required and how any candidate information is shared with them .
As part of an IOPC investigation we reviewed British Transport Police’s recruitment policy. We found that some of the areas that came up as issues in the investigation could benefit from more clarity which may help avoid similar situations arising in future.
While the recruitment policy does set out who should perform certain tasks, this does not appear to have been adhered to, for example things which should be done by HR being done by the hiring manager or others on their team, and this was not challenged. Other obligations were not carried out at all. British Transport Police may want to consider whether a simple recruitment checklist, completed for each recruitment exercise, may assist in ensuring that all steps are taken by the appropriate person and there is clear accountability for this. Any review of roles and responsibilities needs to be realistic about what can be achieved with the resource available. For example, there seemed to be an impression that although the policy says “Where possible HR or Recruitment representatives must be included in interview panels” there were never the resources available for this.
In this investigation, an external person who had previously supported an interview panel and provided questions to them for the recruitment exercise was a candidate in the same recruitment exercise with no formally documented actions to mitigate any conflict of interest. There was also evidence of previous contact with candidates not being acknowledged or consideration given to whether there was a potential conflict of interest. This leaves recruitment open to suggestions of bias and unfairness.
An external panel member was engaged to support a recruitment process with technical however they were not vetted and were provided with personal information about candidates which could create data protection issues.
Do you accept the recommendation?
Yes
Accepted action:
Our current Police Recruitment & Selection policy was reviewed in 2019. This provides a standard operating procedure for the Police Staff Recruitment Process and the Shortlisting and Interview sub-process. This Policy described the roles and responsibilities for both the Recruitment team in People and Culture and the hiring manager within BTP, clearing laying out the expectations on the latter. We promote as good practice for a member of the recruitment or People Delivery team to be present in interviews where practicable but, this is no longer a requirement providing there is at least two members on the panel.
The IOPC recommends that British Transport Police puts in place measures to ensure that the recruitment policy is adhered to.
This follows an IOPC investigation which considered two separate recruitment exercises. Although there was a recruitment policy in place, this was deviated from in significant ways. For example, a candidate who was known to the hiring manager was interviewed without having met some of the essential requirements for the role. Certain parts of the process, for example providing candidates with feedback, were not carried out. This does not appear to have been challenged. Mechanisms to empower the HR department to monitor and enforce the recruitment policy could help to avoid such issues occurring in future.
Do you accept the recommendation?
Yes
Accepted action:
Since this case happened additional investment in Recruitment has seen extra resources in place to oversee campaigns and handling. A new Team Leader role for Police Staff recruitment is in place which provides greater supervision and oversight.
The Government Internal Audit Agency conducted a full audit of recruitment processes in 2021/22 and the audit report provided a moderate rating. All recommendations from this audit have been implemented.
Our recruitment team monitor the standard of candidate assessment both in applications and interviews by hiring managers. Where appropriate, the Strategic Resourcing Manager can require hiring managers to have additional training or for the presence of recruitment/People and Culture representatives in interviews to ensure consistently high standards.
The IOPC recommends that British Transport Police put in place a robust process for visitors to BTP premises to sign in and, where appropriate, be accompanied by a BTP employee.
The IOPC investigation examined visitor logs for BTP’s Leeds office to try to establish when certain visitors attended. It was apparent that not all visitors were signed in or accompanied when visiting BTP premises. We were told during the investigation that the signing in process was “non-existent” and a regular visitor to the office told us that they have not signed in on numerous occasions. This is not only an issue where an investigation is looking to establish facts but is also a risk for security and fire safety.
Do you accept the recommendation?
Yes
Accepted action:
BTP have had Physical Security Policies in place before and after the relevant period of Op Myall, all of which provided proportionate but robust guidance on visitor management. Had the 2015 version of our policy been followed, Recommendation 6 would not have been necessary. We fully accept that action was needed, have already strengthened greatly, and are continuing to do so as decided below:
Updates in 2020 to our Physical Security Policy, aimed to better ensure the security of BTP premises, improved specific direction on Building Security, the Management of Visitors, Incident Reporting, and Roles and Responsibilities (in addition to other areas of security control). Critically, compliance with this policy is now subject of much better governance and testing – including penetration testing.
Leeds West Gate was tested in March 2020 and both operatives were unanimous in stating that they experienced the tightest security they had ever encountered at a police building
Every site, including the relevant offices at Leeds West Gate, were subject to a full risk assessment led by our Designing Out Crime Unit (DOCU) in 2022, with work ongoing to follow up on relevant observations. Going forward, these are to be reviewed annually and scrutinised at our Force Security Group. The 2022 assessment for Leeds West gate was completed by the Sub-Division Superintended and no outstanding areas of concern remain.
The IOPC recommends that British Transport Police puts in place mechanisms to monitor deletion of documents or files from shared and personal computer drives and to recover them where appropriate.
In this investigation, allegations were made about the deletion of documentation from shared computer drives and there was suspicion that documents had been deleted from personal drives. British Transport Police were not able to confirm whether these deletions had happened which impaired our ability to carry out a thorough investigation into these allegations. Any inability to carry out such monitoring and recover files could also cause problems in relation to compliance with data protection obligations.
Do you accept the recommendation?
Yes
Accepted action:
BTP Technology has already greatly improved since the events examined by Op Myall. Supported by considerable investment, particularly since March 2020, our adoption of Cloud based storage and Microsoft Office 365 have significantly improved our ability to monitor and audit deletion of documents or files from shared and personal computers, and to recover them where appropriate (e.g. we can now do this for all e-mail for 12 months).