Investigation into the events around the selected chairperson at a proposed misconduct panel concerning an NCA officer - National Crime Agency, April 2022

In October 2021, a National Crime Agency (NCA) officer [Officer A] was involved in an off-duty incident with Merseyside Police. 

At the time of the incident, Officer A was temporarily promoted to work for a senior ranking officer [Officer 4]. Specific high-ranking NCA roles, such as Officer 4’s, have other officers (such as Officer A) to assist them with their duties. This is known as their private office.

Officer A was suspended from duty and his NCA equipment was seized as part of an investigation.

In November 2021, an NCA internal investigation concluded that Officer A had a case to answer for gross misconduct. The matter was referred to the Human Resources department to arrange a misconduct hearing. 

In January 2022, it was agreed that a senior ranking officer [Officer 3] would chair the misconduct panel for Officer A.

In February 2022, an officer [Officer 2] arranged for Officer A to be transferred into a private office role working for Officer 1, despite Officer A being suspended.

In February 2022, Officer 3 declared to the Professional Standards Unit (PSU) that he had a potential conflict of interest, as he professionally knew the father of Officer A, and requested clarification on the appropriateness of him acting as Chair.

The PSU informed Officer 3 that they were seeking an alternative person to chair the misconduct hearing. The relevant departments consulted and considered the appointment of a different Chair. 

Officer 1 became involved in the conflict of interest and authorised Officer 3 to continue to perform as Chair for the hearing.

During a break at the misconduct hearing, in which the panel retired to consider outcomes, it was alleged that Officer 3 was seen in the canteen speaking with Officer A, his father, union representative and a welfare officer. When the hearing resumed, it delivered its findings. The panel upheld a finding of gross misconduct. The sanction issued was a final written warning with a review to take place on Officer A’s vetting status. 

This matter came to our attention in April 2022 as a conduct referral and we started an independent investigation. 

Officer 1, Officer 2 and Officer 3 became subjects of our investigation. 

We specifically investigated:

• Whether Officer 1 sought to control or exert influence over the misconduct process to ensure Officer A was not dismissed, thus enabling Officer A to commence work for them.  
• Whether Officer 3 may have been party to ensuring Officer A kept his job to work for Officer 1, by continuing to chair the misconduct panel despite recognising their conflict of interest.
• Whether it was appropriate for Officer 3 to engage in conversation in the canteen with Officer A and persons they were with, prior to the misconduct panel’s decision.
• The circumstances in which Officer 2 supplied documentation to transfer Officer A to a role working for Officer 1 whilst Officer A was suspended.

Our investigation conducted more than 100 investigative actions. 

We interviewed and took statements from over 30 witnesses. We took photographs of significant locations to cross-examine accounts and assess credibility. We formally interviewed two of the subject officers and the further officer provided written accounts to assist our investigation.

We instructed examination of the subject officers’ work mobile phones, call data, laptops and tablets. We reviewed various email accounts and recovered relevant items from devices. We identified and reviewed all necessary documentation and considered all evidence against the relevant policies, procedures and legislation. 

Our investigation concluded in January 2024.

Our investigation concluded:

• The involvement and actions of Officer 1 in managing Officer 3’s conflict of interest, and agreement that Officer 3 could continue as Chair of the misconduct hearing was appropriate due to the positions they held and areas of responsibilities. 
• Officer 3 acted appropriately by declaring their conflict of interest. The subsequent decision to continue to act as Chair was accompanied by appropriate rationale after consultation with senior managers. 
• There was no evidence that Officer 1 had influenced, or had sought to influence Officer 3 or the misconduct panel members, to deliver a desired outcome. 
• There was conflicting evidence in respect of the alleged conversation in the canteen during a break at the misconduct hearing. Our investigation found the weight of the evidence suggested the conversation did not take place.
• The actions of Officer 2 to transfer Officer A into a role working for Officer 1 was authorised by relevant senior managers and complied with policies and procedures. 

We carefully considered whether there were any learning opportunities arising from the investigation. We make learning recommendations to improve policing and public confidence in the police complaints system and prevent a recurrence of similar incidents. 

We have identified several key areas for organisational improvement. These relate to policies and guidance in the management of conflicts of interest, the processes involved in a vetting review and to establish a technical solution so encrypted NCA devices are accessible to support investigations.

In addition, we identified a need to discuss whether an officer’s posting should be changed whilst suspended and if so, ensuring there is a consultation process with the Professional Standards Unit. 

Any statutory recommendations will be issued after a consultation phase with the NCA. All recommendations, and the NCA’s response to them, will be published at the appropriate time.