

DSI Operation Aragon

Investigation into the police's management of Mr Usman Khan following his release from prison

> Independent investigation report

> Investigation information

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Lead investigator:	Richard West
Case supervisor:	Ruth Bassett
Director General delegate (Decision Maker):	Adam Stacey
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> Introduction

> The purpose of this report

1. I was appointed by the IOPC to carry out an independent investigation into the police contact with Mr Usman Khan, following his release from prison after a conviction for terrorism offences and prior to his death on 29 November 2019. This came to the attention of the IOPC on 3 December 2019 as a Death or Serious Injury (DSI) referral.
2. Following an IOPC investigation, the powers and obligations of the Director General (DG) are delegated to a senior member of IOPC staff, who I will refer to as the decision maker for the remainder of this report. The decision maker for this investigation is Operations Manager Adam Stacey.
3. In this report, I will provide an accurate summary of the evidence, and attach or refer to any relevant documents. I will also set out the evidence available relating to:
 - (i) the nature and extent of the police contact with Mr Khan prior to his death, and
 - (ii) whether the police may have caused or contributed to the deaths of Mr Khan, Ms Saskia Jones, or Mr Jack Merritt
4. I will provide sufficient information to enable the decision maker to reach a decision as to whether:
 - there is an indication that any person serving with the police may have committed a criminal offence or behaved in a manner that would justify the bringing of disciplinary proceedings. If so, those matters will be investigated
 - to make a recommendation to any organisation about any lessons which may need to be learned
5. If the decision maker determines there is no indication of criminality or conduct, Staffordshire Police, who will have been sent the report, must then advise the IOPC whether or not it considers the performance of a person serving with the police to be unsatisfactory, and what action (if any) it will take in respect of any such person's performance (if required to do so by the decision maker).
6. The decision maker will then consider whether Staffordshire Police's determinations are appropriate, and decide whether to recommend that:
 - (i) the performance of any person serving with the police is or is not satisfactory; and
 - (ii) that specified action is taken in respect of any unsatisfactory performance
7. The decision maker can ultimately direct Staffordshire Police to take steps to comply with its recommendation.

> Other investigations

8. There are a number of different investigations into contact with Mr Khan following his release from prison, and the events at Fishmongers' Hall in which Mr Khan was shot by police and Mr Jack Merritt and Ms Saskia Jones were killed. These include (but are not limited to):
 - (i) Operation Richenda – IOPC investigation into the shooting of Mr Khan by police
 - (ii) Operation Bemadam – SO15 (Specialist Operations branch – Counter Terrorism Command) investigation into the terrorist attack and circumstances leading up to it
 - (iii) National Probation Service (NPS) Serious Further Offence Review
 - (iv) MAPPA (Multi-agency public protection arrangements) Serious Case Review
 - (v) The Security Service's (MI5) post-attack review
 - (vi) Inquests into the deaths of Mr Merritt, Ms Jones, and Mr Khan
9. At the outset of this investigation, the lead investigator, case supervisor and decision maker met with the chairs of the Serious Further Offence Review and the MAPPA Serious Case Review. The lead investigator has maintained regular contact with the Senior Investigating Officer (SIO) for Operation Bemadam and his team throughout the investigation, as well as maintaining regular contact with the solicitors to the inquest.
10. The final report for Operation Richenda was completed and finalised by the decision maker for the case, Adam Stacey, on 27 November 2020.

> The investigation

> Terms of reference

11. Adam Stacey approved the terms of reference for this investigation on 22 January 2020. The terms of reference can be seen in full in appendix two, however, in brief they are:
12. To investigate Staffordshire Police's involvement in the decision to allow Mr Khan to travel to London unaccompanied, including:
 - a) what their duties and responsibilities were in relation to his travel arrangements to attend the 'Learning Together' event in London
 - b) what relevant policies, protocols or procedures were in place
 - c) what information they were aware of in relation to the assessment of Mr. Khan's risk, subsequent to his release from imprisonment and whether that was shared with the relevant agencies

> Background information

13. During the investigation, it became clear from the outset that there were no established policies or procedures in place for how the management by police of terrorism offenders should happen, either within Staffordshire Police or nationally. In this section of the report, background information will be provided covering Mr Khan (including his offences and psychologist reports), the restrictions he was subject to on his release from prison, the decision for the Prevent team in Staffordshire to manage offenders such as him and the roles of various areas of policing with respect to Mr Khan.

> Mr Khan - offences

14. Mr Khan was sentenced on 9 February 2012 at Woolwich Crown Court after pleading guilty to an offence under Section 5 of the Terrorism Act 2006. This section of the act states, *“A person commits an offence if, with the intention of*
 - (a) committing acts of terrorism, or*
 - (b) assisting another to commit such acts,**he engages in any conduct in preparation for giving effect to his intention.”*
15. In the sentencing remarks of Judge M, he stated the following: *“The first defendants to plead guilty were 3 of the Stoke defendants, Usman Khan [and two others] who pleaded guilty to count 9. The basis of that plea was as follows: first, they were trying to raise funds to build a Madrassa [an educational institution] beside an already existing Mosque in Kashmir: second, the long term plan included making the Madrassa available for men who would be fighting to bring Sharia to Kashmir in Pakistan: third, the plan included some, including at least one of the Stoke defendants, being able to have fire arms [sic] training in or around the Madrassa; fourth, they did not intend to participate in an act of terrorism in the UK in the immediate future. Fifth, they contemplated that, once trained, they might return to the UK and engage in some sort of terrorist activity but there was no timetable, no targets identified, nor any method agreed. The Crown on its part agreed that it would not allege that those defendants were criminally liable as participants, either primary or secondary, in the planned attack on the London Stock Exchange, and would not allege that any defendant was party to a plan to carry out any other attack in the UK in the immediate future.”*
16. Judge M further stated, *“The Crown’s position was that these three defendants [Usman Khan and two others] were part of the group of 9 formed in October 2010 to decide how best to further the Jihadist cause including planning for acts of terrorism. Meetings on the 7th November and 12th December were intended to further this and were conducted within Section 5. Different proposals were considered, but in the event two plans emerged, the attack on the Stock Exchange and the plan of the Stoke defendants identified in their basis of plea. Each part of the group was aware of the plan of the other and the matters were discussed freely. The group continued to function until the arrests as a forum for discussion of possible courses of action... The*

Crown contended that these defendants contemplated that some of those trained would commit their acts of terrorism abroad but that others might return to the UK and commit them here but accepted that nothing had been agreed as to timetable, target or method. Further the Crown accepted that, after going to Kashmir, experiences there might mean that no such activity would have actually taken place in the UK.”

17. Finally, Judge M explained that it was clear to him Mr Khan’s intention was to attend the Madrassa, and he was keen to perform acts of terrorism in Kashmir. He also stated it was clear that, once he and other recruits had been trained and gained experience in Kashmir, they may return to the UK to perform acts of violent terrorism. He explained that it was clear this was a *“serious, long term, venture in terrorism the purpose of which was to establish and manage a terrorist training facility at the Madrassa, to fundraise for its construction and operation by the use of various means, including fraud, and to recruit young British Muslims to go there and train, thereafter being available to commit terrorism abroad and at home.”*
18. Mr Khan was given a sentence of imprisonment for public protection (IPP), with the minimum term served before release considered set as eight years, less time served on remand. On appeal, his original sentence was quashed and instead he was given an extended sentence of 21 years, comprising a total custodial sentence of 16 years imprisonment, less the time served on remand, and an extension period of five years to his licence when released.

> Mr Khan – psychologist reports

19. While in prison, Mr Khan took part in Extremism Risk Guidelines (ERG22+) assessments with Forensic Psychologists, who wrote reports following the conclusion of those assessments. The most recent report prior to his release was written by Ms Ieva Cechaviciute and dated 30 April 2018. Ms Cechaviciute outlined that the first ERG22+ assessment had been completed in 2013 and updated in 2014. A further ERG22+ assessment had been completed in 2016. Ms Cechaviciute’s report in 2018 stated that the ERG22+ is *“a set of Structured Professional Guidelines for assessing risk in those engaged and involved in extremist offending.”*
20. The report by Ms Cechaviciute was based on interviews with Mr Khan, files kept in relation to him, case notes and information from the security department. There were also discussions with various people who knew Mr Khan in prison, including his offender manager, imams and other prison staff.
21. Protective factors given by the report included Mr Khan’s capacity for empathy, interest in employment, positive life goals, potential for pro-social relationships and the availability of professional care.
22. This report went into detail about the information on which it was based and gave an assessment of the risk posed by Mr Khan. It also provided a non-exhaustive list of 14 warning signs for him, including:
 - (a) feeling of lack of purpose in life and loss of focus on pro-social goals
 - (b) growing feelings of injustice, thinking that he is being persecuted or treated unfairly
 - (c) unemployment, lack of focus and needing to support himself financially

- (d) boredom, feeling lost about what to do
 - (e) not talking to others when feeling vulnerable
 - (f) spending time with peers and being secretive about it
 - (g) going through a transitional time in his life, for example, trying to adjust to new living circumstances, coping with setbacks, relationship difficulties
23. The report gave a list of 15 “*Offence replacement behaviours*”, described as “*pro-social alternative behaviours that should be encouraged in order to aid with Mr Khan’s risk management in the community.*” These included:
- (a) not associating with individuals that hold extremist beliefs
 - (b) pursuing long-term pro-social goals, such as stable employment
 - (c) practicing healthy ways to cope with emotions associated with perceived injustice
 - (d) engaging meaningfully with professionals working on his risk management and rehabilitation in the community
 - (e) finding healthy ways to cope with boredom/unstructured time (for example, engaging in leisure pursuits, hobbies)
 - (f) using legal and legitimate means to redress injustice
24. Finally, the report gave various recommendations, on both “*risk-management interventions*” and “*rehabilitative interventions*”. The risk-management interventions included:
- (a) high-level monitoring of Mr Khan’s associations as well as his internet activity
 - (b) providing assistance with finding employment and supporting himself when struggling financially
 - (c) providing assistance with occupying leisure time
 - (d) open discussions between Mr Khan and professionals working with him about his progress.
25. The rehabilitative interventions included:
- (a) *“It is recommended that Mr Khan’s work with professionals on release also focuses on developing his protective factors and encouraging offence replacement behaviours. Mr Khan may also need additional support with coping with stress linked to his transition to the community, any setbacks he may face in trying to achieve his goals or if he is struggling to maintain structure in his life.”*

> Part 4 Counter-Terrorism Act 2008

26. Part 4 of the Counter-Terrorism Act (CTA) 2008 imposes notification requirements on people convicted and sentenced in respect of certain offences. Section 41(d) confirms that one of those offences is Section 5 Terrorism Act 2006, the offence for which Mr Khan was convicted.
27. On his release from prison, the legislation outlines that Mr Khan had to notify police of his:

- (a) Date of birth
 - (b) National Insurance number
 - (c) Name at the time of being sentenced
 - (d) Name at the time of notification
 - (e) Address at the time of being sentenced
 - (f) Address at the time of notification
 - (g) Any other address at which he resided
28. The Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 added further requirements, including:
- (a) all contact details at the time of being sentenced
 - (b) all contact details at the time of notification
 - (c) identifying information of any vehicle that Mr Khan was the registered keeper for or had a right to use
 - (d) specific financial information (including account number, sort code, card number, expiry date, etc., for each bank account)
 - (e) specific information regarding identification documents
29. The legislation also outlines that Mr Khan would have to notify police of any changes to these details and would have to re-notify police of the above details every year.
30. Section 54 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 explains that it would be an offence to fail, without reasonable excuse, to comply with the requirements under this act. A person found guilty of this offence could be sentenced to up to five years imprisonment.
31. The Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 also introduced the power to apply for a warrant, if necessary, to enter the premises to assess the risks posed by a person subject to notification requirements, and if there had been two occasions when a constable had sought entry to the address in order to search them but been unable to gain entry.
32. Throughout this report, frequent reference will be made to notification or Part 4 requirements (i.e. the information Mr Khan was required to provide and his requirement to provide this information initially, every year, and when any of it changed) and Part 4 offenders, or just Part 4s (i.e. those offenders who have committed an offence which means they are subject to the above notification requirements).

> Licence conditions

33. Mr Khan's licence on release from prison showed that he was initially subject to various conditions as part of being released from custody. These included (but were not limited to):
- (a) residing at an Approved Premises (AP)

- (b) not undertaking work without permission of the supervising officer
 - (c) complying with any requirements specified by the supervising officer for the purpose of addressing his offending behaviour or rehabilitation
 - (d) surrendering his passport
 - (e) not accessing a computer or device which is internet enabled without the approval of his supervising officer
 - (f) not deleting the usage history of his mobile phone, and allowing police to inspect it
 - (g) not entering any airport, port or railway station without the approval of his supervising officer
 - (h) complying with curfew and sign-on times at the AP
 - (i) allowing himself to be fitted with an electronic monitoring tag
34. While complying with his Part 4 requirements was not a specific licence condition, he did have a licence condition not to commit any offences and breaching his Part 4 requirements would have been committing an offence.
35. Approved premises, created in the Offender Management Act 2007, are premises approved by the Secretary of State, in which accommodation is provided for people on bail in criminal proceedings, and for (or in connection with) the supervision or rehabilitation of persons convicted of offences.

> **Decision for Prevent to take on the management of Mr Khan**

36. Senior officer F, a member of Staffordshire Police Leadership team, provided a statement dated 17 July 2020 in response to questions from the IOPC, in relation to the structure and governance of how Mr Khan was managed and Staffordshire Police's position, locally and regionally, regarding Mr Khan.
37. Senior officer F explained that counter-terrorism policing for the West Midlands region is provided by West Midlands Counter-Terrorism Unit (WMCTU), operated by West Midlands Police (WMP), with close collaboration with Staffordshire Police, Warwickshire Police and West Mercia Police, who operate Special Branch (SB) functions. Senior Officer F outlined that Part 4 offenders within WMP area would be managed by Team 7 in WMCTU. For Part 4 offenders in the region but outside the WMP area, they would be managed by the local force. Within Staffordshire Police, Senior Officer F explained that this role was provided by the Prevent team. However, Team 7 retained an overview of all Part 4 offenders in the region and also attended Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA) meetings.
38. The Prevent team in Staffordshire Police consisted of Officer A, Officer B, Officer D and Officer C. Officer D was not part of Prevent, due to a temporary promotion, between March 2019 and November 2019. They all wrote statements dated 4 December 2019 (Officer D, Officer C) or 5 December 2019 (Officer B, Officer A) as part of a post-incident procedure. The IOPC then interviewed them all between 30 September and 2 October 2020. As a result, they provided further statements dated 27 November 2020 (Officer A), 5 January 2021 (Officer D), 8 January 2021 (Officer C) and 2 February 2021 (Officer B). These statements will be referred to as 'initial'

statements (those written in 2019) and ‘further’ statements (those completed after interview by the IOPC), for the purpose of this report.

39. The IOPC lead investigator asked Staffordshire Police for a rationale as to why Prevent officers were chosen to manage Mr Khan. Senior officer K, for the Investigations Directorate at Staffordshire Police, responded via email. He explained that there was no nationally accredited qualification for how Part 4s should be managed, and it was done differently across the country, with the MAPPA process being the common theme. He also stated that Part 4 management sat within the MAPPA process, of which Prevent formed part. Officer A clarified in his further statement that Prevent only attended MAPPA in specific cases, where there was overlap.
40. Senior Officer K stated that Prevent were trained in a number of different fields relating to radicalisation and they worked with partner agencies involved in this case. He explained that if somebody had been deemed to be de-radicalised and released from prison under Part 4, Prevent could be considered the best resources to see the signs of re-radicalisation, as this was what they did on a daily basis.
41. Senior Officer K also explained that the government’s Prevent strategy highlights Prevent as being able to respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism, prevent people being drawn into terrorism and work with sectors and institutions where the risk of that exists. He stated these are all key components of managing a Part 4 offender.
42. Senior Officer K outlined that Prevent regularly work with the multi-agency partners involved with MAPPA on a regular basis, which would make them best placed as part of the multi-agency response. He mentioned that Prevent work with communities, they are the “*eyes and ears on the ground in community engagement,*” and have links to people that the Part 4 offenders have previously associated with. Senior Officer K added that there was a “*natural ethical corridor*” between the Prevent team managing Part 4 offenders and any other intelligence. This meant that Prevent would not be aware of any covert activity being undertaken, so the risk of them accidentally making Mr Khan aware of it would be lower.
43. Finally, Senior Officer K identified that Mr Khan was only the second Part 4 offender released in Staffordshire. Once more Part 4s started to be released, a mechanism was put in place to transfer the existing Part 4s over to Team 7 at WMCTU, and for new Part 4s to be managed by Team 7 from the outset. He stated this was in order to have a consistent approach and was not necessarily about better trained or differently accredited staff managing the Part 4s.
44. Senior Officer K provided a report for the IOPC, dated 8 March 2021. He described being verbally briefed on how Mr Khan would be managed. He had no concerns about it, given that the previous Part 4 had been dealt with for a breach by Prevent, then prosecuted by WMCTU. He wasn’t aware of any issues raised about the management of that offender, and he was aware that Officer A, who managed the previous Part 4, was still in Prevent.
45. Assistant Chief Constable (ACC) Matthew Ward of WMP provided a statement dated 18 December 2020 to describe the structure within the West Midlands region for how

convicted terrorist offenders were managed at the time of the incident at Fishmongers' Hall, and to explain the roles of WMCTU and WMP within this structure.

46. ACC Ward described the management of Registered Terrorist Offenders as being *"just one part of PREVENT management (now known as CT nominal management). This PREVENT management seeks to prevent risk individuals [sic] from engaging or re-engaging in extremist activity and working with partners to integrate, re-integrate or rehabilitate both convicted and non-convicted individuals."*
47. ACC Ward explained that, prior to October 2019, management of Part 4 offenders fell outside of a formal collaboration agreement between the four forces in the West Midlands region. Responsibility for this therefore fell to the host force to whom they were released. ACC Ward stated that he wasn't aware of when the Prevent team were chosen to manage the Part 4 offenders, but this wasn't inconsistent with other forces around the country. West Mercia Police managed their sole Part 4 offender jointly between their SB and Crime Offender Managers.
48. Officer A explained that this was a role that could have been taken on by Team 7 within WMCTU, or sex offender managers, but in his opinion, there wasn't any desire for it to change. He stated that it was only when he spoke to the regional Prevent lead that it was ultimately changed to Team 7. Mr Khan was due to be handed over to Team 7 in December 2019. Officer A couldn't recall whether Mr Khan was aware of this but thought it was likely that he would have let Mr Khan know.
49. Officer D, in her further statement, described some discussion in their office about the Part 4 role being at odds with the Prevent role, due to Prevent being pre-criminal and Mr Khan having been convicted of a terrorism offence. She described it as being *"a bit bizarre"* that they were trusted to manage someone *"so high up in the 'food chain'"*.
50. Officer B stated that he hadn't been given any specific training for managing Part 4s or carrying out risk assessments in this area, and the question was regularly asked in the Prevent office as to why Team 7 at WMCTU weren't undertaking this role.
51. ACC Ward explained that in September 2019, Team 7 proposed that they should have responsibility for all Part 4 offenders in the region, due to an increase in the number of offenders in Staffordshire and their role as a specialist team in this area. This was accepted by the WMCTU Head of Investigations and various Heads of SBs, and the Part 4 offenders were transferred between October and December 2019. Mr Khan was the last one due to be transferred, on 11 December 2019. This proposal shows that there were *"concerns around the consistency"* in the region regarding the approach to Part 4s, and that since WMCTU already took responsibility for priority operations [investigations by the Security Service (MI5) and Counter-Terrorism (CT) policing], it was proposed that Team 7 took on full ownership of Part 4s.
52. Officer E, at Staffordshire Police, provided a statement to the IOPC dated 5 January 2021, in response to a list of questions. He stated that shortly after becoming Head of SB, he requested to the Head of Investigations at WMCTU that Team 7 take over management of the Registered Terrorist Offenders, on or around 21 October 2019. This was agreed with WMCTU. In a further statement, dated 8 February 2021, in response to questions from the IOPC, Officer E clarified that any previous suggestion about Team 7 taking on this role did not involve him nor was it known to him.

> Working practices of Team 7, WMCTU

53. ACC Ward outlined in his statement that Team 7 offered advice and guidance to the Prevent team, including understanding and the use of Part 4 legislation, the use of risk management plans, conducting face-to-face meetings with Part 4 offenders and managing exhibits. In addition, in March 2019 they had a meeting to provide an overview of the Team 7 offender management processes.
54. ACC Ward described the way that Team 7 conducted their role, managing the Part 4 offenders in the West Midlands Police force area. He stated this task was initially done within Prevent in their area, primarily by Prevent officers, before it became clear that the team required greater investigative experience and Team 7 was created. He explained that *“the role of Team 7 was to obtain intelligence to help assess risk and support rehabilitation; to ensure compliance with Part 4 requirements and gather evidence to assist the prosecution of any breaches; and to identify opportunities to mitigate any threats posed by a Terrorist Offender.”* He stated that, as of November 2019, there was no training for this role and there was no Authorised Professional Practice (APP) issued by the College of Policing.
55. Despite the fact that there was no APP, Team 7 developed a clear process. They appointed a lead *“Offender Manager”* in sufficient time to attend all MAPPA meetings, engage with the NPS and prison service, and build up a subject profile. They would work with NPS to get bespoke licence conditions, which meant Team 7 officers collected the offender from prison. They then completed the Part 4 registration at a police station and escorted the offender to an AP, where they were fitted with a GPS tag.
56. ACC Ward added that Team 7 would use intelligence from CT Policing, to conduct risk assessments and determine how frequent visits would be, usually one or two times a week upon release. This would remain until any risk was mitigated. Team 7 recorded all interactions with the offender on a case management system. They also developed *“Trigger Plans”* which outlined the police response in the event of removal of the GPS tag or a breach of licence conditions.
57. Finally, ACC Ward stated that all Team 7 officers could covertly carry police issued Taser devices, and received advanced driver training to enable them to react at pace, if circumstances meant it was necessary to do so.

> Management of first Part 4 offender (RTO1) by Prevent

58. Officer A explained that in 2015 he became aware of a convicted Terrorism Act (TACT) offender, referred to hereafter as RTO1 (Registered Terrorist Offender 1), who would be leaving prison and moving to Staffordshire. He stated that following discussions between Prevent, Staffordshire Police SB and WMCTU, a decision was made that Prevent would be responsible for the Part 4 management of RTO1.
59. Officer A stated that it was apparent that there were no established practices or procedures in place within Staffordshire Police for how this management should take

place. He was tasked by the Head of SB to formalise the process and create a policy. He said that he met with WMCTU, asked about the role, asked for their “documents” [i.e. policies etc. that they used] and made them specific to Staffordshire Police. Senior Officer K, in his report for the IOPC, explained that the Prevent officers adopted the same process of Part 4 management as WMCTU, who had a process in place.

60. The IOPC has only seen one policy created in this process by Officer A. Officer A explained that he received no feedback on the policy document he created after sending it to the Head of SB, so he worked to it. He said that he did not believe it was ever adopted as an official policy of Staffordshire Police.
61. The policy, whose subject was, “*The Management of Nominals subject to Part 4 Terrorism Act 2008 Registration and Notification Requirements*”, is dated 16 July 2015. It set out the background for the policy, that being the registration and notification requirements set out by legislation. It outlined that the primary aims of the Prevent team’s engagement with Registered Terrorist Offenders would be to protect the public from risk and ensure compliance with Part 4 of the Counter-Terrorism Act (CTA) 2008. It explained the benefit of police having dialogue with offenders, both for managing risk and helping with various other issues the offender has. It also provided the legal justification for visiting Part 4 offenders in their homes and sets out the role of MAPPA. Finally, it outlines that the “*Priority Threat Assessment Indicators of Extremism*” document should be completed, and that visits should be every six months, three months, or every month depending on whether the outcome of that assessment is weak, moderate or strong respectively.
62. The policy does not set out any training that is required or identify anything specific which would affect the risk posed by the Part 4 offender, beyond the above document.
63. Officer A explained, in his further statement, that he never received any training for how he should undertake Part 4 management. He made clear in his statement that this was a separate task from any Prevent work and was not managed as a Prevent case. It was an additional piece of work, beyond Prevent.
64. Officer A stated that, despite the lack of policy, procedures, or training, he felt confident managing RTO1. He said he felt “*confident in [his] own abilities, and that [he’d] be able to work through it and figure it out. It just involved an evolution, [he] learnt as [he] went along.*” He stated that he never felt hampered by the lack of training and doubts he would have done anything differently, had he had any training.
65. Officer A set out in his initial statement that RTO1 breached his Part 4 notification requirements and was then arrested for involvement in another plot. Officer A was asked by the Senior Investigating Officer (SIO) at WMCTU to put together a chronology of the Prevent team’s contact with this offender, in advance of his trial.
66. Officer A outlined in this document that RTO1 had been known to him from Prevent work, before he was convicted. RTO1 was released from prison to an AP in Birmingham and recalled by the National Probation Service (NPS) twice, before ultimately completing his sentence and being released from prison back to Staffordshire. He was out of prison for 10 months before breaching his notification requirements, then was arrested and ultimately convicted for his involvement in another terrorism plot.

67. Officer A explained that based on the policy on managing Part 4 nominals, monthly visits were conducted with RTO1, or regular phone calls if visits were not possible. Prevent were involved with MAPPA from the start and Officer A explained they were *“fully informed and felt very much a contributing partner to the process.”* However, Officer A explained that Part 4 is limited legislation and is reliant on the individual complying with visits that aren't legally binding. Officer A also stated in the chronology document he prepared that, *“Within Staffordshire Police, it is the Prevent team that will manage individuals who are subject to Part 4 CTA 2008 but there is no Risk Assessor training to support this in the same way that ViSOM's get Risk Assessor training. In my view this is an area that should be looked at.”* Officer A explained that based on no training ever being given, he assumed this document probably wasn't considered.
68. In his further statement, Officer A explained that RTO1 and Mr Khan were like *“chalk and cheese”*. RTO1 was obstructive, secretive, and evasive. Officer A described him as constantly negotiating visits and asking when they would be reduced. Mr Khan was the complete opposite and always accepting of visits. Officer A explained that *“What happened with [RTO1] didn't affect how I would go on to deal with KHAN, other than we were told that we should just gather evidence of any notification breach and hand it over to Team 7, as opposed to putting together the file ourselves.”*

> **Role of Staffordshire Police Prevent Officers with respect to Mr Khan**

69. Having dealt with the previous Part 4, Officer A explained that it set a precedent when Mr Khan came out. There was never any meeting to tell Officer A what to do and Prevent were not given a briefing on Mr Khan before taking him on. They did, however, have a meeting with Team 7, the team in WMCTU responsible for Part 4 management in West Midlands Police force area. Officer A stated that Prevent raised that they didn't think they should be dealing with Part 4s at all. However, Officer A stated Team 7 told him they did not have capacity and it would put a strain on their staff. He also explained that Prevent's role with Part 4s ended up feeling disjointed, as they felt like an *“extra link in the chain”* that wasn't necessary.
70. In his further statement, Officer A described the role with Mr Khan in detail. He explained that neither Prevent nor Part 4 management constituted offender management, which was undertaken by the NPS, in the case of Part 4s. The Part 4 role was *“simply making sure that an offender doesn't breach certain rules, it is not offender management.”* Officer A emphasised that managing Part 4 offenders, as it was done by Prevent, was not about the detection of impending terrorist acts or atrocities.
71. Officer A also clarified that Mr Khan was not a Prevent subject, in terms of being referred to them as being vulnerable, the usual pathway to contact with Prevent. The Part 4 role was separate from that of Prevent.
72. Officer A explained that his understanding of the role was that they were managing the Part 4 requirements and ensuring Mr Khan complied with them. In addition, they would meet with him and provide updates to the relevant parties on any engagement they had with him, how well he was engaging, his mood etc. He stated he was always

clear that they were not decision makers. They could give their opinion, but NPS, or MAPPA, always had the final say.

73. Officer A explained that they would write an email report of their meeting with Mr Khan to send to SB, copy and paste it onto ViSOR (Violent and Sex Offender Register) and put it onto the Staffordshire Police Intelligence Network (SPIN). ViSOR is a system used for managing violent and sexual offenders. Officer D stated that *“For Prevent cases, we might go to the north of the county and visit three people, but with Khan we would always go back and write it up. We wanted to make sure it was all done correctly.”*
74. Officer A also outlined that the 2008 and 2019 acts, described above, did not give the Prevent team any legal authority or powers in respect of Mr Khan. They would have had powers if Mr Khan breached his Part 4 requirements, but even then, it wouldn't be clear that there was a necessity to arrest him. It could just be investigated as a crime, without an arrest. If he breached his licence conditions, it would require NPS to process a recall before they could arrest him.
75. Officer A stated he dealt with Mr Khan as a Prevent officer and made sure he was compliant with Part 4. Team 7 wanted Prevent to meet with Mr Khan weekly, so they did, but Officer A explained, *“[Mr Khan] would have known that the visits were outside Part 4 and he could say no to them, unless we had another power we could use. We, the Prevent team, were just trying to comply with what we were told to do. We knew people wanted intel from our visits with him, so we did visit him regularly, to feed that back.”*
76. In discussing the role they were performing with respect to Mr Khan, Officer A stated, *“we were just a source of information, almost like the eyes and the ears, which could be important later down the line. We didn't do any decision making or assessment, we would just pass everything on.”* In addition to the reports of Prevent engagements sent to SB, Officer A's emails show that he forwarded on emails including: weekly GPS tag reports; updates from NPS (when received); details of Mr Khan's driving licence, National Insurance number, Xbox and SIM card; updates to Mr Khan's curfew; potential addresses for him to move into; and details of at least one job interview.
77. Officer A mentioned in his initial statement that Mr Khan described feeling well supported by Prevent. In his further statement, he explained, *“I think this was partly because we were always in touch with him. We tried to unblock barriers for him where we could, by talking to Probation Officer O [Mr Khan's probation officer at NPS] or otherwise, if we could sort it then we would do. We probably did a lot more than legislation would have us do, but that just felt right to us. We met with him regularly, we bought him a coffee and we had a chat with him. That said, we also made it clear to him, if he did offend, we would lock him up, but we didn't want to have to. It was also always clear that between us and Probation Officer O, it was a team effort.”*
78. In terms of Prevent's role in comparison with the role of Probation Officer O, Officer A explained that Probation Officer O always had primacy for Mr Khan. The licence conditions were managed by the NPS and Probation Officer O was the offender manager, he would be the one invoking the recall to prison if necessary.

79. Officer A explained that contact between him and Probation Officer O was “as and when”. They agreed at the outset to communicate well with each other and Officer A was happy with the information sharing. He stated that Probation Officer O would run things past him, as they were the two people who met and engaged with Mr Khan the most. He explained that this was as a “sounding board”, as opposed to seeking approval. Probation Officer O, in a statement dated 11 February 2021, stated that they spoke to each other “more or less on a daily basis.”
80. Officer D, in her further statement, explained that “None of the training courses I have been on have had any relevance to the role of managing Part 4 offenders... In my opinion, the experience of being a police officer and talking to people is much more applicable to the Part 4 role than any training. We weren’t really given much of a role with Part 4s – people know that we chat to people, so we were told to go and chat to them and knew we had to check that he was complying with the set out Part 4 regulations.” Officer D added that it wasn’t a significant change of behaviour for them, they just also had to ensure Part 4 was adhered to, and report back on the chat.
81. Officer D added that whoever was available in their office would go on the visits. She described the role as feeling “a bit woolly overall” as it was clearly more than just ensuring the Part 4 compliance, but it was never explained what they needed to do. They would just email the information to SB and put information on SPIN.
82. Officer B was assigned as the offender manager on the ViSOR system. In practice, he stated that this just meant he arranged the meetings and ensured ViSOR was updated. In respect of the lack of training, Officer B explained that, “it was really that we felt unaware of what the role was supposed to be, and whether we were carrying it out correctly. We never got any confirmation that we were doing the right thing... There just wasn’t any framework to say what was expected of us. It wasn’t the case that we didn’t know what we were doing, we are very used to engaging with people through the policing role and the Prevent role, so we just did that.”
83. The training records of the Prevent officers shows that they were not trained as advanced drivers or trained to covertly carry Taser. Officer B referenced in his statement that he questioned why Team 7 had Tasers, and whether Prevent should wear covert stab vests, but was just told “it would be looked into.”
84. Officer D, Officer C and Officer B had little contact with the other agencies involved. The majority of contact between the Prevent team and the NPS, Learning Together, or anyone else was handled by Officer A.

> Role of Staffordshire Police Special Branch

85. In her statement, Senior Officer F said, “The work of Special Branch is described as the ‘Golden Thread’ between national security agencies and local policing (Guidelines on Special Branch work in the United Kingdom 2004).”
86. At the time of the events at Fishmongers’ Hall on 29 November 2019, Senior Officer F explained that Staffordshire Police SB broadly consisted of the Fixed Intelligence Management Unit (FIMU), which handled the receipt and assessment of intelligence relating to Counter-Terrorism; Operational Intelligence Management Unit (OIMU),

which handled local intelligence support of sanctioned priority operations within the county; Dedicated Source Unit (DSU), which managed Covert Human Intelligence Sources in relation to Counter-Terrorism; and Office Administration, which managed the secure telecommunication and intelligence systems. Senior Officer F also stated that, *“there exists ‘joint equity’ for the intelligence management of Staffordshire based priority operations. WMCTU are the lead OIMU and have primary responsibility under an appointed WMCTU SIO, whilst Staffordshire Police Special Branch OIMU provide local support.”* Senior Officer F later explained that Registered Terrorist Offenders [such as Mr Khan] could be subject to priority investigations by the Security Service and CT Policing. A WMCTU SIO would be appointed and the WMCTU Head of Investigations would have oversight.

87. Senior Officer K clarified to the IOPC that *“SB function was in simple terms an intelligence arm for WMCTU and was tasked by the WMCTU through the daily management structure. Staffordshire SB did not have an investigative arm as that was always managed by WMCTU.”* Senior Officer K also added that while the line management of SB was within Staffordshire Police, most CT tasking came from WMCTU.
88. Officer E stated that, at the time of Mr Khan’s release from prison, he was the temporary Head of SB. Between January 2019 and October 2019 he was the Detective Sergeant (DS) in charge of the OIMU. On 7 October 2019, he became the substantive Head of SB. Officer E explained that when he was the DS in charge of the OIMU, Officer H was the Head of SB and Officer G was a Detective Constable (at the time) on his team.
89. Officer E explained that the OIMU provided local intelligence support to WMCTU. This meant his team received and assessed information from covert and overt sources, administered it onto the relevant IT platforms, and ensured it was shared with WMCTU and the Security Service. As an example, he said *“intelligence which may not have been immediately visible to WMCTU colleagues (due to different IT systems and accesses or that obtained from local partners such as local authority, probation or housing) would be shared.”* Officer E also mentioned that his team would be represented at operational meetings which took place.
90. Officer G explained in a statement dated 7 January 2021 that the OIMU responsibilities included intelligence development, in force engagement, providing analytical support, identifying intelligence gaps and registering, assessing and disseminating material to partners. In this particular case, SB had responsibility for creating, registering and disseminating the reports from Prevent engagements with Mr Khan with WMCTU. Other information provided via Prevent, such as mentor reports and electronic tag data, was reviewed, registered and disseminated by SB. When he was the DC on the team, Officer G had the day-to-day management responsibility for Mr Khan’s case.
91. ACC Ward’s statement gave a description of the various areas of responsibility for SBs. This included intelligence management, specifically, receiving and jointly assessing any local terrorism or domestic extremism intelligence reports, to determine whether they need further investigation, and providing local, operational intelligence in support of WMCTU counter-terrorism investigations within the force area. ACC Ward outlined that, operationally, SBs and WMCTU work incredibly close together.

92. Officer H provided a statement dated 18 December 2020, in response to questions from the IOPC. He explained that the OIMU are “*responsible for the ongoing management of local matters in relation to... Priority Operations.*” However, he emphasised that the Security Service would lead on these matters until any overt police action occurred.
93. Officer H explained that for Priority Investigations, whilst the WMCTU have an OIMU department, when an investigation has strong links to Staffordshire then the Staffordshire OIMU becomes an integral part of the intelligence management process, due to the local aspects of it.
94. With respect to Prevent, Officer E stated that Prevent officers would provide updates, from their own engagements or from other sources, to SB. SB would assess those updates and share them with WMCTU. Alternatively, SB or WMCTU may task Prevent officers to try and obtain certain information, for example with respect to movements or lifestyle details.
95. Officer A explained that, in his understanding, Team 7 had oversight of Mr Khan’s Part 4 management and licence conditions, and SB were the local conduit for information sharing between Prevent and WMCTU. He stated that Prevent shared all of their information with SB.
96. ACC Ward stated that, in April 2020, direction and control of SBs was transferred to WMCTU.
97. Officer H explained that, when he joined as Head of SB in 2016, he was first line manager to the Sergeant in Prevent. However, when he returned from a secondment in January 2019, he was made aware the responsibility for Prevent had transferred to the Neighbourhoods and Partnerships Directorate, and he was no longer the line manager. He continued to oversee the general HR functions of the department and remained available to staff to provide support and assistance. Officer E stated he was informed by Officer H, after taking over as Head of SB, that Officer A did not fall under his line management.
98. Officer A stated that, for most of the time he was involved with Mr Khan, his line manager was effectively Officer H, and then Officer E. He stated that he would have regular catch ups with Officer H and give him updates. Officer A explained that, at the end of 2018, he was told that Prevent would come under Neighbourhoods and Partnerships. However, no formal line management structure was put in place, and the reality was that the Head of SB continued with his day-to-day management. Officer A stated his next line manager was technically a Superintendent, “*who in reality wouldn’t have any detailed knowledge of my day-to-day work and actual cases.*” Officer E stated that, since the events of Fishmongers’ Hall brought the line management of Officer A into focus, WMCTU Prevent now manage him.
99. Senior Officer K explained the rationale for moving Prevent away from the SB line management structure. He described the differences between the Prevent role and the SB, emphasising the community aspect of Prevent which fell outside the core functions of SB. He also outlined the benefits of distance between SB and Prevent, in terms of engagement with the community.

> Role of West Midlands Counter-Terrorism Unit

100. ACC Ward of West Midlands Police explained that WMCTU was a regional collaboration formed in 2007 between the four police forces in the West Midlands region. The intention was for it to be a multi-disciplinary unit drawing on a wide range of expertise, to respond appropriately to complex and extensive counter-terrorism investigations.
101. ACC Ward outlined that WMCTU led in the region on the 'PURSUE' part of the national counter-terrorism strategy. This meant that WMCTU would lead any counter-terrorism investigations in the region. WMCTU also co-ordinated for the region for 'PREVENT', 'PROTECT' and 'PREPARE', the other three objectives of the national counter-terrorism strategy. A key part of leading on 'PURSUE' included working with the Security Service to "conduct investigations into individuals residing within the West Midlands region who were deemed to pose a threat to national security."
102. ACC Ward stated that WMCTU and Staffordshire Police SB had agreed that a breach of notification requirements would be investigated by WMCTU as a counter-terrorism investigation.
103. ACC Ward explained that whilst WMCTU had no direct management of Staffordshire MAPPA cases, they would attend the meetings to offer advice and guidance. They would act as a critical friend for any proposed changes in licence conditions or management decisions. ACC Ward stated there were 26 Registered Terrorist Offenders within the West Midlands Police force area, compared to two in Staffordshire, in November 2019.
104. ACC Ward stated that counter-terrorism investigations led by WMCTU were known as Priority Investigations and were commenced by the Security Service, who have primacy in the UK for preventing terrorism. The WMCTU Head of Investigations would oversee them, and would appoint a Counter Terrorism Senior Investigating Officer (CTSIO) at an early stage. The Security Service would have responsibility for the intelligence development, whilst the police would be responsible for any overt actions, such as arrest or prosecution.
105. Officer A stated that the Prevent team had a reasonable working relationship with Team 7 at WMCTU, but this was mainly through SB and seeing them at MAPPA. His understanding was that WMCTU were the investigative side for any breach of Part 4, for investigation and prosecution. He described them as being "extensively involved" at MAPPA.

> Learning Together

106. Dr Amy Ludlow and Dr Ruth Armstrong are the founders of Learning Together, and both gave statements dated 17 December 2019. Dr Ludlow described it as an "action research initiative" and that it is a network of independently run partnerships between universities and criminal justice organisations. She stated that she is employed by the University of Cambridge, with 60% of her time being focused on Learning Together.

107. Dr Ludlow stated that she got to know Mr Khan whilst he was in prison at HMP Whitemoor. He took part in a *“Writing Together”* programme, he attended a *“Big Ideas”* seminar, as well as other activities. Dr Ludlow did not have any concerns about Mr Khan and knew from his participation in groups that he was bright.
108. Dr Ludlow explained that Mr Khan was encouraged to stay in contact with Learning Together after leaving prison, and he did so. Learning Together arranged for him to be provided with a non-networked laptop in order for him to be able to do work with them.
109. Probation Officer O stated that it was obvious from speaking to Mr Khan that he was passionate about Learning Together and spoke highly of the staff. It was Mr Khan’s explanation for turning things around in custody and Probation Officer O noted that his improvement in behaviour coincided with his involvement in Learning Together. Probation Officer O saw it as a positive and extremely strong protective factor for Mr Khan.
110. Officer A explained that he knew Mr Khan worked with Cambridge University through Learning Together, and that Learning Together worked with offenders, but not a lot more than that. His impression was always that they were supportive to Mr Khan. He had fairly limited contact with Dr Armstrong, mostly via email or being copied into emails. This would be in relation to arrangements for events, or gathering more information about their work, for example, not Part 4. Officer A also emphasised that Learning Together wouldn’t *“run anything past”* him, it would be Probation Officer O that they liaised with.
111. Finally, Officer A stated that Learning Together gave Mr Khan a sense of purpose and status. Officer A described him as *“more animated when talking about it, he lit up.”*

> Summary of the police involvement with Mr Khan

112. During this investigation, a volume of evidence was gathered. After thorough analysis of all the evidence, I have summarised that which I think is relevant and answers the terms of reference for my investigation. As such, not all of the evidence gathered in the investigation is referred to in this report.

> Events prior to Mr Khan being released from prison

113. Multi-agency public protection arrangements (MAPPA) were established by Section 325 – Section 327B of the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) 2003. MAPPA requires criminal justice agencies and other bodies to work together to protect the public from serious harm by dangerous offenders. The agencies involved in this case held meetings every six weeks to discuss Mr Khan. Attendees included representatives from the NPS, WMCTU, Staffordshire Police (both Prevent and SB) and HM Prison Service.
114. MAPPA meetings prior to Mr Khan’s release from prison took place on 26 June 2018, 15 August 2018, 11 October 2018, and 5 December 2018. Updates on Mr Khan’s progress, and intelligence received in prison, were discussed during these meetings. The minutes

of meetings suggested that Mr Khan's behaviour appeared to have improved in the eight months prior to the first meeting. There were references to concerns about him being the "emir" in his part of the prison, implying a level of seniority or influence. During 2017, there were concerns noted about the other prisoners he associated with and that he may be attempting to radicalise other prisoners. However, in 2018, the intel reporting appeared to mostly fall under categories other than extremism and radicalisation.

115. In the MAPPA meeting on 11 October 2018, the minutes showed that Probation Officer O noticed positive change in Mr Khan around the time he started working with Cambridge University. In the meeting on 5 December 2018, it was noted that there was intelligence suggesting an inmate called Khan was trying to radicalise other Muslim prisoners, he had said he would return to his old ways following release, and he allegedly told Muslims he tried to radicalise that they should stick together. This was low-graded intelligence, and no further details could be verified.
116. Officer A became aware of Mr Khan, as a Part 4 case, in January 2018 when he was told he would need to attend MAPPA meetings in advance of Mr Khan's release from prison on 24 December 2018.
117. Officer A explained that he had known of Mr Khan prior to his conviction in 2010, as Mr Khan was part of a group engaging in aggressive Da'wah activities (inviting people to Islam, preaching and promoting). Officer A stated that the Prevent team had gathered a lot of evidence about the group that was used in the trial of Mr Khan, but he did not know to what extent Mr Khan had been involved in the offences of which he'd been convicted. Officer A also added that he didn't recall ever meeting Mr Khan prior to his conviction, although he had met two of his co-defendants. Probation Officer O mentioned in a statement from 3 December 2019 that Mr Khan referred to knowing Officer A previously.
118. Officer A stated that no briefing on Mr Khan's offences was given to the Prevent team, although some documents were shared at MAPPA. He did not recall doing any reading, preparation or research prior to taking on management of Mr Khan, and he could not remember when they received the ERG22+ assessments prepared by psychologists in prison (such as Ms Cechaviciute). However, Officer A explained that their role was not about conducting risk assessments, it was to monitor Mr Khan's Part 4 compliance and report back any concerns.
119. Officer A explained that on 28 November 2018, he travelled to HMP Whitemoor with Probation Officer O in order to serve a letter on Mr Khan, outlining his obligations under Part 4 Counter Terrorism Act 2008. During this meeting Officer A explained that Mr Khan talked about how he had changed whilst being in prison. He talked about the fact that he didn't want to return to his previous life, he wanted to continue with his education and become a mentor in the future. Officer A also stated that Mr Khan "*said he is determined to maintain this new path he is on but did accept that it might be difficult and he was likely to need support along the way.*" Probation Officer O, in his statement dated 11 February 2021, stated that during this visit, Mr Khan "*spoke about his previous bad behaviour and said that he was very different now.*"
120. In his further statement, Officer A added that Mr Khan seemed to be emphasising that he wanted to comply with his licence conditions and that he wanted to move on with his life. Officer A came away thinking Mr Khan was "*on board*" with what was being asked of him, and that they would be able to work with him. Officer A stated that he "*didn't pick up on any resistance*".

121. Officer A explained that on 30 November 2018, in preparation for Mr Khan's release, he completed a "*Post-Release Risk Assessment Matrix*" based on the information they had about Mr Khan. This is believed to be a reference to a '*Priority Threat Assessment for Indicators of Extremism*' which Officer A completed on 30 November 2018 and is referenced in the policy from WMCTU that he adapted. He stated that it wasn't particularly sophisticated or helpful, it was done because WMCTU used it, and it was to justify the regular visits. However, Officer A explained that it wouldn't really change how anyone was managed.
122. The '*Priority Threat Assessment for Indicators of Extremism*' completed by Officer A had various different indicators for engagement, intent and capability with respect to extremism. The score was strong for engagement and intent, and moderate for capability. Officer A noted in his rationale in this form that the assessment was based on historic information that led to conviction as well as his attitudes in custody. It was accepted that he appeared to have made a change in his outlook and attitude, but this was untested outside custody.
123. A '*Trigger Plan*' was also created prior to Mr Khan's release. This outlined what to do, including who should be contacted, in the event that Mr Khan breached his licence, tampered with his tag, or needed to go to hospital. It also provided background information on his offence and the restrictions to which he was subject.
124. Officer A explained that the MAPPA meetings were useful, in terms of the insight they offered into what Mr Khan's living arrangements would be and what kind of person he was. It was useful to know in case, for example, Mr Khan said something that was inconsistent with what they knew. However, this did not happen, and ultimately, the information they received at MAPPA would not change what they did, as it was always just the Part 4 role.
125. Officer A described his understanding of the intelligence from prison being that Mr Khan had been challenging but appeared to have turned over a new leaf in the past year.

> Release from prison

126. Officer A and Officer B collected Mr Khan from prison on 24 November 2018, as part of his licence conditions, and his notification requirements were completed on the same day prior to him being taken to the AP. Officer A described him being in good spirits, again expressing a genuine desire to turn his life around. Mr Khan accepted responsibility for bad decisions and blamed himself, seemed grateful for the support he was being given, and was keen to follow the rules put on him. Officer A explained the consequences if Mr Khan breached his licence or notification requirements, which Mr Khan understood and reiterated his desire to avoid. They completed the notification process, then took him to his AP where they met with Probation Officer O. They remained there whilst a GPS monitoring tag was fitted, and they left.

127. Officer A added in his further statement that on the day he was released from prison, Mr Khan was “*fully compliant*” and “*talked incessantly*” for the two-hour journey from prison, but he was an engaging and likeable person. He talked about wanting to be a mentor, as he felt he understood why people offend, and Officer A felt some of what he said made sense. Officer A said Mr Khan was very animated when talking about academia and his view on what made people do what he did, which was a recurring theme.
128. Officer B, in his initial statement, stated that Mr Khan presented as being open to change and had no issues with them as police officers. The SPIN record described his appearance and contained the above information, as well as that Mr Khan stated he was glad to be at an AP in Stafford.

> Meetings between Prevent officers and Mr Khan

129. Intelligence reports written by the Prevent officers and put onto SPIN, the records from ViSOR, emails from the Prevent officers to SB and statements of the Prevent officers all cover the detail of visits between them and Mr Khan. The records of meetings will be summarised below and not reproduced in full.
130. The above evidence shows that the Prevent officers met with Mr Khan on a regular basis following his release from prison. They met with him on 27 December 2018, 31 December 2018, then around every week until 13 February 2019, after which it was around every two weeks that they met with Mr Khan.
131. In their first meeting following his release, on 27 December 2018 at the AP, Mr Khan discussed his offence with Officer B and Officer D. The SPIN report stated that he told them he had grievances before going to prison, he wasn't religious, he felt picked on. He stated that he felt he had been led on by his co-defendants and used by them but accepted that what he did was wrong. Officer D described him as being very accepting of the conditions of his release and wanting to work with the authorities.
132. A visit to Mr Khan on 31 December 2018 mostly dealt with his mobile phone and is discussed below. Similarly, a visit on 7 January 2019 mostly dealt with his mobile phone and is also discussed below.
133. In her initial statement, Officer D stated that she and Officer B visited the AP on 3 January 2019. He told them he had no issues. Staff at the AP advised them Mr Khan's brother gave him a television. Staff also noted that Mr Khan was always polite, very quiet and he did not socialise with other residents.
134. The records of the initial meetings with Mr Khan show he had an apparent positive outlook. Across 14, 23 and 30 January 2019, all meetings mention Mr Khan being pleased or happy to see the Prevent officers.
135. On 14 January 2019, Officer A and Officer B met Mr Khan. The record of the meeting notes that Mr Khan felt he was well supported by Prevent, which he appreciated. It was mentioned to him that the frequency of the meetings would slowly decrease over time. Mr Khan said he didn't mind them and found the meetings useful. Officer A's statement noted Mr Khan felt Stafford was a good place to make a fresh start.
136. Officer A was made aware by Probation Officer O that Mr Khan had asked to purchase an Xbox and been granted permission. Officer A emailed this information to SB. Officer A explained in his statement that Mr Khan asked him to accompany him on 16 January

2019 to collect it from a computer shop in Stafford, to ensure there was no internet capability. Officer A also photographed all the identifying numbers on the Xbox.

137. Delius was the case management system used by the NPS for recording contact relating to Mr Khan. Delius notes made by Probation Officer O on 11 January 2019 showed that during a telephone call with Officer A, he "*advised of decision regarding XBOX*" and there was a discussion regarding how to manage the device. Probation Officer O recorded that Officer A had no issue with it, as long as "*the item has been disabled*" [referring to the internet].
138. On 23 January 2019, Mr Khan met with Officer D and Officer C and told them that he was feeling happy, positive and relaxed. He also stated that his plan for the next six months was to get a place to live and get a job, explaining that he wanted to work and didn't like being on benefits. Mr Khan also mentioned on this visit that he was not that interested in going to mosque at that time. Officer D noted that Mr Khan said he kept himself to himself at the AP due to the other residents being disrespectful, drug users, or having mental health issues.
139. Officer C mentioned that at the meeting on 23 January 2019, Mr Khan said he would do anything as a positive opportunity to learn skills so he could get a job, in reference to him learning calligraphy at the AP. Officer C also noted, as this was the first time he had met Mr Khan, how relaxed and friendly Mr Khan was.
140. On 30 January 2019, Mr Khan mentioned to Officer A and Officer B an issue in which a visit to his parents hadn't gone to plan, but the record of the meetings showed he "*accepted that mistakes can happen.*" He had also experienced a problem in applying for a provisional driving licence, but again reasoned that he would just do it again. He reiterated how much he had changed from being in prison, and that he was keen to do whatever was required of him to move forward and comply with his conditions. Finally, Mr Khan mentioned wanting to go to a gym, and Officer A explained that disclosure [of Mr Khan's offences] would need to take place, which Mr Khan accepted.
141. On 6 February 2019, Officer B and Officer D met with Mr Khan, in which the difficulties of visiting his family, due to his licence conditions, were discussed. He was described as appearing relaxed about this. He also mentioned wanting to complete vocational courses to do everything he could to get a job and stated that he would never go back to prison. The record of the meeting stated that Mr Khan was more than happy to have officers attend and speak with them and appeared to be relaxed.
142. At the next meeting on 13 February 2019, Mr Khan was again described as being pleased to see the officers, Officer A and Officer C. Mr Khan allowed the officers to photograph his provisional driving licence, which he'd recently received. They discussed Mr Khan being pleased to have settled in Stafford, not Stoke, and how he was progressing looking for work. Mr Khan explained that this hadn't progressed much, due to his licence conditions. The record of the meeting stated that Mr Khan was accepting of the fact that whilst restrictions were in place it would be difficult to find work, but they would be less restrictive over time and they were in place for a reason. He reiterated his commitment to complying and moving his life on in a positive way.
143. Officer D and Officer C next met Mr Khan on 27 February 2019. At this meeting, they discussed Mr Khan joining a gym. Mr Khan also mentioned that he paid a very expensive price for his mistakes and would not be doing anything like that again. He stated he was happy at the AP and would await instruction regarding moving on to accommodation of his own.

144. Officer A described that on 7 March 2019, he disclosed Mr Khan's conviction to the committee representative for Stafford Mosque. Officer A then told Mr Khan that he could attend the mosque. Officer A also confirmed with the owner of the gym Mr Khan had joined that Mr Khan had disclosed details of his conviction.
145. On 13 March 2019, Officer A visited Mr Khan alone, due to no other officers being available. The records of the meeting show that they discussed Mr Khan's work with Learning Together. Mr Khan had recorded a video for an event that Learning Together held, which he seemed genuinely proud of. He told Officer A that the video had been played at an event, and the organisers called him so he could hear it being played and hear the applause it received, which he really enjoyed. They also spoke about Mr Khan being given a non-networked Chromebook [i.e. a laptop not connected to the internet] to do university work, which he seemed to be genuinely looking forward to. Officer A recorded that Mr Khan talked about the university work a lot, how he enjoyed it and the opportunity he'd been given. He repeated about how he had turned himself around, that he had no intention of returning to prison, and stated that his long-term career goal was in de-radicalisation. Mr Khan also confirmed that he had attended the Mosque for the first time, said prayers and then left without interacting with anyone.
146. Officer B and Officer C met with Mr Khan on 27 March 2019. He was described as being in a good mood and talkative as usual. They talked about the gym, mosque, and his mentor. It was recorded that he was still very positive about the future, looking forward to getting his Chromebook so he could do work with Learning Together.
147. The next meeting, between Mr Khan, Officer B and Officer C, took place on 10 April 2019, where Mr Khan was again described as being in good spirits, polite and chatty. They discussed work and housing, an upcoming visit to HMP Whitemoor for Learning Together, amongst other things. They again spoke about the reasons people get involved in extremism, and how Mr Khan was interested in using his experiences to help people. Officer B, in his initial statement, mentioned Mr Khan having an issue with a mentor, as there was no pattern to when he would meet the mentor.
148. In Officer B's statement, he mentioned that *"whenever Usman talked about doing work with Cambridge he presented as being excited, he thought that this was a group that he belonged in. He felt that he was one of them and always spoke highly of them. He seemed to genuinely want to help others like himself to move on and thought he had something to offer in this field due to his experience."*
149. Officer A and Officer B met with Mr Khan on 26 April 2019. They discussed an extension in his curfew, and an administrative error that led to a call from the tagging company. Mr Khan had contacted his solicitor about it, but was confident all would be okay. He saw the extension as positive and a step in the right direction.
150. At this meeting, they also discussed a mentor for his ideology, and the discussions Mr Khan was having with him. This mentor, known by the pseudonym TM, gave a statement to police dated 13 July 2020. He explained that his role (Theological Mentor) meant exploring the ideology and beliefs of someone's faith and supporting that person to challenge those beliefs. Mr Khan also mentioned that his family were trying to arrange a marriage for him. When asked about staying in Stafford, Mr Khan said that was still his plan, for at least the first year.

151. On 10 May 2019, Mr Khan was met by Officer A and Officer B to give him a letter explaining the new notification requirements he needed to comply with, which they would go through on 15 May 2019. These were the new requirements introduced by the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019. The letter explained all the requirements Mr Khan was subject to, highlighting whether requirements were existing, amended or new.
152. On 15 May 2019, Mr Khan attended Stafford Police Station, to complete his re-registration under Part 4 Counter Terrorism Act 2008 with Officer A and Officer B. According to the record of the meeting, he attended on time and in good spirits. It also stated that he raised concerns about being deported, how long he would need to wear the tag (as he claimed to know of offenders who had done worse crimes but worn it for less time) and that he may seek legal advice on the matter.
153. The recording of this re-registration was obtained by the IOPC. Officer A was speaking about the requirements for Mr Khan regarding foreign travel. Mr Khan clarified whether this was about deportation, but Officer A explained it was just in the event of any foreign travel. The recording also showed that Mr Khan raised an apparently hypothetical question about permanently moving to Pakistan and asked when he would have to inform them. As part of that, he mentioned a concern about being deported. Officer A clarified that no one was discussing taking away Mr Khan's citizenship, but Mr Khan should just tell them as soon as possible if he received any letters about it. The recording didn't show the conversation regarding the tag. In his further statement, Officer A explained that Mr Khan "*wasn't making a big issue of it,*" he was just asking questions.
154. On 29 May 2019, Officer A and Officer C met Mr Khan at the AP. They discussed his job search, including that Mr Khan had applied to many local jobs but had no success. He mentioned he would be training for his Construction Skills Certification Scheme (CSCS) card and would look for work in the construction industry after receiving the card. Mr Khan also mentioned wanting to get an A level in English, and that he was hoping to get a Chromebook from Learning Together. They discussed a Learning Together event at HMP Whitemoor on 12 June 2019, discussed below, where the Prevent officers would escort Mr Khan to the event. Mr Khan believed he may get the Chromebook at that event.
155. Officer B had a phone call with Mr Khan on 28 June 2019, in lieu of a visit. His statement refers to it being on the 26 June 2019, but the record he created of the call at the time showed it took place on the 28 June 2019. The record showed that Mr Khan was in a positive mood, explaining that he had passed the course and attained his CSCS card. He had been looking for jobs and seen some promising leads he intended to share with Probation Officer O, and he was hoping to get onto a dumper truck course, discussed below, which he felt would give good prospects and a good wage.
156. During this phone call, Mr Khan also discussed his contact with Mr N, the Managing Director of a community engagement organisation , which is discussed below. According to the records of the meeting, Mr N was looking for people with a unique perspective on certain issues that communities face, and Mr Khan was very interested in this. Officer B noted in his statement that Mr Khan was upbeat about some prospects of his life and could see doors opening for him.

157. A visit by Officer A took place on 2 July 2019, after Mr Khan requested someone attend to delete some messages on his phone. During this visit, the record of the meeting showed they discussed Mr Khan being happy to get his CSCS card, and that he was hoping to get on a dumper truck course. He said he was hopeful about working in the building trade, and that he felt very positive about this. They also talked about Mr Khan not having any friends locally, but Mr Khan said he was content in his own company and got support from his family, the gym and Learning Together. Mr Khan explained that he liked going for walks and playing Xbox, and this was unlikely to change when he lived alone. He reiterated his desire to move on from his past and not go back to prison. The record of the meeting ends with him being described as upbeat and positive about the future.
158. The next recorded visit to Mr Khan, by Officer A and Officer B, was on 15 August 2019. The record mentioned that AP staff had mentioned concerns about accommodation for Mr Khan after he left the AP, but when discussed with Mr Khan he stated the council was looking to find him somewhere. On the whole, he is described as being positive about the future, and had been looking at jobs in the construction industry. However, it is also recorded that he seemed to be hoping someone would just give him a job, he did not seem to be very proactive at finding one.
159. Officer A and Officer C met Mr Khan on 30 August 2019. This visit is discussed below in the section regarding a dumper truck course.
160. On 3 September 2019, a Prevent officer informed Mr Khan that his mentor would no longer be visiting him, due to contractual issues with the mentor company. Mr Khan was described as accepting the news and appreciating being told about it. Officer A's emails show an email chain with NPS on 3 September 2019 in which he referred to speaking to Mr Khan about no longer having a mentor.
161. On 17 September 2019, Officer B and Officer C met Mr Khan. They discussed him imminently moving out of the AP and reminded him of his obligations under Part 4. He also stated that he wasn't seeing a mentor at that time and had put the job hunt on hold whilst he settled into his flat. Officer B described him as his usual self and nothing concerning came out of the meeting.
162. Mr Khan moved to a flat on 24 September 2019, in the company of Officer C and Officer D. This is discussed below.
163. The next recorded visit, on 31 October 2019, was an unannounced visit by Officer B and Officer C. They went into his flat, which was dark, and he told them they had woken him up. They recorded that he had a lot of Xbox games and DVDs. He told them he was going to the gym less and had stopped going to the mosque. He no longer had a mentor, which caused issues accessing the internet and searching for jobs. He stated he would bring this up with probation as he was interested in getting a monitored device. Officer B recorded that Mr Khan was still being positive about his future and there were no concerns. Officer C did mention, in his initial statement, that Mr Khan seemed frustrated about the lack of employment opportunities.

164. Officer B explained that not going to a mosque would not be a concern, as Mr Khan was not really religious. Officer C stated that he believed Mr Khan had only ever gone to mosque twice, so this didn't raise any concerns. Officer C felt he was just settling in at the time.
165. The last visit to Mr Khan by Officer B and Officer C on 14 November 2019 is discussed separately below. On that visit, Mr Khan asked the officers to leave his flat.

> Other evidence of Prevent officers

166. All of the officers mentioned in their statements that they have worked together for a long time and have a close working relationship. Officer A, Officer D and Officer B worked the same shift together previously, when they were on response policing. Officer C was the same shift, but based in a different station, so they knew him as well from meeting him at incidents. They knew each other's strengths and weaknesses and would pick things up for each other.
167. In her initial statement, Officer D explained that from her first meeting with Mr Khan, he had accepted his mistake and blamed himself. He was grateful for the support being provided to him, and often praised probation, police, and Cambridge University.
168. In her further statement, Officer D explained that prior to meeting Mr Khan, she wasn't positive about the prospect. Mr Khan was a convicted terrorist and she was annoyed about that and having to look after him. However, on meeting him, he was nice, open, and chatty. He demonstrated vulnerability with her. She explained that he had nothing in his life before prison, so he would talk about prison quite a lot. She felt they had a good working relationship, and she thought that if he had an issue, he would have spoken to them.
169. Officer D stated that she didn't recall any particular changes in his behaviour throughout the time she knew him, nor did she have any concerns about his behaviour. She did note that due to the lack of powers they had, she felt that Mr Khan was in control of the relationship, and she felt he probably knew that.
170. Officer C, in his further statement, said that he took Mr Khan at face value. They would not want to antagonise him because they needed to be in contact for a long time – *“if you had an attitude with him, he'd be likely to clam up and not really speak to us.”*
171. Officer C outlined that it was always very relaxed when they saw Mr Khan. He explained that they would usually meet for a coffee and just check Mr Khan was okay and didn't need anything from them. Officer C described being *“shocked at how relaxed he was and how positive he was about moving on and finding work, changing his life and leaving his past behind him.”*
172. Officer C stated that it was hard to describe the relationship with Mr Khan, due to what has happened. Mr Khan was always open and up front with them, Officer C never felt any animosity or anything like that from Mr Khan. He said the only time there was any change in behaviour was on the last visit, and Officer C believed there was a reason for that, discussed in detail below.

173. Officer C could not think of any warning they had of what was going to happen at Fishmongers' Hall, and he could not think of anything that could have been done differently.
174. Officer B described their relationship with Mr Khan as being a professional relationship, with good rapport. He was always happy to talk to them, and except for the visit on 14 November 2019, they had never had cross words or seen him upset. Officer B stated, "*he was always the same, every time we spoke to him.*"
175. When asked how he thought Mr Khan saw Prevent, Officer B stated that whilst he couldn't be sure, "*he maybe saw us as people who could offer him some assistance and support. There were a number of times when he'd ask us for things and we'd deliver, so I think he saw us as people he could talk to and work with. He was happy to work with us.*" Officer B said everyone in the Prevent team had a similar relationship with Mr Khan. He noted that Mr Khan did not have an issue with Officer D, as a woman, which he said could sometimes be an issue when dealing with people who hold extremist beliefs.
176. Officer B described Mr Khan as a positive person, who wanted to achieve things and had goals. He was always fairly open and Officer B didn't feel that Mr Khan was hiding anything. There were no behavioural changes in the time they knew him and there were no red flags to suggest that Mr Khan was going to do what he did.
177. Officer B and Officer D both referred to feeling that there was information in respect of Mr Khan that they didn't know about. Officer B mentioned concerns that SB were giving Prevent "*as little information as possible*" but acknowledged there may have been reasons for that. Officer A stated that he didn't recall getting any information from SB, but probably would not have done so because he was not aware of any "*adverse reporting*" around Mr Khan.
178. Senior Officer K, in his report for the IOPC, explained that due to the different levels of vetting and nature of work undertaken, Prevent would not have been aware of all the available information. He described this approach as common practice across policing, not just the CT area, so that officers are not put in a position of accidentally compromising an operation or inadvertently disclosing tactics.
179. Officer A explained that their meetings with Mr Khan were always very casual, just arranging a time, having a chat, and keeping the relationship going. He said that in his view, it helped put faces to the people he would be letting down if he breached anything.
180. Officer A stated that, as far as it could go, his relationship with Mr Khan was a good relationship, and did not really change throughout knowing him. It was an easy relationship, even when there was something Mr Khan was not happy about. Officer A said that after he gave a rationale, Mr Khan would be pragmatic, accepting, and move on. Examples of this include the questions Mr Khan asked at the re-registration process on 15 May 2019, or the dumper truck course, which is discussed below.
181. Officer A, when being interviewed by the IOPC, was asked about the pattern of Mr Khan talking about changing his ways. Officer A felt that this was genuine. He said they never picked up on anything to suggest he was lying. Mr Khan seemed

consistent across his contact with probation, his mentor, and staff at the AP. Officer A said that Mr Khan always seemed genuinely reflective and thoughtful.

182. On 6 November 2019, Officer A completed an updated Priority Threat Assessment Indicators of Extremism form. In this, based on the scores given by Officer A, Mr Khan's "*engagement indicators*" were considered weak, his "*intent indicators*" were non-existent, and his "*capability indicators*" considered moderate. In his rationale, Officer A noted that there had been little or no adverse reporting for Mr Khan, and Mr Khan remained engaged and cooperative with Prevent. However, Officer A also noted that Mr Khan's lack of employment was a factor which kept him vulnerable.
183. Emails provided to the IOPC show that there was significant contact between Officer A and SB, and Officer A appeared to forward on emails he considered would be relevant to SB.

> MAPPA meetings

184. MAPPA meetings in relation to Mr Khan took place every six weeks. Officer A attended every meeting and gave updates in relation to Mr Khan. At all of the meetings, there were at least three officers from WMCTU present and often more. However, this did not appear to include the CTSIO or deputy CTSIO, nor the officers from the WMCTU OIMU for the Priority Operation into Mr Khan. At most meetings there was at least one representative from Staffordshire SB. Officer D attended some of the earlier meetings, but after that the only officer from Prevent was Officer A.
185. On the meeting on 23 January 2019, the first following Mr Khan's release, Officer A provided an update that things were going better than expected. Mr Khan was completely compliant and would contact the officers as opposed to them chasing him. Officer A described Mr Khan as not wanting to breach his conditions and appearing earnest. Officer A also updated the meeting that his visits with Mr Khan would be reduced to fortnightly. It was mentioned by a WMCTU officer that while Mr Khan was doing well, it was still early days, so they needed to be mindful of his previous offending. Officer A added that he reminded Mr Khan frequently of the consequences of non-compliance.
186. Officer A mentioned in his statement that the frequency of visits would be reduced, because Mr Khan was compliant and they were running out of things to say to him. They would need a justification to keep seeing him every week, and they no longer felt that there was a justification for such frequent meetings.
187. This meeting on 23 January 2019 also referred to a Learning Together event in March, which is discussed below.
188. Officer A gave a short update at the next MAPPA meeting on 7 March 2019, to mention Mr Khan was going to a gym and had a bank account and had disclosed his offence to both the gym owner and bank. Officer A mentioned that Mr Khan was keen to be compliant, and positive views of Mr Khan's progress were expressed by Probation Officer O and the AP manager. There was a question raised as to whether Mr Khan was self-disclosing for status, but Officer A believed it was because he would rather do it himself.

189. In notes taken by Officer G at this meeting, there appeared to be reference to Officer A moving to monthly engagements. However, this was not recorded in the minutes of the meeting.
190. The MAPPA meeting on 17 April 2019 noted concerns about possible aggressive behaviour by Mr Khan towards a new mentor but noted that no other agency reported such behaviour. There was also a discussion around a Learning Together event at HMP Whitemoor, discussed below.
191. At the MAPPA meeting on 30 May 2019, Officer A appeared to raise some concerns about Mr Khan. He mentioned that Mr Khan presented similarly to a teenager, wanting everything done for him. He stated that there had been a lot of interest from Cambridge University, and believed this may have been leading Mr Khan to apply for jobs that he didn't have the skills or academic background for. Officer A described Mr Khan as not being driven and needing to mature. He referenced the fact that Mr Khan did not have a social network for support, which employment may have helped with. Officer A also mentioned the questions raised during the re-registration under Part 4 on 15 May 2019, regarding Mr Khan giving up his British nationality.
192. Officer A also highlighted a concern that Mr Khan would be vulnerable when leaving the AP, as whilst he was confident, he *'believe[d] his own hype'* which gave him unrealistic ideas and expectations. There was nothing to suggest Mr Khan was doing anything wrong but Officer A felt his behaviour did raise some concerns. There was also a risk that Mr Khan's *'bubble could burst'* if he stopped working with Learning Together and Officer A raised his concerns around how Mr Khan would behave going forward if this happened.
193. In his further statement, Officer A explained what he meant by saying Mr Khan's *"bubble could burst"*. He explained that Mr Khan's eyes would *"light up"* when talking about Cambridge University, and that he felt Mr Khan got a sense of status from his involvement. Officer A knew that a need for status had been a factor in his offence, and felt that if it was removed, he couldn't see where that status or excitement would come from.
194. The minutes show that the WMCTU officers and SB officers discussed decreasing Mr Khan's curfew, and that it would be better to have more of a curfew once he left the AP. It was noted by WMCTU that it would be odd to remove a signing on requirement and extend the curfew at the same time, which had been discussed, but was agreed not to be appropriate. It was also mentioned during the discussion that there had been nothing to suggest Mr Khan was likely to re-offend.
195. At the meeting on 11 July 2019, Officer A gave the usual update around engagement with Mr Khan, including that they had recently checked his phone. Officer A referred to Mr Khan being on his own, but mentioned that when asked about it, Mr Khan implied he was happy in his own company. Officer A also gave an update regarding enquiries made with the gym, which confirmed Mr Khan was attending as described. Moving on from the AP was also discussed at this meeting, with Officer A and Probation Officer O confirming they were happy for Mr Khan to move on into his own accommodation. This meeting, and the next meeting on 22 August 2019, also discussed a dumper truck course Mr Khan wished to undertake. This is considered in a separate section below.

196. The next meeting on 22 August 2019 mentioned the continuing contact with Cambridge University, including the event at Fishmongers' Hall in November, discussed in a separate section below. This meeting also mentioned Mr Khan's search for accommodation away from the AP. Officer A explained that there were no issues with Mr Khan, he was always punctual and respectful. However, he did present like a teenager and did not appear very driven, but there were no concerns that he was reverting to his previous mindset. Officer A added that Mr Khan was quite isolated, not reaching out to others, and this behaviour was likely to continue after leaving the AP.
197. During the discussion at this MAPPA meeting, in respect of Learning Together, it was questioned whether there was a risk associated with it, in that it was feeding Mr Khan's sense of self-entitlement. Officer A noted Mr Khan appeared to possess a desire for status, and the attendees at the meeting agreed to remain mindful of it. Probation Officer O mentioned that Mr Khan appeared to be mentioning Cambridge University less. Finally, it was mentioned that Mr Khan did want to find a job, but did not know how to achieve this. Officer A referred to Mr Khan as "*childlike... stubborn... and can get stroppy when frustrated*". However, it was raised by NPS that this was never transferred into anger at them – "*red flags would be raised*" if so.
198. Officer A mentioned, at the MAPPA meeting on 3 October 2019, that he wanted to see Mr Khan more proactively occupied, broaden his horizons, and not just spend all his time at the gym or at home. Officer A told the meeting that Mr Khan was not pushing for employment while he settled into his new home. This meeting also discussed a potential opportunity for work with a community engagement organisation, referred to below.
199. At the final MAPPA meeting on 14 November 2019, it was discussed that Mr Khan was considering self-employment, after he claimed that his family would purchase him a property to renovate and sell on. It was noted at the meeting that this was the third TACT offender to suggest self-employment. Suspicions were raised that the families of the offenders might be communicating with each other. It was also mentioned that Mr Khan appeared to change the type of job he wanted regularly, with Officer A noting his lack of experience and Probation Officer O noting that he just wanted to get a job of any kind.
200. During this meeting, it was also discussed that Mr Khan's tag data showed he often made trips into Stafford, but often on Saturdays would not leave the house. Officer A highlighted that this wasn't necessarily different to what was expected, Mr Khan had told agencies that he was comfortable in his own company. It was also noted at this meeting that Officer A would review Mr Khan's DVD collection, and that they had the ability to inspect his phone and Xbox if they felt any concern. The Learning Together event on 29 November 2019 was also discussed at this meeting, which is mentioned below.
201. In his further statement, Officer A referred to a discussion at MAPPA about Mr Khan isolating himself. It's not clear which MAPPA meeting this was referring to. Officer A stated that it was noted and accepted that it was normal behaviour for him, and Mr Khan was happy to be indoors, playing games. Officer A added, "*it was agreed that it was something that we would keep an eye on, but the solution really was that he*

needed to be working and have a purpose.” Officer A also noted that any concerns he had would be reported to MAPPA.

> Mobile phones given to Mr Khan

202. Probation Officer O stated that he gave Mr Khan a mobile phone upon his arrival at the AP. The phone had been obtained by police, but Probation Officer O gave it to Mr Khan to avoid any mistrust that might have arisen if police had given Mr Khan the phone.
203. In his initial statement, Officer B explained that he and Officer D attended the AP on 31 December 2018. This was in order to sort out an issue Mr Khan had with his mobile phone. Whilst Mr Khan’s licence conditions prevented him from accessing the internet, the phone he had been given had access to the internet. The record of this meeting stated that they explained to Mr Khan that there was an issue with his phone, and that they needed to check it. He retrieved the phone, handed it over, and it was replaced with another one. Officer B described Mr Khan as being happy to hand it over and appreciative when it was replaced. Officer B stated Mr Khan was relieved that he now had a phone he couldn’t *“accidentally [sic] slip up with”*.
204. Officer D, in her initial statement, also described this visit. She mentioned that they arrived at the AP and asked to examine the phone. Mr Khan retrieved it from his room and handed it over. Officer D described Mr Khan stating that he wanted to do things right, and that he hadn’t been on the internet. Officer D and Officer B then left to purchase another phone without internet access. They returned shortly afterwards, and Mr Khan reiterated that he felt better and wanted to do things right. Officer D outlined that, during this visit, Mr Khan stated he had been out walking to familiarise himself with the area, but didn’t yet feel comfortable being out of prison and didn’t like being out of the AP when it was dark. The contemporaneous records of meetings with Mr Khan confirm the accounts of Officer D and Officer B.
205. Officer A, in his initial statement, described visiting Mr Khan with Officer B on 7 January 2019. Mr Khan highlighted that he had been looking at the instructions for his phone and found a basic web browser. Officer A described him being concerned by this and bringing it to the Prevent officers’ attention as he did not want to breach his licence conditions. Officer A stated that Mr Khan handed over his phone, and Officer A examined it. Officer A said that it was clear Mr Khan had not used the browser. Officer A turned off all data connections, but couldn’t permanently disable the web browser, and this was highlighted to the NPS. Officer A also described checking the call log, Mr Khan stating he wanted to settle in Stafford, and Mr Khan stating he wanted to start attending mosque. Officer B gave a similar account of this meeting.
206. Officer A attended the AP on 9 January 2019 to provide Mr Khan with a new phone that did not have internet capability and retained the old phone.
207. In his further statement, Officer A explained, *“it’s hard to buy a phone without the internet. With the first one, we went to buy it, and we were told it had no internet, but it did. We went to get another, checked it, and it had none, but KHAN called us up and said it did have a browser. For us, this indicated that he wanted to comply, because he alerted us to it and asked for the phone to be changed. Eventually, we found a*

model that had no internet at all. He needed a phone so that we, and others, could contact him, he would have had a lot of appointments at that time.”

208. At the MAPPA meeting on 23 January 2019, the minutes show that Officer A provided an update that this had occurred and that they had secured a phone that did not have internet access.

> Learning Together event in March

209. Probation Officer O’s statement of 11 February 2021 described an email he received from Dr Ruth Armstrong about an event in Cambridge on 12 March 2019. He asked for more details and confirmation of her awareness of Mr Khan’s offence, which she provided, confirming it was an overnight event. Probation Officer O explained that it was decided the event was too soon, with the overarching consideration being that they *“could not say with confidence what risks he posed.”* A period of time to assess risk would have been needed for anyone who came out of custody, and Mr Khan had only been out of HMP Whitemoor for around 12 weeks.
210. Probation Officer O added that, following a request from Learning Together, it was arranged for them to attend the AP and film a video with Mr Khan.
211. The MAPPA minutes from the meeting on 23 January 2019 stated, *“Dr Ruth Armstrong from Cambridge University is pushing for Usman to attend an even [sic] in March and has stated that they are willing to arrange accommodation and for someone to go with him. Probation Officer O was of the view that this is too soon and that the events they are suggesting in September and October would be more appropriate.”*
212. Probation Officer O made a record on the Delius system on 6 February 2019 regarding the event. He noted that whilst they were refusing permission, it was with reluctance, and they would give serious consideration to any future events. He also noted they would advise Mr Khan of the offer and the refusal, in the interests of transparency and to prevent any issues arising from him finding out about the event elsewhere.
213. Ms P, the line manager of Mr Khan’s allocated Counter-Terrorism Probation Officer, provided a statement dated 5 February 2021¹. She stated that Learning Together was a protective factor for Mr Khan, and that there was a long discussion about Mr Khan attending this event. She had contact with Probation Officer O outside MAPPA. She stated that the event was too soon because he hadn’t been assessed enough in the community, and the event required an overnight stay.
214. On 13 February 2019, Officer E emailed Officer A about NPS making enquiries with the electronic monitoring company, regarding Mr Khan staying away from the AP overnight. Officer A responded, explaining, *“There had been an enquiry about Usman attending an event run by Cambridge University which would be in Cambridge and would require him being in Cambridge overnight. This enquiry was generated by Cambridge University to Probation and Usman was completely unaware of the*

¹ Mr Khan had a designated Counter Terrorism Probation Officer (CTPO) but Ms P was more involved than this CTPO.

suggestion. Probation looked into the logistics of how something like this might work but ultimately made the decision that now is not the right time to be trying to arrange this as it could be a step too far too soon. Usman has never been made aware of the offer so it has not created an issue with him. I think it might be something they would consider facilitating sometime in the future but would likely be once he has moved on from the AP.”

215. On 19 February 2019, there was an email chain between Officer A and SB officers, where Officer A clarified that Cambridge University were planning to film a video with Mr Khan. He explained that the purpose of the video was to secure ongoing funding for Learning Together, and he would obtain a copy of the video.
216. The MAPPA minutes from the meeting on 7 March 2019 confirmed that Probation Officer O declined this event for Mr Khan, as it was too soon. Mr Khan accepted this. The minutes recorded that as a result, staff from Cambridge University came to the AP to film a video with Mr Khan, to be played at the event. Officer A was tasked with sharing a copy of the video with CTU colleagues. The minutes noted that Staffordshire SB officers requested to be made aware if Mr Khan was going to an event. An officer from WMCTU offered to facilitate Mr Khan’s attendance at any future events by them taking him, in order to reduce pressure on Staffordshire Police officers. It was also recorded that the next event was in June at HMP Whitemoor, but at that time, Mr Khan did not want to go back to the prison.
217. Officer G stated that Prevent shared a copy of a video made by Learning Together. Officer G prepared a copy for WMCTU and a copy for the Security Service.
218. In his further statement, Officer A explained that there would not be anything Learning Together should “*run past*” him specifically. Learning Together would liaise with Probation Officer O, Officer A wouldn’t have any knowledge of what they were doing with him. In relation to the video, he explained that as far as he was aware permission was given through NPS, but it was not anything to do with him. He stated that any contact with Learning Together would be nothing to do with Part 4.
219. Officer A added that, in relation to this first event, it had been “*knocked back*” by MAPPA. It was felt to be too soon, and it involved an overnight stay, so it was felt that “*the logistics would have been a nightmare.*”

> **Learning Together event at HMP Whitemoor**

220. The MAPPA minutes from the meeting on 17 April 2019 recorded that Mr Khan had changed his mind about attending the event at HMP Whitemoor. It was noted in the minutes that checks would be taken to ensure he had not been pressured into changing his mind, and that CTU officers had offered to provide an escort on the day.
221. Officer A, in his further statement, stated that when this event came up, it was a one-day event, and in a controlled environment [i.e. a prison]. It was discussed at MAPPA and agreed that he could attend. Officer A did not recall any concerns being raised about the event. Officer A stated that the WMCTU officers said they would have taken Mr Khan to the event if he was their Part 4, so Officer A agreed to accompany Mr Khan when asked if they could do it.

222. Officer A explained in his statement that they would only have had powers over Mr Khan if NPS recalled him. As it was, they were just facilitating him getting to the event. Officer A also emphasised that, in relation to this event, there were no decisions for him to take. He was not the person who gave permission to attend the event, that was a decision for MAPPA and NPS. He simply gave his opinion at MAPPA and then did what he was tasked to do.
223. Emails obtained by the IOPC show that on 13 May 2019, Officer A asked for information about this event from Dr Ludlow, including what Mr Khan's role would be and who the attendees would be. Officer A then forwarded the information provided by Dr Ludlow on to SB.
224. The minutes from the MAPPA meeting on 30 May 2019 simply recorded that Mr Khan was looking forward to the event. Probation Officer O stated that he also told this meeting that Mr Khan had not been pressured into attending, and it was confirmed that he could attend.
225. In his initial statement, Officer A explained that he and Officer B took Mr Khan to the event and met with the Learning Together team prior to Mr Khan going into the building. Mr Khan was given a Chromebook and printer to help him undertake courses outside of prison, which Officer A photographed. Mr Khan went inside, and Officer A and Officer B waited outside. They returned Mr Khan to the AP once the event was finished.
226. In his initial statement, Officer B stated that he did not know why they were taking Mr Khan to the event, Officer A just told him they were. Officer B said that Mr Khan was in good spirits when they picked him up, as he was looking forward to seeing the group from Cambridge. They dropped him at the event and went to get lunch. On the way back to the AP, Officer B explained that Mr Khan was very upbeat, talking about how well the event had gone.
227. The MAPPA minutes from the meeting on 11 July 2019 stated that Mr Khan had told staff at the AP that he enjoyed the event, despite having felt apprehensive beforehand. They also showed Officer A stated that Mr Khan felt proud of his involvement with Learning Together.

> **Dumper truck training course**

228. Officer E stated that in July 2019, he became aware of a proposal being considered for Mr Khan to complete a dumper truck training course. This caused him concern due to Mr Khan being a convicted terrorist who had conspired to cause serious harm to the public. He said that a dumper truck could potentially be a very destructive weapon, and recent intelligence suggested the most likely attack method favoured by terrorists was using a vehicle as a weapon. He highlighted these concerns to Officer A, to ensure they were represented at the meeting and the course rejected. Officer E stated Officer A did not agree, so Officer E sought an invite to the next MAPPA meeting to raise his concerns. The minutes of the meeting on 11 July 2019 show that he attended.

229. Officer E was asked, in questions sent by the IOPC, whether he considered the potential benefits of Mr Khan completing the course and gaining employment, in terms of lowering his risk. He explained that issues of rehabilitation, structure and opportunity for offenders are the responsibility of the NPS, they are not his role. His role as a police officer is underpinned by protecting the public. He stated that, in relation to that role, he felt *“it is more pertinent to consider, ‘did I take into consideration the (much greater) potential risks (to the public) of Usman Khan completing that course, in terms of heightening his risk? The answer to this is yes and is therefore the reason for providing resistance to the suggestion of a dumper truck course.”*
230. Officer E also gave various examples of potential job opportunities available to Mr Khan, such as telesales opportunities and other construction roles. In those cases, checks were requested by the NPS, conducted by SB, and no objections were raised.
231. Emails obtained by the IOPC show that on 3 July 2019, Officer G emailed a report to Officer A. This report outlined that use of a vehicle as a weapon was a *‘highly likely’* methodology in a UK-based attack and discussed previous attacks in which this had happened. Officer A responded to the email saying that he would reference the report, but that there was no evidence of this being on Mr Khan’s mind. He stated that NPS had no grounds to oppose this, emphasising that they have to work with an individual to move on in a positive way and would need a strong reason to put obstacles in the way.
232. At the MAPPa meeting on 11 July 2019, the minutes show Probation Officer O provided an update that Mr Khan had been offered a week-long dumper truck course at the end of July, through Ixion, a training provider. This was described as causing concern at the MAPPa meeting, as due to recent events where vehicles had been used as weapons, it may not have been appropriate.
233. The minutes from the meeting show that Officer A said that Mr Khan had a provisional driving licence and had access to larger and faster vehicles. He reminded the meeting there was no intelligence to suggest Mr Khan was thinking about this. He also said that the course was in line with the path of employment Mr Khan wanted, and that it would increase his employability. Probation Officer O added that the equipment would vary in size but be confined to a building site.
234. Officer E explained that as it transpired, a WMCTU officer raised concerns about the proposal, so he didn’t need to further echo them. He also explained that the WMCTU SIO and WMCTU OIMU had been made aware of the course, prior to the MAPPa meeting, although the minutes of the meeting do not show that they attended.
235. The minutes record that clarification was needed on the equipment Mr Khan would have had access to, and what would be achieved on completion, before authorising his participation.
236. Mr L, a senior member of MAPPa meetings in relation to Mr Khan, gave a statement dated 5 February 2021. He outlined that the panel were not in full agreement regarding the dumper truck course at this meeting on 11 July 2019, due to concerns about terrorist attacks involving the use of a vehicle.

237. Emails obtained by the IOPC show that Officer A forwarded on details to SB received from NPS regarding the dumper truck course on 15 July 2019.
238. The minutes of the next MAPPA meeting, on 22 August 2019, showed an update from Probation Officer O in relation to the course. Mr Khan would have had access to a forward tipping dumper, which could be driven at a speed of 15mph within the construction site. There were concerns recorded in the meeting, raised by a WMCTU officer, that Mr Khan having access to heavyweight vehicles would have been inappropriate given that he was a convicted terrorist. A senior figure at Stoke and Staffordshire Probation queried what the specific risk would be. Another WMCTU officer raised a concern that a construction site may not be the best working environment for Mr Khan, as his conviction may lead to other workers ousting him. The minutes record that Officer A raised the possibility of Mr Khan passing his driving test, and his family buying him a car, which would also present the ability to commit an act with a vehicle. The attendees at the meeting decided that assurance needed to be built over time, Mr Khan needed to demonstrate he could be trusted, and they did not approve the dumper truck course.
239. Officer A stated, *"It was discussed at MAPPA, there was some discussion about what a dumper truck even was, people weren't clear on that. Ultimately, the collective decision taken at MAPPA was that it wasn't an appropriate course to take at this time."*
240. Officer E, in discussing Team 7's input at MAPPA, stated, *"in my experience, their input was robust such as when providing a challenge to a proposal for Khan to be provided a dumper truck course."*
241. Mr L stated that this course was considered inappropriate because it allowed access to heavy machinery. He stated that they had to balance the risk against the benefits of employment.
242. Officer A and Officer C met Mr Khan at the AP on 30 August 2019, after it had been decided that he would not be able to do the dumper truck course. Mr Khan asked why MAPPA had decided he could not do it. It was explained to him that MAPPA needed to see progress, and that the grant for training would be available for a different course. He was described as accepting of the decision after it was explained. At this meeting, Mr Khan also asked when his tag would be taken off, which he was told it would be at least 12 months. They also spoke about accommodation as Mr Khan was looking to leave the AP.
243. In his further statement, Officer A elaborated that Mr Khan was disappointed initially, because doing the course would have helped him get work. However, Officer A stated he was always pragmatic when things were denied, there wasn't any stropiness – *"he'd be disappointed, but it was always, okay, I'll see what I can do next."*
244. In his further statement, Officer C explained that Mr Khan could not understand why the course had been denied, as there had not been any issues and he had been doing everything asked of him. He was upset that he was not allowed to do it, not angry. Officer C continued that there was a *"consistent pattern that when things were explained to him, he would be understanding,"* and he was *"more than happy at the*

end of this conversation". Officer C added that Officer A was "really good" with Mr Khan, when it came to explaining issues such as this.

> Mr N – a community engagement organisation

245. On 1 May 2019, Dr Ruth Armstrong and Mr N, a member of the public involved in a community engagement organisation, both emailed Officer A and Probation Officer O, in relation to the possibility of Mr Khan working with Mr N. Dr Armstrong explained that Mr N's work sounded like it would be exactly what Mr Khan wanted and would be good at. Mr N emailed with some further information. Mr N stated in this email, *"I feel sure there is an opportunity here to look at how police and authority service design and delivery may be informed by the experiences and knowledge of Usman."*
246. Mr N provided a statement to police dated 10 December 2019. He met with Mr Khan on 25 June 2019, which he stated was agreed in emails with Probation Officer O and Officer A.
247. The MAPPA minutes from 11 July 2019 showed that Probation Officer O updated the meeting to the effect that Mr Khan had met and chatted with Mr N, at the event at HMP Whitemoor. Mr N had met with Mr Khan, and wanted to consider working with Mr Khan, to support Mr Khan sharing his story in the community. Officer A highlighted that Mr Khan had discussed his long-term aspirations to become a mentor, and this may be a useful connection.
248. Mr N stated that following their meeting, several text exchanges took place over the next few months, whilst he liaised with NPS. He spoke to Mr Khan on 24 September 2019, where he had the impression that whilst Mr Khan said he had read the A community engagement organisation literature, Mr N's view was that he had not. On 27 September 2019, he provided more detail to Probation Officer O of what a project might look like, which he understood was to be shared with Officer A. Probation Officer O recorded this email from Mr N on the Delius system, in which Mr N stated, *"My thinking at this time is that there may be a role for Usman to talk through some of his experiences with front line staff from police and other agencies in order stimulate some thinking around the context in which they carry out their roles."*
249. The minutes from the MAPPA meeting on 3 October 2019 showed that there was mention of Mr N, who had started an advisory programme and was interested to work with Mr Khan. The minutes showed concerns raised by an officer from WMCTU as to *"who was funding this particular aspect of work and whether it has been psychologically assessed. As a community engagement organisation is not part of Cambridge University, is Mr N trying to drum up business which could potentially put UK [Mr Khan] in a vulnerable position."* The minutes show that all agreed more detail was required.
250. Probation Officer O explained that *"the MAPPA panel were worried about the risk that Usman may be exploited to some extent and put in a vulnerable position. I later spoke to police colleagues about the work and informed Mr N that, contrary to my expectations, they had decided that Usman should be required to show consistent progress over a further 12 months before he was permitted to work with a community engagement organisation."*

251. Ms P stated that Mr Khan's involvement was considered inappropriate because he was a terrorism offender on licence. She outlined concerns that Mr Khan could be presented as a success story before it was appropriate and may attract media attention.
252. On 25 October 2019, Probation Officer O updated the Delius system with an email to Mr N. He referenced a lengthy discussion with 'police colleagues' and explained that *"the outcome unfortunately was not what I was expecting and they have stated that they feel that Usman should be required provide consistent progress over a further 12 month before he is permitted to do what is suggested, they also do not feel that it is appropriate for Usman to be perusing paperwork that you are able to provide."* Mr N stated that Probation Officer O emailed him on 25 October 2019 to say, *"Prevent wanted KHAN to show consistent progress for a further 12 months before being allowed to do what his role may involve."* Mr N therefore ceased contact with Mr Khan.
253. Officer A, in his further statement, talked about the potential work with Mr N, although Officer A mentioned he may be misremembering. Officer A recalled that Mr N wanted to work with Mr Khan, but MAPPA didn't sanction it in the end. He stated, *"contact with him wasn't permitted in the end, I think it was because it just didn't seem to fit, it was too soon in his mentor career and we didn't really see any benefit to KHAN."*
254. The MAPPA meeting on 14 November 2019 confirmed that contact with Mr N had ceased.

> Move out of Approved Premises

255. Officer A's initial statement explained that on 13 September 2019 he received an email from Probation Officer O that confirmed Mr Khan had secured a flat. He forwarded this email to SB, confirming that he would arrange for a re-registration (due to the change of address) and would update the tagging company. He also liaised with the AP and arranged for Mr Khan to move out, with the help of Prevent officers, on 24 September 2019.
256. Officer C and Officer D helped Mr Khan with moving out of the AP. Officer C described, in his initial statement, that they attended the AP to pick him up, as well as unplug the GPS Tag unit that needed to go with them, and took him to his new flat. Officer C and Officer D then waited at the flat for the people from the GPS tag company to arrive. Officer D stated, that while they were waiting, they spoke to Mr Khan about his future, and he mentioned that finding a job was his next goal. He appeared happy in his flat and said he was looking forward to being in his own property and the extra freedom.
257. Officer D stated that the tagging company arrived, set everything up, and then they attended Stafford Police Station with Mr Khan to complete the Part 4 re-registration process. Mr Khan was patient and calm throughout. The IOPC obtained the recording of this process, which corroborated the account given by Officer D.
258. The record of the move, created at the time by a Prevent officer, outlined that they took him to his new flat and waited for the electronic tag staff to arrive and set it up. Mr Khan asked for the tag to be extended by a few metres so he could stand at the

front of the building but was told this was NPS' decision. The registration process was then completed at Stafford Police Station. The officer completing this described Mr Khan as relaxed, he seemed happy about the new address and freedom it gave him. They said he spoke about employment and that his best opportunities would be in the building industry, due to his CSCS card.

259. Officer A added, in his further statement, that Prevent did not reduce contact with Mr Khan from every two weeks after he moved out, as "*transition points*" are recognised in Prevent as vulnerabilities, and this would clearly be a transition point. However, the records of meetings and Prevent officer statements show that they were less frequent than every two weeks after Mr Khan moved out on 24 September - the next recorded meeting was 31 October.

> Learning Together event at Fishmongers' Hall on 29 November 2019

260. In his initial statement, Officer A referenced receiving an email from Probation Officer O in relation to the event at Fishmongers' Hall on 29 November 2019, and that Dr Amy Ludlow from Cambridge University was hoping Mr Khan would be able to attend. Probation Officer O asked for Officer A's opinion. Officer A believed he called Probation Officer O to discuss it. Officer A believed he did not have any objections to the event but would have fallen to his default stance of it being MAPPA and NPS' decision to make.
261. Officer A's emails show that on 20 August 2019, Probation Officer O forwarded him an email from Dr Ludlow which mentioned the event at Fishmongers' Hall and suggested Mr Khan would receive a '*save the date*' card.
262. The MAPPA minutes from the meeting on 22 August 2019 show an update from Probation Officer O, that there would be a Learning Together event in November, but there did not appear to be any discussion of this event recorded in the minutes. The minutes simply noted that Mr Khan would be invited but would have to source his own travel. Officer A, in his further statement, explained that his main worry about this event was that they were going to be asked to take him to the event again. Officer A emphasised that, "*the event was 11 months after his release from prison, he'd had some restrictions removed, and everything around him was relaxing, albeit with some level of control around him remaining in place. I don't remember anyone expressing any concerns about him attending the event.*"
263. Probation Officer O, in his statement of 11 February 2021, explained that he believes it was agreed at this MAPPA meeting that Mr Khan could attend the event. He recalled there being discussion about Mr Khan's progress over time, the ongoing engagement with Learning Together, and the fact that there was nothing since release that raised significant concerns.
264. Officer A emphasised that the final decision for whether Mr Khan could go to this event was with NPS. His recollection of the rationale for going was that there was no reason to say no. "*It was consistent with what we were working towards, it seemed like a natural progression in the approach to these events.*"
265. Mr L added that he considered this to be a step beyond the Learning Together event at HMP Whitemoor. However, he'd been in the community for a longer period, and

they continued to receive reports, that were not raising significant issues. Mr Khan had continued to engage with Learning Together and the individuals working for it, who agreed to escort him from and to Euston station. Learning Together was also seen as a protective factor for Mr Khan, which was important given his struggles with employment and occupying his time. Therefore, the event was not a concern for the panel.

266. On 1 November 2019, Officer A received an email from Probation Officer O, which was part of a chain involving Dr Ludlow. This email showed that Mr Khan appeared to be concerned about travelling whilst on tag and would have preferred someone to accompany him to London and back. Probation Officer O was asking Officer A if he could arrange for someone to accompany Mr Khan on the train. Officer A explained, in his initial statement, that he discussed this with Probation Officer O in a phone call. Probation Officer O told him Mr Khan wanted Officer A or Probation Officer O to go with him to London. Officer A said this would probably not be possible, as it would require two officers. He later informed both Dr Ludlow and Probation Officer O that he couldn't facilitate police accompanying Mr Khan. As an alternative, he suggested a Learning Together staff member took Mr Khan from Euston to the event, which Dr Ludlow accepted and arranged.
267. Officer A made clear in his initial statement that he did not have any concerns about Mr Khan attending the event, which he expressed to Dr Ludlow and Probation Officer O. Mr Khan had been engaging with both Prevent and NPS, and there was no cause for concern or to believe accompanying him would be necessary. Officer A also said that travelling by himself may also have encouraged some personal responsibility for Mr Khan.
268. Officer A also described a phone call with Mr Khan, in which he explained the travel arrangements for the day, including that he could not accompany Mr Khan, but had made other arrangements (i.e. for someone from Learning Together to meet him) to help him get to, and return from, the event. Mr Khan was accepting of this. Officer D stated that this call happened in early November, after Mr Khan called the Prevent office, spoke to Officer D, and she transferred him to Officer A.
269. Officer A explained that, at the time of this request, he thought it was a genuine request for support, because he was apprehensive about travelling alone. Dr Ludlow had also emailed him, explaining that Mr Khan had told her he would feel more comfortable and reassured if he had someone accompanying him.
270. In his further statement, Officer A elaborated on the rationale for not accompanying Mr Khan. He explained, *"I considered that he was apprehensive about going to London, as he'd never been there before. Probation Officer O said that he wouldn't be going with KHAN, and I felt that I couldn't justify us taking him. I would never send one officer alone, as that would be contrary to basic personal safety. If we went with him, we would then be escorting him, not accompanying him. If we're escorting him, then there is some level of risk, which means there would need to be a plan or some level of operation. Potentially a covert operation around it too. That would all need a high level of justification. But we didn't have any concerns about him, so how could we justify it? We didn't have any powers, there wouldn't be any justification for it. It would be putting us in a vulnerable position, by giving us responsibility for him that we didn't*

have. Suppose we did go with him, and he got off the train early and went into Milton Keynes. We wouldn't have had any grounds or powers to stop him."

271. Statements from the officers in SB show that they were not aware of the request from Mr Khan to be accompanied to London.
272. Probation Officer O mentioned that he raised the event at MAPPA on 14 November 2019, including the travel arrangements made, and no concerns were raised. The minutes of that meeting do not show any concerns being raised. The Delius records show that on 20 November 2019, Probation Officer O confirmed with Officer A the train times for Mr Khan and confirmed that a member of staff from Learning Together would be meeting Mr Khan at the station.
273. Ms Lisa Ghiggini, an employee at Learning Together, gave a statement dated 2 December 2019. She stated that, a couple of weeks before the event, Officer A had said he was a little concerned about Mr Khan, as he was no longer going to the gym and was sleeping in late. Officer A had no recollection of this.
274. Officer A also stated, *"I have been asked about whether I considered letting anyone from the Metropolitan Police Service or City of London Police aware that Khan was traveling to London. It never crossed my mind to do so. My instinct, regarding Part 4, would be no, it's not like he needs to register down there. From a Prevent angle either, he wasn't a Prevent subject so it wouldn't be necessary. It's not what was done in practice, as far as I'm aware. The tag meant he would be tracked on GPS, so there wouldn't be any doubt as to where he was. That said, SB and Team 7 had been updated of this trip."*

> Last visit to Mr Khan by Prevent officers – 14 November 2019

275. The last visit to Mr Khan by Prevent officers took place on 14 November 2019, when Officer B and Officer C attended his flat. The record of the visit described him as being happy to have them in the flat, talking about employment and his upcoming trip to the Learning Together event. He mentioned looking for work but it being difficult to find anything, which he had been discussing with Probation Officer O.
276. The officers had been tasked to identify what Xbox games Mr Khan had, and they asked if they could photograph them. The record of the meeting states that Mr Khan was not happy with this and asked if it was to do with his license conditions or his Part 4. The officers advised him that it wasn't, they were just asking, and Mr Khan *"reluctantly"* allowed them to do so. Mr Khan described this as a break down in trust, asked for Officer A to contact him about it. He said he would be speaking to his solicitor in due course. After the photos were taken, Mr Khan opened the door and asked them to leave.
277. In his statement, Probation Officer O explained that this action came from a MAPPA meeting, where concern was expressed about what Mr Khan was watching. It was agreed at the MAPPA meeting that it should be investigated by police. The minutes of the meeting show that this action was allocated to Officer A. Officer E stated that this request came from Officer G, who was present at the MAPPA meeting, but Officer G's statements do not refer to this.

278. Mr L stated that this action came about from MAPPA, as the attendees at the meeting wished to ensure he wasn't viewing extremist or unsuitable material. Therefore, an action was given to Officer A to review the media collection.
279. Officer C described this visit in his initial statement. Officer C stated that Staffordshire SB had tasked them to take photographs of the Xbox games, and this was explained to Mr Khan. He described Mr Khan getting upset and saying that he could not understand it, he had abided by all his conditions but there was still no trust. Officer C stated that Mr Khan wanted a call from Officer A to explain it further and asked them to leave the flat. Officer C also stated that, approximately two days later, Officer A phoned Mr Khan, who reassured Mr Khan that it was nothing to worry about.
280. Officer C also discussed this visit in his further statement. He stated that they'd been asked to record what games Mr Khan had, which they thought was "*a bit daft*", but that "*as an officer you are told to do things, and you just do them.*" Officer C described Mr Khan as being dumbfounded by the request, and it made him think they did not trust him, despite not having had any issues with him. Officer C explained that Mr Khan thought it was a backwards step. He described Mr Khan as seeming despondent about it, certainly not shouting or anything like that. Officer C stated that they told him it was just something that they had to do.
281. After they had taken their photos, Officer C recalled saying something along the lines of, they would go if Mr Khan wanted them to, which he did. Officer C stated he is "*pretty sure that we offered to leave, but [he's] not 100% sure.*"
282. Officer C added that during the visit, he did not see anything unusual in the flat. He cannot recall any concerns being raised about it following the visit, and this was the only time he ever saw a change in behaviour, with a clear reason why.
283. Officer B discussed this visit in his further statement. He stated that they had been given a task, after the previous update mentioned Xbox games, they were asked to find out what games he had. They mentioned this to him after entering the flat and suggested a photo would be best.
284. Officer B explained that Mr Khan was reluctant at first, and they told him they did not have legal powers to take the photos, they were asking him to allow it. Officer B stated that Mr Khan saw it as an invasion of his privacy but let them do it and then asked them to leave. Since they did not have any powers to be there, they did not push back and left the flat. Officer B explained that after being asked to leave, if they did not leave, they would effectively be trespassing.
285. Officer B clarified that, up until that point, Mr Khan had been acting normally. They had done unannounced visits before without issue, it was just the issue of the Xbox games. He said they were in the property for no more than five minutes. Officer B considered that Mr Khan felt the request to take photos showed a lack of trust, and Officer B saw that point of view. Officer B felt that since Mr Khan was living independently now, he probably felt that people should not just come in and look at his things. Officer B thought that was the issue, not that there was anything of concern, and that he would probably feel the same if someone did that to him. Officer B stated that Officer A called Mr Khan about this afterwards but does not recall asking him to do so.

286. Officer B did not recall noticing any electrical items being tampered with, or anything unusual. He stated that he would have asked Mr Khan if he saw anything unusual. He did not go into the kitchen and did not see any knives.
287. Officer A described this sequence of events in his further statement. He recalled that Officer B and Officer C had fed back to him that Mr Khan was unhappy and wanted to speak to Officer A, so Officer A called him to discuss it. Officer A stated that Mr Khan let him know he was unhappy and asked why it was being done now. Officer A told him they were being asked to check. Officer A said he felt Mr Khan was annoyed as he had been consistently compliant, so was confused as to why there was mistrust now. Officer A explained to Mr Khan that they had been tasked with it and had to comply. He said that people were checking they were doing their job in managing him, and that they just needed to get through it. Officer A stated that Mr Khan accepted his explanation but did not think the timing was fair and *“it niggled him”*. Officer A felt the issue was resolved after the call; it was just the case that Mr Khan wanted to get it off his chest.
288. Officer A stated that he assumed Mr Khan had just been having a bad day, and it didn't raise any concerns for him. He had had people *“more annoyed about smaller things,”*. Officer A said Mr Khan did not block them doing it, he was not evasive, he was just annoyed that it was happening. In Officer A's view, Mr Khan was authorised to have the Xbox, so it made sense that he would have the games, and he wasn't able to get on the internet with it. Officer A said he could see where Mr Khan was coming from in being annoyed.
289. Officer C explained in his statement that Officer A told Mr Khan that these things happen, he was sorry that Mr Khan was upset, but they did not have any issues with him. Officer C recalled that Officer A said Mr Khan was okay after the call.
290. On the Delius system, on 19 November 2019 Probation Officer O recorded a discussion with Mr Khan, where Mr Khan expressed that he was upset following officers photographing his games, as he had followed everything he needed to and fully complied. Probation Officer O then provided an update on Mr Khan with respect to the gym and the Learning Together event in London, then added that there did not appear to be any change in circumstances that could raise concerns.

> Events on the 29 November 2019

291. In Officer B's initial statement, he explained that on the 29 November 2019, he attended the morning briefing in SB. It was mentioned during that meeting that Mr Khan was going to London, which Officer B had not been aware of. He described there being a conversation in the meeting around whether Mr Khan had got the correct train. Later that day, Officer B received a call from a SB officer, asking him to confirm with NPS which train Mr Khan was supposed to get, and whether he had got it. Officer B spoke to Probation Officer O, gave the details of the train to SB, and was asked to speak to Mr Khan to confirm whether he had gotten on the train.
292. Officer B spoke to Mr Khan, who seemed in a good mood and sounded happy. He confirmed that he was in London on his way to the event. Officer B described him sounding excited to be there. Officer B told Mr Khan he hoped he had a good day and

would speak to him on Monday to arrange a meeting, as they had been due to see him on that day. Officer B wished him luck for the event, and then hung up. Officer B stated there was nothing in the phone call to cause any concern.

293. Officer B explained that they became aware of an incident on London Bridge. When it became clear there was an attack, officers from SB came in and asked questions about Mr Khan. They were asked to find his location using the tag. Officer B said that he and his team did not think this was something Mr Khan would have done, and when they saw video footage via the news, could not make any kind of identification. He tried calling Mr Khan's mobile but got no answer. Ultimately, the tag data came back showing Mr Khan had been on London Bridge for over an hour, and it was confirmed that he was responsible.
294. Officer A similarly explained that he became aware of an incident on London Bridge, but did not consider Mr Khan could be involved. SB came into the office to ask about him, and Officer A told them it would not be him. He stated that he *"nearly fell out with them over it,"* they were asking him to check Mr Khan's tag, while Officer A told them he would *"bet [his] house"* that it was not Mr Khan. Officer A described his major concern being that, if this had happened near Mr Khan, it would scare him. Probation Officer O eventually called Officer A to let him know what had happened, and Officer A explained it was *"like the floor dropped out from underneath me, I was devastated."*
295. Officer D, in her initial statement, said *"This was a complete shock. I felt physically sick and couldn't understand what I had heard... I found the reality of the situation almost unbelievable and hard to accept that this was KHAN who we have known as he gave no indication whatsoever to even think that this was part of his thinking never mind taking action."*
296. Officer C, in his further statement, stated that, *"It was a complete shock when we found out this had happened. I can't think of any warning we had that he was going to do this."*

> The Security Service's Priority Investigation

297. Witness A, a Deputy Director within the Security Service, gave a witness statement dated 4 February 2021. This statement provided a lot of background information about the operations of the Security Service, which will not be covered in detail here.
298. Witness A explained that the Security Service were involved in the initial investigation of Mr Khan, which led to him going to prison. When in prison, he was subject to the lowest priority (P4) investigation for the Security Service. This priority level is for *"individuals (such as released terrorist prisoners) who have previously posed a serious threat to national security, who are judged as not currently involved in such activities, but that there is judged to be a risk of re-engagement."* This continued until February 2015, when the Security Service closed their investigation, because they had received no intelligence to indicate that KHAN was undertaking any activities of national security concern.
299. Witness A stated that the Security Service reopened their investigation on 8 August 2018, in anticipation of Mr Khan's release, at the same level of priority. On 22 November 2018, the Security Service notified Staffordshire SB and WMCTU of the

reopening of their investigation. This included mentioning that the Security Service assessed the residual risk of Mr Khan's re-engagement to be low. The Security Service also informed WMCTU and Staffordshire SB of information suggesting that Mr Khan intended to carry out an attack upon his release, whilst noting that this information was uncorroborated, and its validity was unknown.

300. Meetings were held between the Security Service, WMCTU and Staffordshire SB on 28 November 2018 and 19 December 2018. These were to discuss the risks he posed, the coverage required, and the trigger plan in case he breached any of his conditions.
301. On 6 December 2018, Witness A stated that the Security Service increased the priority of their investigation to P3, to enable further monitoring of Mr Khan. This was due to the intelligence regarding Mr Khan intending to carry out an attack upon release, and his previous conviction which increased the credibility of him engaging with extremism. This level of priority is for *"individuals or networks that require further action to determine whether they pose a threat."*
302. Following his release from prison, Witness A explained that the Security Service carried out a period of heightened surveillance of Mr Khan, and then coverage continued from January 2019 onwards. Witness A stated that there was no intelligence to suggest Mr Khan was engaged in activities of national security concern at reviews in March 2019 and October 2019. Witness A provided some detail of what Mr Khan was doing following his release from prison, noting that despite his apparent determination to be compliant, the Security Service remained sceptical of the reason for this.
303. Witness A noted that whilst the Security Service had no direct and formal relationship with MAPPA, they did attend a number of MAPPA meetings at which he was discussed. Witness A did not state which MAPPA meetings were attended. Witness A said that during the meetings in July and August 2019 there were discussions around a dumper truck course, Mr Khan giving a talk on his experience of de-radicalisation, and discussions around him being quite solitary.
304. A meeting was held between the Security Service, Staffordshire SB and WMCTU on 18 November 2019. This meeting recorded that: no intelligence of concern had been seen since Mr Khan's release from prison; the Security Service assessed Mr Khan wished to travel to Pakistan once his conditions ended; Mr Khan had been attending the gym less frequently and had ceased attending the Mosque; police commented that overall Mr Khan had significantly withdrawn since moving into his new flat; and Mr Khan was planning to attend a Cambridge University event in London. The Security Service had become aware of this event in late October. The risks identified were that Mr Khan might re-engage in Islamist extremist activity, including being involved in radicalisation and incitement of others, and that Mr Khan may attempt to travel to Pakistan, although this was assessed as a low risk.
305. Witness A explained that discussions took place within the meeting as to *"how the level of coverage of KHAN could be enhanced, including of his proposed trip to London. It was considered that any further coverage would assist MI5 to identify any intelligence of concern, in particular in relation to KHAN's mindset. Given that no intelligence of concern had been seen since KHAN's release from prison, it was agreed that this further coverage would be reviewed and the investigation should be*

considered for closure if MI5 was unable to identify any intelligence of concern.” The Security Service was not able to obtain further coverage of Mr Khan whilst he was in London.

306. Witness A stated that, *“Despite the reporting that we were receiving and the coverage we had in place, at no point did we have any intelligence to suggest that KHAN was planning to carry out an attack, nor an attack specifically in London on the 29 November 2019.”*
307. Witness A also explained that *“Intelligence reviewed during the post-attack review highlighted that by late 2019 KHAN was becoming frustrated and disgruntled with parts of his life in the UK. The review considered that there was insufficient intelligence to reach a firm assessment on whether KHAN's level of frustration and discontent had substantially increased to what would have been a concerning level in the latter half of 2019. Whilst there were some signs of occasional disgruntlement and frustration, the level observed in this case was nothing beyond that which MI5 often observes in people who have come out of prison and are trying to re-establish their lives. The level of discontent certainly did not meet a level to suggest KHAN was planning to carry out an attack.”*

> WMCTU involvement

308. In a further statement dated 19 January 2021, ACC Ward gave specific details of WMCTU's involvement in respect of Mr Khan. They received notification from the Security Service on 22 November 2018 that a Priority Investigation had commenced into Mr Khan. This notification noted details of his conviction. It noted that since 18 February 2015 there had been no signs of Mr Khan undertaking activities of national security concern, and his residual risk was assessed as low. It also noted recent intelligence suggesting Mr Khan may have been intending to carry out an attack upon his release. It was considered a 'P4' investigation, meaning it was a covert investigation into someone who had previously posed a serious threat to national security, was now judged as not posing such a threat, but there was a risk of re-engagement.
309. As a result of this notification, WMCTU appointed a Counter Terrorism Senior Investigating Officer (CTSIO) and an Operational Intelligence Management Unit (OIMU). As discussed previously, an OIMU from Staffordshire Police SB was also established. The Staffordshire Police OIMU would act as a conduit between Prevent and WMCTU.
310. ACC Ward described the meetings between the Security Service, WMCTU and Staffordshire SB on 28 November 2018 and 19 December 2018. In addition to what was described by Witness A, ACC Ward stated that on 28 November 2018 they discussed an *“implementation strategy to develop coverage and assurance.”*
311. ACC Ward explained that *“the threat posed by Mr Khan and the current mitigation measures in response to his threat were monitored by exception reporting, along with all other priority investigations and CT threats, at a weekly Tasking Meeting chaired by a senior officer from West Midlands CTU. The weekly Tasking meeting included representatives from the Security Service (MI5) and Staffordshire Police Special*

Branch. At no point was the threat posed by KHAN ever escalated at the weekly Tasking Meeting nor was any concern raised that the current offender management measures in place were either insufficient or inadequate.”

312. ACC Ward explained that in early November 2019 a new WMCTU CTSIO from Team 7 was appointed, to complement the decision to move the offender management to Team 7. As a result, a meeting with the Security Service, WMCTU and Staffordshire SB took place on 18 November 2019. It was agreed at this meeting for WMCTU to assist the Security Service in developing further coverage.
313. In addition to this, as has been described above WMCTU attended every MAPPA meeting in relation to Mr Khan and made significant contributions to those meetings.

> **Staffordshire Police Special Branch involvement**

314. Officer E explained in his statement of 8 January 2021 that when he took on the role of Head of SB, just prior to Mr Khan’s release from prison, he became aware from Officer A of Prevent’s arrangements for Mr Khan’s release from prison and their role with him. He stated that they shared the risk assessment prepared by Prevent with WMCTU and across Staffordshire Police. They also assisted Prevent in creating a ‘Trigger Plan’ in the event of any breach of conditions by Mr Khan.
315. Delius records show that SB had contact with Probation Officer O prior to Mr Khan’s release, regarding the process in case of a breach, as well as the sharing of location data from the GPS tag. The Delius records also show contact between SB and Probation Officer O after Mr Khan’s release, in relation to him having an email address, having a provisional driving licence, the issue with his mobile phone and his passport details.
316. ACC Ward explained that the Staffordshire Police SB produced ‘Secret’ and ‘Official – Sensitive’ subject profiles for Mr Khan prior to his release. These were updated shortly before and shortly after Mr Khan’s release.
317. Officer E stated that he maintained close oversight of Mr Khan, and the other Part 4 offenders, through close liaison with the SB staff. He oversaw the management by Prevent through direct liaison with the Prevent team, as well as indirectly through the updates provided. Officer E stated that he frequently discussed Mr Khan with Officer A, to enable him to provide updates to the WMCTU Head of Investigations at weekly meetings. SB also held a formal, regular, internal meeting, where operational matters were discussed.
318. Officer E, in a statement dated 5 January 2021, gave examples of tasks given by SB to the Prevent team. These were details requested regarding Mr Khan’s Xbox, and his mobile phone details.
319. Officer G outlined some of the actions he took in relation to Mr Khan. This included briefing the Local Policing Commander for Stafford, briefing the Area Control Room managers and briefing the On-Call SB officers on ‘Trigger Plans’ in the event Mr Khan breached his conditions.

320. Officer G also mentioned information that was disseminated by the SB OIMU, including intelligence research on addresses, mentor reports, Mr Khan's 'Subject Profile' and analysis of his tag data.
321. On 11 April 2019, Officer G emailed Officer A asking for clarification on Mr Khan's involvement with Cambridge University (including the visit to HMP Whitemoor), clarification about a comment made by Mr Khan to his mentor, and asking for Officer A's assessment of Mr Khan's attitude, confidence and appearance since his release.
322. Officer A responded, answering the question about the mentor and outlining his perception of Mr Khan. He explained that, *"Usman has maintained a positive outlook and has been consistent in his in his [sic] attitude and assertions that he is very much a different person to the person who went into jail and he very much wants to move on in life and become a positive contributor to society. He maintains a Western style dress sense and apart from attending Mosque on a Friday he is not overly religious. He enjoys going to the gym and feels he benefits from this. He has continued to engage well with us and his Offender Manager and his conversations are consistent with the Mentor reports. I find him quite open in his presentation and keen to ensure he remains within the constraints of his licence. I have had no cause for any concern to date."*
323. The reports written by Mr Khan's mentors, M1 and M2, do show consistency in his behaviour. He emphasised with them how keen he was to move on in life and find employment, which the mentor helped with. There were occasions when he demonstrated some frustration, rudeness and agitation, but these appeared to be sporadic and did not appear to be continuing issues.
324. Officer E, in his statement of 8 January 2021, described that in late October 2019, Officer G identified and highlighted an issue of Mr Khan being isolated. This was based on: Mr Khan no longer having a mentor; Mr Khan living alone; Prevent engagements with Mr Khan being reduced; Mr Khan not attending the Mosque; Mr Khan infrequently attending the gym; and Mr Khan leaving his flat less. Officer A was asked to increase the frequency of Prevent engagements with Mr Khan, but Officer A did not share the concerns outlined above. A meeting was then requested, by SB, with WMCTU. Prevent were then directed to increase the frequency of their engagements.
325. In his further statement of 8 February 2021, Officer E explained that autonomy existed for the Prevent team to manage the frequency of their engagements appropriately, although it may have been discussed at MAPPA. He stated that the *"spirit of mutual co-operation"* usually led to agreements without a formal decision.
326. Officer G provided an email exchange between him and Officer A from 28 October 2019. Officer G enquired about when the next engagement with Mr Khan would be, and asked about Mr Khan not having a mentor. Officer A explained that they would engage with him in the following days and that Mr Khan was not currently a priority for a mentor.
327. Officer G explained that following the Prevent engagement with Mr Khan on 31 October 2019, he *"sought [Officer A's] opinion from the Prevent engagement as my interpretation from reading the content was that UK [Mr Khan] appeared to be isolating himself from others and was no longer seeking employment. I requested*

consideration for increasing the frequency of Prevents [sic] engagements with UK and clarity on what support Probation offender managers were providing to UK in the absence of any Mentor.”

328. Officer G provided an email he sent to WMCTU on 6 November 2019, outlining these concerns. He stated that the visits to Mr Khan were monthly and he thought they should consider increasing them. He also suggested a meeting with WMCTU and the Security Service to discuss the change in Mr Khan’s circumstances (leaving the AP) and *“re-evaluate the situation going forward.”*
329. Officer G provided an email exchange with Officer A from 6 November 2019 in relation to this. It showed Officer A responded explaining that it was difficult for Mr Khan to seek employment, due to not being able to access the internet without a mentor. Officer A also noted that he did not believe Mr Khan was isolating himself any more than he was when at the AP. Mr Khan was contacting the job centre regularly, contacting Dr Ludlow from Learning Together, and was going to a Learning Together event later in November. Officer A concluded the email by saying that there was nothing to suggest that increasing the visits was needed or justified. Officer A also provided an update from Probation Officer O to Officer G, which described Mr Khan as being committed to finding employment.
330. Officer G did respond to this email requesting that updates from NPS be forwarded on to SB. Officer A clarified that he was not usually sent the updates, it was received in response to an email Officer A sent to Probation Officer O.
331. Officer G also stated that he spoke to the Security Service on 6 November 2019, as he *“had concerns that [Mr Khan] appeared to be isolating himself as he was no longer attending mosque, wasn’t socialising, had no employment, no mentor support and there were less frequent Prevent engagements.”*
332. Officer E stated that following the meeting at WMCTU on 18 November 2019, the CTSIO formally requested Prevent increase their engagements and this was directed as an action.
333. In relation to the visit by Prevent officers on 14 November 2019, Officer E stated that Officer G specifically asked the Prevent team to find out what Mr Khan was doing in his flat, in relation to the isolation concerns. Officer E stated this view was shared at MAPPA by others.
334. In relation to the event on 29 November 2019, Officer E stated that he was *“made aware of MAPPA discussions regarding a proposed trip to London which was approved by Probation. I was not aware of further details shared but understood this would be managed and risk assessed by Probation as part of Khan’s ongoing participation in the Cambridge University Learning Together programme.”*

> Analysis of the evidence

> Role of the Prevent team

335. The reason that the Prevent team were involved with Mr Khan was the Part 4 notification requirements to which he was subject. The legislation, Part 4 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, simply puts a requirement on Mr Khan to notify police of certain details, making it a criminal offence if he doesn't do so. The legislation does not grant police any specific powers. The Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 gave a power to apply for a warrant in certain circumstances, but the evidence does not suggest there would ever have been a need or justification for applying for a warrant in this case.
336. The Prevent officers outline in their statements that they were not clear about why they were involved with Mr Khan, instead of Team 7 at WMCTU.
337. ACC Ward stated that this role fell outside of the formal collaboration agreement in the West Midlands region. Therefore, when the first Part 4 offender was released, it was up to Staffordshire Police to consider who would be the most appropriate team to deal with Part 4 offenders.
338. Senior Officer K provided an email to the IOPC explaining why Prevent was chosen. There was not an agreed process nationally for how Part 4 management should be handled. Senior Officer K outlined the role of Prevent and the similarities between their role and the role managing Part 4 offenders. There appear to be clear parallels between Prevent's work with people who are vulnerable to extremism and managing Part 4 offenders. As described by Witness A, one of the main risks in respect of Mr Khan was identified as being that he would re-engage with extremism.
339. Officer A outlined that he considered that Team 7 or sex offender managers would have been able to take on the role. Eventually, as more Part 4s were released, the role was in fact transferred to Team 7. The evidence suggests that, with the benefit of hindsight, Team 7 may have been best placed to take on the role from the start. This may have provided a more consistent approach. However, as ACC Ward explains, the Part 4 role fell outside of the regional collaboration agreement, so needed to be fulfilled by Staffordshire Police in the absence of an agreement for it to be done by Team 7. As described by Senior Officer K, Prevent had skills that could be transferred to this role and appeared to be a suitable choice to fill it. It is important to note that prior to the creation of Team 7, management of Part 4 offenders was done within Prevent in the WMP area. Officer D also states that the role didn't feel like a significant change in behaviour from them.
340. Officer A describes his actions in preparing to take on the role of managing Part 4s. He liaised with WMCTU to understand how they did the role and took copies of their documents (e.g. the policy on managing Part 4s, the Priority Threat Assessment), which he made into Staffordshire documents. He did not receive any specific training in relation to how to do this role, and nor did any of the other Prevent officers.
341. The evidence suggests that Officer A prepared for this role and sought the advice of those in WMCTU who were doing it at the time. ACC Ward also explained that Team 7 offered advice and support to Prevent, to understand how Team 7 performed the role. This includes a meeting in March 2019, and they were also always present at MAPPA. As explained by Officer A, it was a process of learning what he was supposed to be doing, but he never felt that he was hampered by the lack of training.
342. Officer A describes his understanding of the role as being ensuring Mr Khan complied with his Part 4 requirements, and also regularly engaging with him.

343. Based on all the evidence the IOPC has seen, there is no evidence to suggest Mr Khan ever breached his Part 4 notification requirements. The Prevent officers put arrangements in place to complete the registration process when Mr Khan was released from prison, when new legislation came into force, and when Mr Khan moved house. The evidence shows that they appeared to be proactive in ensuring Mr Khan complied with his requirements, as opposed to just relying on him to remember. For example, when Mr Khan moved out of the AP, they met with him a week before the move to ensure he was prepared to complete the process the following week.
344. In engaging with Mr Khan, Officer A explains that they did not undertake any decision making or assessments with respect to Mr Khan. They made a record of the meetings and forwarded them on to SB. The evidence shows that the records of the meetings were detailed, going into the various topics of conversation with Mr Khan as well as his general demeanour and mood. Officer D states that they would always go straight back to their office to write up the meetings with Mr Khan, to ensure it was done correctly. There is no evidence to suggest that there was any expectation that Officer A or the Prevent team should have been making any formal assessments of Mr Khan, beyond the Priority Threat Assessment Indicators of Extremism. As Officer A stated, from his perspective this was only done to justify the meetings and because Team 7 did it.
345. Officer A was very clear in his statement that Probation Officer O, with MAPPA's input, was the decision maker, not him. There is no legislation to say that Officer A had any decision-making role in respect of Mr Khan. Probation Officer O, through the NPS, was responsible for managing Mr Khan's licence conditions.
346. Officer D and Officer B both describe their role as not being very clearly defined. The evidence does appear to suggest that there was a lack of precision and clarity over what the Prevent officers were supposed to be doing in their engagements with Mr Khan, and a lack of confirmation that they were doing it correctly. There were no clearly established procedures within Staffordshire Police for how the role should be undertaken. That said, there does not appear to be any evidence of any issues being raised by anyone about how Prevent were managing Mr Khan. Senior Officer K states that the move to Team 7 was in order to have a consistent approach, not necessarily about better trained or differently accredited staff. There also does not appear to be any evidence to suggest the Prevent officers did anything outside the scope of the role, as they understood it to be.
347. Similarly, there appears to have been a lack of clarity over who was Officer A's line manager. Officer E and Officer H, who each spent time as the Head of SB, both stated that this was no longer their responsibility at the time when Mr Khan was released from prison. Officer A states that the Head of SB was effectively his line manager throughout, although not officially. Officer A states his next line manager was technically a Superintendent, *"who in reality wouldn't have any detailed knowledge of [his] day-to-day work and actual cases."* Regardless of this, the evidence suggests that both Heads of SB maintained oversight of Prevent's engagements with Mr Khan and Officer A spoke to them regularly about him. Officer E confirmed that the line management of Officer A has now been resolved and Officer A is line managed by WMCTU Prevent.

348. Officer A stated that Mr Khan described feeling well-supported by Prevent. He explained that they tried to sort out problems for Mr Khan, they met with him regularly, and ensured he complied with his Part 4 requirements. Mr Khan was regularly described by the officers as being pleased to see them, being open with them, and happy to talk about what was going on in his life. The evidence suggests that the relationship with Prevent officers appeared to be positive for Mr Khan, regardless of any lack of clarity the Prevent officers felt about their role.
349. The Prevent officers met with Mr Khan frequently after his release from prison. It was initially weekly, at the request of Team 7, but decreased to every other week within the first few months. They appear to have decreased in frequency again in July 2019. The visits were less frequent than once every two weeks, with no recorded meeting between 2 July 2019 and 15 August 2019, and no recorded meeting between 24 September 2019 and 31 October 2019. In November 2019, Officer G referred to them in an email as being monthly.
350. Officer A mentioned at the MAPPAs meeting on 23 January 2019 that visits were going to become fortnightly, but there does not appear to be any record of a decision to reduce them further in the minutes. Officer G did make a note at the MAPPAs meeting on 7 March 2019 that Officer A advised the engagements would be moving to monthly, although this didn't appear to happen immediately and was not recorded in the minutes. The decrease in the frequency of meetings to two weeks was explained by Officer A as being due to Mr Khan being compliant, them running out of things to say to him, and the lack of any justification for maintaining the frequency of meetings. Mr Khan continued to be compliant up until, and after, July 2019. There was no evidence of any lack of compliance or any issues in the relationship between Prevent officers and Mr Khan that would have meant more frequent meetings continued to be necessary.
351. Officer A stated that meetings were every two weeks both before and after Mr Khan left the AP. There were meetings on 15 August 2019, 30 August 2019, and 17 September 2019, prior to Mr Khan leaving the AP. The next recorded meeting after Mr Khan left the AP on 24 September 2019 was on 31 October 2019, over a month later.
352. As part of Officer A's role, he liaised with Probation Officer O on a regular basis. He described himself as a "*sounding board*" for Probation Officer O and appears to have fulfilled that role. The emails obtained by the IOPC show contact between them, particularly when it came to employment or training opportunities, or the logistics for events Mr Khan was attending. Probation Officer O described them speaking to each other very frequently, more or less daily, though Mr Khan was not the only Part 4 offender they were both working with. There is no evidence to suggest any issues in the working relationship between the two.
353. The evidence shows that the way Mr Khan was managed was largely consistent with Team 7's working practices, as described by ACC Ward. Prevent had a representative at all MAPPAs meetings, they engaged with NPS, and licence conditions were obtained allowing Prevent to collect Mr Khan from prison. Prevent recorded in detail all their interactions with Mr Khan and "*Trigger Plans*" were developed for use in the event of any breaches of his conditions. Team 7 would build up a subject profile for their Part 4 offenders, and two were prepared by SB in the case of Mr Khan.

354. ACC Ward stated that Team 7 would conduct visits once or twice a week at the outset until the risk was mitigated, which is what Prevent appeared to do. Prevent themselves didn't necessarily use intelligence from CT Policing to conduct risk assessments and determine how frequent visits should be. However, it is clear that SB and WMCTU would have been able to influence this if they had concerns about the frequency of meetings. This is demonstrated by the meeting in November 2019 which led to Prevent being directed to increase the frequency of their engagements.
355. ACC Ward states that Team 7 officers could covertly carry Tasers, and received advanced driver training, to enable them to react at pace. Prevent did not carry Tasers and did not appear to receive advanced driver training.
356. There is also evidence to show Officer A occasionally emailed with Learning Together. However, this does not appear to have gone very far beyond arranging logistics and gathering information about their work with Mr Khan. Officer A states that Probation Officer O was responsible for liaising with Learning Together.
357. Officer D and Officer C both raise a point about the fact that they needed to keep Mr Khan on side. Officer D states that Mr Khan probably knew he was in control of the relationship, and Officer C states that they would not want to antagonise him. The last visit to Mr Khan, where he was upset by the request to take photos and asked them to leave, could be an example of him having control of the relationship. That said, the IOPC is not aware of any evidence to suggest there was anything the Prevent officers should have challenged Mr Khan on, but did not.

> Role of the Security Service, WMCTU and Special Branch

358. The evidence of ACC Ward and Senior Officer F is clear that the Security Service would lead on intelligence development in relation to Priority Operations, and police would lead on any overt action in relation to Priority Operations. Officer H also emphasises that the Security Service would lead on these matters, until any overt police action occurred. There was never any overt policing action conducted in relation to the Priority Operation into Mr Khan after his release from prison. Therefore, the Security Service would have led on the operation into Mr Khan throughout the time following his release from prison. Their involvement is beyond the scope of this report.
359. As ACC Ward outlines, a key part of WMCTU's role was working with the Security Service. WMCTU were notified that Mr Khan was subject to a Priority Operation and two meetings were held prior to his release. At the first meeting, ACC Ward states they discussed an implementation strategy to develop coverage of Mr Khan. WMCTU also set up an OIMU to support the Priority Operation into Mr Khan, as did Staffordshire Police SB.
360. The evidence appears to suggest that information would go from Prevent, via SB, to WMCTU and the Security Service. As explained by Officer G, information provided via Prevent, such as their engagements with Mr Khan, electronic tag data and mentor reports, would be disseminated by SB.

361. ACC Ward states that a weekly tasking meeting was held, involving WMCTU, the Security Service and Staffordshire Police SB. The threat was monitored by exception reporting, as was the case for every investigation and CT threat. At no point was the threat posed by Mr Khan ever escalated by any of the agencies involved, nor were any concerns raised that the measures in place were insufficient or inadequate.
362. Ultimately, the Security Service led on the Priority Operation in respect of Mr Khan and would have had sight of intelligence from both overt and covert sources. WMCTU acted in support of them on the Priority Operation and would have only taken over should any overt action have been necessary. SB acted in support of WMCTU, who led from the policing side for the Priority Operation.
363. According to Witness A, the Security Service never identified any intelligence to suggest Mr Khan was planning an attack. At the meeting involving the Security Service, WMCTU and SB on 18 November 2019, they discussed seeking more coverage of Mr Khan, in particular for the purpose of better understanding his mindset. However, they also agreed that since no intelligence of concern had been seen since Mr Khan's release from prison (close to a year ago at this point), if no intelligence of concern was identified, the investigation should be considered for closure.
364. The only piece of intelligence of significant concern appears to be that there was intelligence, obtained while Mr Khan was still in prison, suggesting he may have been intending to carry out an attack upon his release. This was uncorroborated intelligence and the validity of it was unknown. As noted by Witness A, Mr Khan was subject to a period of heightened surveillance following his release from prison and then subject to continuing coverage from January 2019.
365. The Security Service did attend some MAPPA meetings as well. However, it is not certain which meetings they attended or what their contribution to those meetings was.
366. SB did appear to go beyond the role of simply being a conduit for information from Prevent to WMCTU. They worked with Prevent to create a 'Trigger Plan' if Mr Khan breached his conditions, they prepared subject profiles of him, and there are multiple examples of them seeking clarification or information from Prevent about Mr Khan. For example, they requested details of Mr Khan's Xbox and mobile phone, they requested details on Mr Khan's involvement with Learning Together and requested Officer A's perspective on Mr Khan. They also had contact with Probation Officer O, shortly before and after Mr Khan left prison.
367. Officer G raised concerns about Mr Khan being isolated in November 2019 and not appearing to seek employment, suggesting Officer A increase the Prevent engagements with Mr Khan. Officer A did not agree with this. Officer E states that a meeting then took place between SB and WMCTU and as a result Prevent were directed to engage more frequently.
368. Officer E states that Prevent had some autonomy for the frequency of their engagements, however, it appears that WMCTU were capable of directing the frequency to increase, if they felt it was necessary.

369. There is also the example of the dumper truck course, where they provided information to Officer A, who appeared to disagree with their perspective. Officer E then arranged to attend MAPPA to ensure his view was appropriately represented at MAPPA. Officer E mentioned that his objection in this case was due to his role and responsibility as a police officer being to protect the public. He considered issues of rehabilitation, structure and opportunity to be outside his role as they were the responsibility of the NPS.
370. The evidence appears to suggest that SB liaised regularly with Officer A, and WMCTU. They would request information from Officer A and Prevent and forward that on. The evidence also shows that in the event of disagreements with Officer A, they took action to ensure that their view was considered, by MAPPA and WMCTU.
371. The evidence also shows a lack of clarity over who Officer A's line manager was. Officer A felt that it was, effectively, the Head of SB, whereas the two officers who fulfilled the role of Head of SB, Officer H and Officer E, were clear that they were not his line manager. Whilst the Heads of SB clearly maintained oversight of the engagements with Mr Khan, this appears to have been from an intelligence standpoint. There does appear to be a lack of clarity over the extent to which they could or should direct Officer A's actions, evidenced by the request for increased Prevent engagements with Mr Khan going to WMCTU and the Security Service.
372. Similarly, WMCTU did appear to have a prominent role at MAPPA, with at least three officers from WMCTU attending every meeting, and often more. Evidence from Officer E and Officer A suggests they were very involved in those meetings, and the minutes confirm that. ACC Ward describes the WMCTU officers attending MAPPA as "*critical friends*", but the evidence suggests significant involvement at MAPPA. Their role in decision making is discussed further below.

> Policies, protocols or procedures in place

373. The only policy that the IOPC is aware of, in relation to Prevent's role with Mr Khan, is "*The Management of Nominals subject to Part 4 Terrorism Act 2008 Registration and Notification Requirements*". Officer A stated that he did not believe this was ever adopted as a Staffordshire Police policy and the IOPC is not aware of any evidence that it was. This is a document that was provided to Officer A when he initially sought advice from WMCTU.
374. This policy does not provide any specific guidance on how the Prevent officers should have interacted with Mr Khan in their regular meetings. However, the policy does note the benefit of police having dialogue with offenders, for managing risk and helping with various issues. It is clear from the evidence that the Prevent officers fed back the details of their engagements with Mr Khan, which would help with managing and assessing his risk. It is also clear that the Prevent officers did try to help Mr Khan with various issues. This includes the issue around mobile phones, helping him attend the event at HMP Whitemoor and with moving house. As Officer A states, "*we tried to unblock barriers for him where we could.*"
375. The policy does state that, if the outcome of "*Priority Threat Assessment Indicators of Extremism*" was strong, then meetings should be every month. The outcome of this

assessment by Officer A was initially strong, and the Prevent officers met with Mr Khan at least every month. They met with him more frequently than that until July 2019.

376. Whilst there do not appear to have been any policies, protocols or procedures in place for Staffordshire Police in terms of how Prevent should engage with Mr Khan, both SB and WMCTU had oversight of their engagements. This was through MAPPA (for Team 7 in particular) and through the updates sent by Prevent to SB, which were also forwarded onto WMCTU. WMCTU had significant experience with managing Registered Terrorist Offenders, having 26 in their force area in November 2019. Officer E also noted that in respect of Team 7's attendance at MAPPA, *"their input was robust."* ACC Ward's statement outlines how Team 7 managed Part 4 offenders, and the evidence clearly shows that Prevent undertook the role in a similar way. The evidence suggests that, had there been any sign that Prevent were doing anything clearly out of line with WMCTU's expectations, this would have been noticed and rectified.

> Information sharing in relation to Mr Khan

377. The MAPPA minutes provide strong evidence that Officer A shared both updates from his team's engagements with Mr Khan, and his perspective on how Mr Khan was progressing. For example, he provided updates on the issue with the mobile phones, Mr Khan emphasising how keen he was to comply, Mr Khan going to the gym, his bank account and disclosing his offence. He was willing to raise concerns about Mr Khan, for example, about him not having a strong social network, about the difficulties he was having finding jobs and potentially unrealistic expectations when it came to employment. There does not appear to be any evidence of any issues with information sharing by Officer A in that regard.
378. Similarly, emails obtained by the IOPC and the records of meetings with Mr Khan show the detail of information which was shared with SB. The evidence suggests it was the Prevent officers' usual practice that they would have their meetings with Mr Khan, and then send an email on to SB to update them. As discussed previously, the Prevent officers would meet with Mr Khan, have a chat about what was going on, and then leave. For what were short meetings with him, a lot of detail is provided about those meetings. Officer D states, they made sure to return to the office straight after meetings with Mr Khan to write them up and ensure they were done correctly.
379. There is also strong evidence of Officer A sharing various pieces of information and updates with SB. He would send GPS tag reports every week, when he received them, and appeared to send other updates or pieces of information as and when they were received. There does not appear to be evidence of a gap in information sharing between Prevent and SB.
380. Officer G did raise a request that updates from NPS be forwarded on to SB on 6 November 2019, but Officer A clarified that he was not usually sent the updates.
381. The SB officers stated that they were not aware of the request from Mr Khan to be accompanied to London, and there does not appear to be any evidence of Prevent informing them. However, the travel arrangements were discussed at MAPPA, and no

issues were raised. It appears clear from the evidence that nobody expressed any concern about Mr Khan travelling to London. The request from Mr Khan to be accompanied appeared to solely be for the purpose of reducing any nervousness on his part, although it is impossible to say whether that was the actual reason.

382. Officer A clearly had to consider what information he shared with SB, and what information he didn't share with them. It is not clear from the evidence whether this request should have been shared with SB, given that it was purely relevant to travel arrangements and could be perceived as having little relevance to the investigative side. It is also relevant to note that, in the MAPPA meeting on 7 March 2019, there was reference to WMCTU officers offering to facilitate Mr Khan's travel to a Learning Together event. The travel arrangements were discussed at the final MAPPA meeting on 14 November.
383. It is also of note that Officer B, Officer C and Officer D were not aware, on 29 November, that Mr Khan was going to London. Officer B states that they had been planning to see Mr Khan on that day, so if they had known about the event in advance, it is possible they would have arranged to see him before then. However, it is impossible to say whether they would have done or not, and equally it is impossible to know whether a home visit to Mr Khan in the days prior to 29 November would have picked up on anything. Regardless, this would suggest that these three Prevent officers could have been given more information about what was going on with Mr Khan.
384. Both Officer A and Probation Officer O refer to being in frequent contact with each other, with Probation Officer O suggesting it was almost daily. However, it does not appear that they would, as a part of their processes, send written updates to each other on meetings with Mr Khan. It may be that the relevant information was conveyed to each other by phone, however, this is not something that can be confirmed. In any case, they both always provided updates on their contact with Mr Khan at MAPPA.
385. Beyond MAPPA, SB and NPS, it is not clear that there is anywhere else that Officer A should have shared information. The evidence suggests that it was Probation Officer O's role, as the offender manager, to liaise with other agencies involved with Mr Khan, as well as liaising with Learning Together. There is no evidence to suggest that Officer A should have been liaising with people or agencies more widely than he was.
386. The Prevent officers shared details of the meetings they had with Mr Khan. Officer A provided updates to MAPPA and had regular contact with Probation Officer O. His emails show that he forwarded on relevant pieces of information to SB. SB also asked Officer A questions at various times, for example in relation to the first proposed Learning Together trip, which Officer A answered. There does not appear to be any evidence of information which Officer A clearly should have shared but did not, with any party involved.
387. Officer G explains that SB shared all the relevant information from Prevent with WMCTU, by administering it onto appropriate platforms. There is evidence of SB sharing information with Officer A, where it was felt that he needed further information, the example being in relation to the dumper truck course. Officer G has also provided examples of him liaising with WMCTU, for example when it came to the meeting between Prevent and Mr Khan on 31 October 2019 and his views about actions to be taken as a result. In any case, the SB officers outline that information sharing between

SB and WMCTU was very frequent and ACC Ward described them as, operationally, working incredibly close together. Officer E explains that he provided updates on Mr Khan to the WMCTU Head of Investigations at weekly meetings.

> Information available to police regarding the risk posed by Mr Khan

388. Mr Khan pled guilty to terrorism offences in 2012. The basis for the plea, as outlined in the sentencing remarks of Judge M, was that Mr Khan and his Stoke-based co-defendants were seeking to raise funds to build a Madrassa in Kashmir. Their plans included making the Madrassa available for men who wanted to fight to bring Sharia to Kashmir, would have included firearms training, and there was a possibility, though no direct plan, that the defendants (including Mr Khan) would have returned to the UK and engaged in terrorist activity. The basis of the plea also included that they did not intend to participate in terrorist activity in the UK in the immediate future, and the Crown accepted that nothing had been agreed in respect of that. While Mr Khan was not part of the planned attack on the London Stock Exchange, the Crown's position was that he and members of his group were aware of this plan and it was discussed freely.
389. Judge M states that it was clear Mr Khan was keen to perform acts of terrorism in Kashmir, and it was clear that he and other recruits may return to the UK and commit acts of terrorism. That said, it is also clear that the Crown accepted that Mr Khan did not plan to participate in terrorist activity in the UK in the immediate future.
390. When Mr Khan was about to be released from prison, Officer A completed the Priority Threat Assessment for Indicators of Extremism. This gave a score of strong for Mr Khan's engagement and intent, and moderate for capability. As Officer A stated, this was based on Mr Khan's conviction, and it was accepted that Mr Khan appeared to have changed his behaviour, which needed to be assessed outside of custody.
391. It is also of note that Witness A states the Security Service had closed their investigation into Mr Khan in February 2015, and re-opened it in August 2018, in advance of Mr Khan's release. The residual risk of re-engagement for Mr Khan was assessed as low, but there was intelligence suggesting Mr Khan intended to carry out an attack upon his release. However, it was noted that this was uncorroborated intelligence of unknown validity.
392. Officer A met with Mr Khan prior to his release from prison, and escorted him from the prison to the AP. On both occasions, Mr Khan emphasised that he had changed, and was determined to maintain his new path. He was described by Officer A as being fully compliant.
393. The Prevent officers met with Mr Khan numerous times after his release from prison. Officer D did not recall any particular changes in behaviour for Mr Khan, throughout the time she knew him. Similarly, Officer C and Officer B never saw any noticeable change in behaviour for Mr Khan, with the exception of the final meeting with him on 14 November 2019. Officer C describes being shocked at how positive Mr Khan was about moving on, and that he could not think of any warning signs at all. Officer A states that their meetings with Mr Khan were always very casual, and it was a good relationship insofar as it was possible to be.

394. There is a consistency in the records of meetings with Mr Khan, that he generally appeared to be positive, intent on complying with everything and keen to move on. There is also consistency between the Prevent engagements with Mr Khan and his meetings with his mentor. Mr Khan is consistently described as having a positive outlook, except for a few occasions of frustration or rudeness.
395. On 10 April 2019, Mr Khan mentioned to Prevent wanting to use his experiences to help people, in the context of dissuading them from getting involved in extremism. On 26 April 2019, the meeting shows they discussed an issue with Mr Khan's tag and that he would speak to his solicitor about it but was confident all would be okay. During Mr Khan's re-registration on 15 May 2019, there was a discussion about the possibility of Mr Khan losing his citizenship or being deported, which Officer A appeared to reassure Mr Khan about. Mr Khan also asked about when his tag would come off.
396. Mr Khan discussed his hopes for employment with the Prevent officers, including on 26 June 2019 during a phone call with Officer B. He mentioned getting his CSCS card, his desire to undertake a dumper truck course, and the possibility of work with Mr N. Officer B describes Mr Khan as being upbeat and seeing doors opening for him. The possibility of work in the building trade was again discussed on 2 July 2019, with Mr Khan described as feeling positive about this.
397. On 15 August 2019, Mr Khan is again described as being positive about the future, although it is mentioned that he wasn't very proactive in seeking employment.
398. On 30 August 2019, Officer A and Officer C met Mr Khan at the AP and explained why Mr Khan wasn't able to do the dumper truck course. They describe him as being upset and disappointed by the decision, but ultimately accepting and pragmatic. Officer C describes a pattern of Mr Khan being understanding of things once they were explained to him and stated that Officer A was good at this with Mr Khan.
399. Officer B described Mr Khan as being his usual self on 17 September 2019, and that nothing concerning came out of a meeting with him. However, Mr Khan did mention putting his search for employment on hold, information that was shared at MAPPA. Similarly, when Mr Khan moved out of the AP on 24 September 2019, nothing of concern appears to have come up. Mr Khan was described as being happy about the freedom he now had.
400. During the visit on 31 October 2019, it became apparent that Mr Khan was going to the gym less and stopped going to the mosque. He also referred to issues accessing the internet which prevented his search for jobs. Officer B recorded that Mr Khan was still positive about the future and there were no concerns, but Officer C did note that Mr Khan seemed frustrated by the lack of employment opportunities. Both officers mention that Mr Khan not going to mosque would not be a concern, as he was not particularly religious.
401. Officer G appears to have raised concerns in this instance about Mr Khan potentially being isolated and no longer seeking employment. Officer A did not particularly share the concerns, outlining that Mr Khan was generally a solitary person and was still committed to seeking employment, referring to an update from Probation Officer O. Officer A explains that it was difficult for Mr Khan to seek employment, due to not having access to the internet. In any case, Officer E explains that Prevent were directed to increase the frequency of their engagements. They were due to see him

on 29 November 2019, which would suggest they had returned to meeting with Mr Khan every two weeks at this point.

402. It is also of note that Ms Ghiggini states that Officer A raised some low-level concern about Mr Khan, although Officer A did not recall this.²
403. Witness A mentions that by late 2019, intelligence reviewed by the Security Service's Post-Attack Review highlighted Mr Khan had become frustrated and disgruntled with parts of his life in the UK. However, this was, in their opinion, nothing beyond what is often observed in people who leave prison and are trying to re-establish their lives. Witness A also states that at no point did they have any intelligence to suggest that Mr Khan was planning to carry out an attack. Witness A notes that Mr Khan was apparently determined to be compliant, but the Security Service remained sceptical of this. It should be noted that this scepticism could be expected when dealing with someone who was convicted for terrorism offences but appeared compliant, and this scepticism does not amount to evidence that he was not genuine in complying.
404. The evidence shows that between August and November, Mr Khan had been prevented from undertaking a dumper truck course, which may have helped him find employment. He had also been stopped from working with Mr N, which aligned with a particular area of interest for him. Finally, he no longer had access to a mentor, which meant that because he was not able to access the internet, it was difficult for him to seek employment. Officer A had also raised concerns at MAPPA about Mr Khan hoping someone would just give him a job.
405. Ms Cechaviciute outlined in her ERG22+ report various protective factors and warning signs. Mr Khan's interest in employment and positive life goals were outlined as protective factors. A lack of purpose, unemployment, and boredom were outlined as warning signs, as well as going through a transitional time in his life, such as new living circumstances or setbacks. The evidence shows that, in the months leading up to November, Mr Khan had experienced difficulties and setbacks in finding employment, and seemed to express frustration about this to Officer C. He had new living circumstances, and as a result had reduced interactions with people and was spending a lot of time alone at home. He appeared to occupy his time playing on his Xbox and watching DVDs.
406. On the final visit to Mr Khan's flat, the Prevent officers had been tasked with identifying what games Mr Khan had been playing. There is conflicting evidence as to whether this originated from the MAPPA meeting on 14 November 2019, or Officer G, but Officer G was present at MAPPA and doesn't reference tasking Prevent with this in his statement. The action was allocated to Officer A in the minutes of the MAPPA meeting.
407. On their arrival, Mr Khan presented as being happy to have them in the flat and talked about his upcoming trip to London. He also mentioned employment, but that it was difficult to find anything. The record of this meeting shows that the officers told Mr Khan that they had been asked to photograph Mr Khan's Xbox games, and he responded negatively to this. He questioned whether this was to do with his licence conditions or Part 4. The officers told him it was neither, they were just asking, which

² Ms Ghiggini clarified while giving evidence during the inquest that she did not speak to Officer A, she stated that she heard this from Dr Ludlow.

he reluctantly agreed to. While Mr Khan was clearly frustrated with this, it is of note that he still complied with the request despite not being legally obliged to do so.

408. Mr Khan described this as a breakdown in trust and asked to speak to Officer A about it. He also said he would be speaking to his solicitor. Officer C stated that Mr Khan said he had abided by all his conditions, but there was still no trust. Mr Khan then asked the Prevent officers to leave the flat, though Officer C stated that he thought that they offered to leave first.
409. Officer C described feeling that the request to take photos of the Xbox games was “*a bit daft*.” Officer B saw Mr Khan’s point of view, that the request showed a lack of trust. Officer A also stated that he could see where Mr Khan was coming from, in being annoyed about it, since he had been consistently compliant about it. Probation Officer O also recorded a discussion with Mr Khan, where Mr Khan expressed being upset because he had followed everything he needed to and fully complied. However, at the end of that record, Probation Officer O also noted that there was no change in circumstances which raised concerns.
410. Ms Cechaviciute’s report outlines that a growing feeling of injustice and thinking that he is being persecuted or treated unfairly would be a warning sign for Mr Khan. The evidence above suggests that Mr Khan may have been feeling that he was treated unfairly during this last visit by the Prevent officers. However, Ms Cechaviciute’s report also states that using legal means to redress injustice was an “*offence replacement behaviour*” and Mr Khan referenced that he was going to contact his solicitor. He had also referenced contacting his solicitor on previous occasions.
411. Officer A states that he had a phone call with Mr Khan, where he explained that they had been tasked to take the photos and they just needed to get through it. Officer A felt that Mr Khan accepted the explanation and the issue was resolved, Mr Khan just wanted to get it off his chest. Officer C also stated that Officer A told him it was resolved after the call.
412. There are parallels between this incident and the dumper truck course. In both cases, something had happened which had upset Mr Khan. In both cases, Officer A explained to Mr Khan why it had happened, and Mr Khan is described as accepting the explanation. There does not appear to be any evidence available to police to suggest that this incident was unresolved or an ongoing issue.
413. When considering the totality of the police contact with Mr Khan, there was a very consistent pattern with Mr Khan. For the majority of the time, he was compliant, positive, and keen to emphasise that. He clearly demonstrated a desire to move forward with his life, by making efforts to seek employment and by engaging with Learning Together. As described above, there does appear to be evidence that he may have been frustrated with his attempts to find employment, he didn’t have much of a social network, and certainly he was upset on, and following, the last visit by Prevent officers. It should also be noted that, at the MAPPA meeting on 22 August 2019, Officer A referred to Mr Khan as being childlike, stubborn, and stropky when frustrated. NPS raised that it was never transferred into anger at them, and it would raise “*red flags*” if so. The final visit to Mr Khan by Prevent officers may, therefore, have raised a red flag. However, Officer C described it as Mr Khan seeming “*despondent about it*” as opposed to shouting at them.

414. However, as Witness A states, there was no intelligence to suggest Mr Khan was engaged in activities of national security concern, or that he was planning an attack. Witness A describes his level of frustration and discontent is in line with that which the Security Service frequently observes. Whilst Ms Cechaviciute did outline some risks which appeared to be engaged, such as a lack of purpose in life, a lack of employment, and a sense of being treated unfairly, this does not amount to evidence that Mr Khan was planning an attack. There is also evidence that Mr Khan was engaging in an “*offence replacement behaviour*”, as he referred to speaking to his solicitor after the visit by Prevent on 14 November. It is important to note that there does not appear to have been much awareness of, or reference to, Ms Cechaviciute’s report, on the part of the police.
415. It is also important to note again, that Prevent were not expected to make assessments of the risk posed by Mr Khan. They fed information back to SB, who fed the information into WMCTU, and ultimately, the Security Service led on the Priority Operation into Mr Khan.

> Decision making in relation to Mr Khan

416. The NPS were the agency with responsibility for managing Mr Khan in the community, and there was clearly scope for them to make decisions outside of MAPPA. For example, the decision to allow Mr Khan possession of the Xbox and the decision not to allow Mr Khan to go to the Learning Together event in March appear to have been largely made outside MAPPA, though they were mentioned there. The NPS’ decisions are not the subject of this report.
417. As stated by Officer A, Probation Officer O used him as a “*sounding board*”. There is evidence of regular liaison between the two, and there does not appear to be evidence of significant disagreements between the two on decision-making. There is evidence of Probation Officer O asking Officer A for his thoughts on proposals via email. Therefore, the evidence does appear to suggest that Probation Officer O valued Officer A’s opinion, as the other person who was in regular contact with Mr Khan, so would likely have taken his views into account.
418. Major decisions appear to have been taken to MAPPA and discussed there. Examples of these have been discussed throughout the report, such as the attendance at the Learning Together event at HMP Whitemoor, Mr Khan leaving the AP, the dumper truck course he wanted to complete, and the work with Mr N and a community engagement organisation. The event at Fishmongers’ Hall was also discussed at MAPPA.
419. In relation to the dumper truck course, the evidence shows that Probation Officer O took this to the MAPPA meeting on 11 July 2019. Unlike the first Learning Together event, there does not appear to be evidence that Probation Officer O thought this course was inappropriate or too soon. The dumper truck course is recorded as causing concern among the attendees at the meeting due to the use of vehicles in previous terrorist attacks. However, both Officer A and Probation Officer O appear to have provided slightly different perspectives. Officer A outlined that the risk was already present since Mr Khan had a provisional driving licence and access to vehicles. Probation Officer O stated that the equipment would be confined to a

building site. The attendees at the meeting decided more clarification would be required.

420. Officer A had expressed previously, in an email to SB officers, that there was no evidence of an attack being on Mr Khan's mind, and that NPS had no grounds to oppose the course. Officer A emphasised the need to work with Mr Khan and the need for a strong reason to obstruct him moving on. The evidence shows that Officer E was sufficiently concerned about this course that he sought an invite to MAPPAs, and he did attend on 11 July 2019.
421. Probation Officer O updated the next MAPPAs meeting on 22 August 2019 that Mr Khan's use of a dumper truck would be confined to a construction site and limited to 15mph. The minutes show that WMCTU officers stated at this meeting that Mr Khan having access to heavyweight vehicles would be inappropriate. Officer A raised the example of Mr Khan passing his driving test and gaining access to a vehicle, which would also present this risk. Ultimately, the decision was that Mr Khan needed to demonstrate he could be trusted and didn't approve the course.
422. Officer E stated that Team 7's *"input was robust such as when providing a challenge to a proposal for Khan to be provided a dumper truck course."* Officer A also describes Team 7 as being *"extensively involved"* at MAPPAs (although this isn't in relation to any meeting in particular). The evidence from the MAPPAs minutes, Officer A's email response to SB officers about the course, and Officer E's statement, suggests that there was some level of disagreement over whether this course was appropriate for Mr Khan. Ultimately, the evidence shows that the decision taken at the meeting was in line with the view of the WMCTU officers and SB officers that this was inappropriate. The evidence, therefore, suggests that those officers had some influence over decision-making, where there was a disagreement.
423. There was another example of apparent disagreement when it came to Mr Khan's potential involvement with Mr N and a community engagement organisation. Probation Officer O updated MAPPAs on 11 July 2019 about the possibility of Mr N working with Mr Khan. Officer A highlighted at this meeting that it aligned with Mr Khan's long-term aspirations and may be a useful connection.
424. The potential to work with Mr N was mentioned again at MAPPAs on 3 October 2019. Some concerns were raised by an officer from WMCTU, and more detail was requested. However, before the next MAPPAs meeting, the decision was made that Mr Khan would not be able to work with Mr N. Probation Officer O states that this was contrary to his expectations.
425. In Probation Officer O's statement, he explains he *"spoke to police colleagues"* and *"they had decided that Usman should be required to show consistent progress over a further 12 months before he was permitted to work with a community engagement organisation."* Mr N references the email, stating that this was Prevent, however, the email Probation Officer O sent only refers to *"police colleagues"*. Officer A had expressed a positive view about this work previously. Officer A also stated that MAPPAs didn't sanction this in the end, and that he thought it was just because it didn't seem to fit, *"we didn't really see any benefit to KHAN."* The evidence shows that this decision does not appear to have been made at MAPPAs.

426. This example shows that, even outside of MAPPA, police officers had influence over decisions made in relation to Mr Khan, including when Probation Officer O had a different opinion.
427. Overall, the evidence shows that, both inside and outside of MAPPA, police officers had significant input into decisions made about Mr Khan. While Probation Officer O was the offender manager, MAPPA rightly played a significant role in the decision-making. The evidence shows that police from WMCTU, SB and Prevent had a lot of input at MAPPA. The dumper truck course is an example of the views of WMCTU and SB taking precedence over the apparent views of Officer A in Prevent, during discussions at MAPPA. The work with Mr N is an example of the views of police officers taking precedence over the view of Probation Officer O, in a decision that appears to have been made outside MAPPA.

> **Decision to allow Mr Khan to attend the event at Fishmongers' Hall**

428. The people who were regularly in contact with Mr Khan invariably described his involvement with Learning Together as being a positive influence. Probation Officer O described it as an extremely strong protective factor, and Officer A stated that Mr Khan lit up when he spoke about it. Probation Officer O also identified Mr Khan's change in behaviour whilst in prison as aligning with his involvement with Learning Together.
429. Officer A first appeared to become aware of the event at Fishmongers' Hall on 20 August 2019, and it was discussed at the MAPPA meeting two days later. Probation Officer O recalled the discussion at that MAPPA meeting being about the fact that Mr Khan had progressed over time, about his ongoing engagement with Learning Together, and that there had been nothing since release that had raised any significant concerns. Officer A didn't recall anyone expressing concern about Mr Khan attending this event. WMCTU and SB officers were present at this MAPPA meeting.
430. Officer A explains the clear progression in events with Learning Together. There had been a suggested event in March in Cambridge, which NPS had declined. This event had involved an overnight stay and was felt to be too soon after his release and a longer period of time was needed to better assess his risk in the community. At MAPPA on 23 January 2019, Probation Officer O specifically mentioned that an event in September or October may be more appropriate. Mr Khan attended an event in June at HMP Whitemoor, having been escorted by Prevent officers, and had appeared to be very positive about this event afterwards. Finally, the event at Fishmongers' Hall was a one-day event, so did not raise any issues of staying overnight. There had been no concerns raised that Mr Khan was re-engaging with extremism, and he had complied with all of his conditions since being released from prison. This event was 11 months after his release from prison.
431. Ultimately, the decision regarding whether Mr Khan could attend the event was NPS' to make, with MAPPA input. However, as explained above, if there had been strong objections from WMCTU or SB it is entirely possible that the decision would have been different. But there was no evidence to suggest any concern about Mr Khan's attendance at this event. As mentioned above, everyone who was involved with Mr Khan appeared to see Learning Together as a positive. Officer A had previously

highlighted at MAPPA, on 30 May 2019 that there was a risk that Mr Khan's "*bubble could burst*" if he stopped working with Learning Together.

432. On 22 August 2019 at MAPPA, it was questioned whether there was a risk that Learning Together was feeding Mr Khan's self-entitlement, but it was agreed to remain mindful of it. There is no evidence to suggest the concern about this potential risk ever escalated.
433. As described above, in the months leading up to the event, some of the risks identified by Ms Cechaviciute did appear to be engaged, including a lack of purpose, a lack of employment, and a sense of being persecuted. However, Mr Khan's work with Learning Together was seen as being almost universally positive. It is also relevant to consider that any feelings of persecution would have increased, should Mr Khan have been denied permission to go to the event. There would have needed to be a justification to deny his attendance, and the available evidence does not appear to show such a justification.
434. The attendance at this event was discussed at the MAPPA meeting on 14 November 2019, and shortly after that during a meeting between WMCTU, SB and the Security Service. The minutes of the MAPPA meeting do not mention any concerns being raised about it.
435. The only duties and responsibilities that Officer A, SB and WMCTU would have had in relation to the decision to allow Mr Khan to travel, were to share any relevant information at MAPPA and give their view on what the decision should be, if they had one. As has been described above, the evidence suggests that this is what they did.

> **Travel arrangements for attending the event in London**

436. Probation Officer O emailed Officer A on 1 November 2019, including an email from Dr Ludlow. Dr Ludlow explained that Mr Khan appeared to be concerned about travelling to London, alone, whilst on tag. There is no evidence that NPS, Dr Ludlow, or anyone else felt that Mr Khan should be accompanied because of any security concerns.
437. As has been described previously, the relationship with Prevent officers appeared to be a positive one for Mr Khan. Officer C stated that Officer A, in particular, was very good with Mr Khan. Mr Khan also does not appear to have travelled anywhere outside of Stafford by himself up to this point, since his release from prison. The evidence suggests it would be reasonable to think that Mr Khan might be apprehensive about travelling to London alone.

438. As Officer A explained, there did not appear to him to be any justification for accompanying Mr Khan to the event. It would have been a big commitment to send two officers, simply to accompany Mr Khan in order to reduce his apprehension about travelling. Officer A also outlines the lack of powers they would have over Mr Khan in this situation, and the potentially vulnerable position they would have been in. Officer A explains that, if he had decided to accompany Mr Khan out of any concerns for safety, this would likely mean that it would require a larger operation around that. It would also potentially call into question why Mr Khan could attend in the first place. Ultimately, the evidence does not suggest there was any evidence available at the time to suggest it was necessary to accompany Mr Khan.
439. Officer A, instead of just denying the request, suggested an alternative option. That was, Mr Khan being met at Euston station by someone from Learning Together and escorted to and from the event in London. This appears to have been in line with the pattern, as described above, of Prevent doing what they could to reduce issues and support Mr Khan. In addition to that, Officer A spoke to Mr Khan and explained the arrangements that had been made, and described Mr Khan as being accepting of it. This is in line with the perceived pattern, in respect of Officer A's explanations about the dumper truck course and, later, the issue around Prevent photographing Mr Khan's Xbox games. Officer A explained the situation and then Mr Khan is described as accepting his explanation.
440. Probation Officer O raised the event at MAPPA again on 14 November 2019, including the travel arrangements, and no concerns were raised.

> Questions to be answered by the DSI investigation

441. At no point during the investigation was a determination made, pursuant to para 21A of Schedule 3 to the Police Reform Act 2002, that any person serving with the police:
- may have committed a criminal offence; or
 - behaved in a manner that would justify the bringing of disciplinary proceedings
442. The recorded rationale for this decision was that following a detailed review of the Prevent officers' statements, there appeared to be some general and specific learning points, but there was nothing to indicate that the officers had done anything which would amount to misconduct.
443. On receipt of this final investigation report, Adam Stacey, acting with the delegated authority of the DG under paragraph 24A(4) of Schedule 3 to the Police Reform Act 2002, is required to finally determine the two matters referred to above.
444. To conclude this analysis, I, as lead investigator, will consider the following:
- what evidence is available regarding the nature and extent of Staffordshire Police's contact with Mr Khan prior to his death
 - what evidence is available in relation to whether the police may have caused or contributed to the deaths of Mr Khan, Ms Saskia Jones, or Mr Jack Merritt

> What evidence is available regarding the nature and extent of Staffordshire Police’s contact with Mr Khan prior to his death?

445. There are detailed records of the meetings between Mr Khan and Prevent officers following his release and prior to his death, summarised above.

> What evidence is available in relation to whether the police may have caused or contributed to the deaths of Mr Khan, Ms Saskia Jones, or Mr Jack Merritt?

446. Mr Khan died after being shot by police officers from the Metropolitan Police Service and City of London Police, which was subject to a separate IOPC investigation, Operation Richenda. The decision maker in that case found that the shooting of Mr Khan was justified.

447. The motives for Mr Khan’s actions, which led to his shooting by police, are impossible to know for certain, and the factors that led to him doing what he did are similarly impossible to know. It is possible that part of the reason Mr Khan did what he did included his discontent with life following his release from prison, including the difficulty finding employment. It is possible that Mr Khan felt unfairly treated following the final visit of Prevent officers to his home. It is also possible that Mr Khan had been intending to carry out an attack since his release from prison, and this was an opportunity for him to do so. Given the lack of certainty as to what motivated Mr Khan’s attack, there is insufficient evidence to suggest the police involved with his management caused or contributed to his death.

448. Mr Khan’s actions led to his own death and caused the deaths of Ms Jones and Mr Merritt. The police had no contact with Ms Jones and Mr Merritt, with the exception of medical care provided on 29 November 2019, which is not the subject of this report. Given that there is insufficient evidence to suggest the police involved with Mr Khan’s management caused or contributed to his death, there is similarly insufficient evidence to suggest the police involved with Mr Khan’s management caused or contributed to the deaths of Ms Jones and Mr Merritt. Other members of the public were seriously injured by Mr Khan on 29 November 2019. Again, and for the same reasons, there is insufficient evidence to suggest the police involved with Mr Khan’s management caused or contributed to those injuries.

> Learning

449. Throughout the investigation, the IOPC has considered learning with regard to the matters under investigation. The type of learning identified can include improving practice, updating policy or making changes to training. There are two types of learning recommendations that the IOPC can make under the Police Reform Act 2002 (PRA):

- Section 10(1)(e) recommendations – these are made at any stage of the investigation. There is no requirement under the Police Reform Act for the Appropriate Authority to provide a formal response to these recommendations.

- Paragraph 28A recommendations – made at the end of the investigation, which do require a formal response. These recommendations and any responses to them are published on the recommendations section of the IOPC website.

450. **Section 10 learning identified during investigation**

During the investigation, the following Section 10 recommendations were made and the decision maker may wish to consider whether any of these should now be issued as a Paragraph 28A recommendations:

1. *The IOPC recommends that the national policing lead for counter-terrorism should ensure that police officers involved in managing offenders released from prison following terrorism offences should be given appropriate and specific training in relation to the types of offenders that they are managing and the different risks that they pose.*
2. *The IOPC recommends that the national policing lead for counter-terrorism should ensure there are suitable policies and procedures in place in relation to the police's involvement in managing convicted terrorist offenders. These policies and procedures should distinguish between the different types of terrorist offenders and cover what the precise role and responsibility of the police force is, in relation to each type of offender. They should also include the duties of the officers in terms of the type of information they should be sharing with each agency that will be involved.*
3. *The IOPC recommends that the national policing lead for counter-terrorism should ensure that police forces develop appropriate systems, to assist with the implementation of policies and procedures, and information capture regarding the management of convicted terrorist offenders. These systems should enable the accurate capture of data in relation to the different numbers and types of terrorist offenders, to support the effective management of CT offenders at a national level and between agencies.*
4. *The IOPC recommends that the national policing lead for counter-terrorism should ensure there is a list of appropriate mobile devices that can be used by convicted terrorist offenders, depending on the conditions to which they are subject, and not allow them access to any other mobile device. Particularly, police forces should ensure that convicted terrorist offenders are not given mobile devices that have access to the internet if they are not allowed access to the internet.*

451. Assistant Commissioner Neil Basu, National Lead for CT Policing, wrote to the IOPC on 22 January 2021, to provide an update on the above learning recommendations. This update was as follows:

1. *In November 2020 London's Terrorist Offender Management Unit (TOMU) ran a pilot course and this is being evaluated with feedback from National Probation Service National Security Division and CTP's Organisational Development Unit (ODU) for development of our future officer training programme.*

A Counter Terrorism Nominal Management (CTNM) core course is being developed with input from across the Counter-Terrorism Network and coordinated by ODU. Subject to recruitment this will be delivered from April 2021 and will have additional bolt-on modules and Continual Professional Development events.

2. *You are aware of CTP establishing Project Semper as a change programme to develop our approach to management of nominals in communities with partners. A key work stream deliverable is production of a national Nominal Management Manual of Guidance. This will address this IOPC recommendation for staff and define an overall approach to management of CT nominals, distinguish between arrangements in different cohorts, and codify roles and responsibilities for CTP officers and staff. It will ensure CTP's approach mirrors other guidance in this space (such as MAPPA and NPS national standards as examples). The first version of the Manual is due to be published for consultation by end of January 2021.*
3. *CTP has appointed Detective Chief Superintendent (DCS) Paul Betts as Capability Lead for Nominal Management and each region has nominated a Nominal Management Lead Responsible Officer (LRO) at the rank of Chief Inspector. This will ensure connectivity between national and regional CTP delivery, and develop a national 'community of practice' for CTNM. The Joint Counter Terrorism Prison and Probation Hub are now collating data nationally to produce a single nominal headcount refreshed on a regular basis. A process is in place to share with regions for data quality and assurance. This approach has been built into the business case for change to ensure regions are adequately resourced to support this activity.*

The funding decision on regional delivery will be made in late February.

4. The CTNM Manual of Guidance now contains guidance for CTP practitioners on issuance of mobile phones to offenders on licence. More specifically, the storage via CTPs online platforms of a dynamic list of suitable phones without internet connectivity is being explored. Consultation is ongoing with relevant technical experts on which devices should be added to the list and how this can be maintained.

452. An email from DCS Paul Betts on 15 March 2021 clarified that, with respect to the response to the first learning recommendation, training is now anticipated to be delivered from June onwards, not April. With respect to the third learning recommendation, DCS Betts informed the IOPC that the funding decision was in and all regions will get uplifted resources to do Nominal Management activity.
453. The decision maker may also wish to consider making a learning recommendation that there should be a process for conducting a review of police contact with a Registered Terrorist Offender, if they go on to commit a relevant further offence. There does not appear to have been a thorough review of the police contact with RTO1 in this case.

>Next steps

454. The decision maker is now required to reach conclusions about the investigation. The decision maker will consider the evidence with a view to determining whether the report indicates that any person serving with the police may have committed a criminal offence, or behaved in a manner that would justify the bringing of disciplinary proceedings.
455. The decision maker will also decide whether to require Staffordshire Police to determine whether or not the performance of a person serving with the police is unsatisfactory, and what action (if any) the authority will take in respect of any such person's performance. If so required, the decision maker will then decide whether those decisions are appropriate, and whether to recommend (and potentially direct) that the performance of a person serving with the police is unsatisfactory, and, if so, the action (if any) that should be taken in respect of it.
456. The decision maker's conclusions will be recorded on a separate document.
457. The decision maker will also decide whether any organisational learning has been identified that should be shared with the organisation in question.

DSI

Operation Aragon

Investigation into the police's management of Mr Usman Khan following his release from prison

- > Independent investigation report
- > Appendices

> Appendix 1: The role of the IOPC

The IOPC carries out its own independent investigations into complaints and incidents involving the police, HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC), the National Crime Agency (NCA) and Home Office immigration and enforcement staff.

We are completely independent of the police and the government. All cases are overseen by the Director General (DG), who has the power to delegate their decisions to other members of staff in the organisation. These individuals are referred to as DG delegates, or decision makers, and they provide strategic direction and scrutinise the investigation.

> The investigation

At the outset of an investigation, a lead investigator will be appointed who will be responsible for the day-to-day running of the investigation on behalf of the DG. This may involve taking witness statements, analysing CCTV footage, reviewing documents, obtaining forensic and other expert evidence, as well as liaising with the coroner and other agencies.

The lead investigator is supported by a team that includes other investigators, lawyers, press officers and other specialist staff.

Throughout the investigation, meaningful updates are provided to interested persons and may be provided to other stakeholders at regular intervals. Each investigation also passes through a series of reviews and quality checks.

The IOPC has three main types of investigation. This case was what we refer to as a Death or Serious Injury (DSI) investigation, which means any circumstances where, or as a result of which, a person has died or sustained a serious injury and:

- at the time of death or serious injury, the person had been arrested by a person serving with the police and had not been released, or was otherwise detained in the custody of a person serving with the police, or
- at or before the time of death or serious injury, the person had contact of any kind – whether direct or indirect – with a person serving with the police who was acting in the execution of his or her duties, and there is an indication that the contact may have caused – whether directly or indirectly – or contributed to the death or serious injury

The investigation aims to identify and obtain the available evidence regarding the nature and extent of the police contact, and whether the police may have caused or contributed to the death or injury.

The possible outcomes of DSI investigations reflect the fact that it is not an inquiry into any criminal, conduct or complaint allegation against any person serving with the police.

> Investigation reports

Once the investigator has gathered the evidence, they must prepare a report. The report must summarise and analyse the evidence and refer to or attach any relevant documents.

The report must then be submitted to the decision maker, who will decide if the report indicates that any person serving with the police may have committed a criminal offence, or behaved in a manner that would justify the bringing of disciplinary proceedings. If the decision maker decides that there is such an indication, it will be investigated as a conduct matter.

The report will also be given to the appropriate authority (normally the police force), who may be required to determine whether the actions of anyone serving with the police were unsatisfactory and what action (if any) will be taken in respect of any such person's performance. The appropriate authority must inform the decision maker of both its decisions. Unsatisfactory performance will be dealt with through the police force's unsatisfactory performance procedure (UPP). UPP is generally handled by the person's line manager and is intended to improve the performance of both the individual and police force.

If the decision maker considers that the appropriate authority's response is not appropriate, the decision maker has powers to recommend or ultimately direct that the matter is dealt with by UPP. The decision maker will also decide whether to make individual or wider learning recommendations for any relevant organisations.

> Inquests

In investigations into deaths, the IOPC's investigation report and supporting documents are usually provided to the coroner. The coroner may hold an inquest, either alone or with a jury. This hearing is unlike a trial and is a fact-finding forum. A coroner might ask a selection of witnesses to give evidence at the inquest. At the end of the inquest, the coroner and/or jury will decide how they think the death occurred based on the evidence they have heard and seen.

> Publishing the report

After any possible proceedings relating to the investigation have concluded, the IOPC may publish a summary of its investigation report. Redactions might be made to the report at this stage, for example, to ensure that individuals' personal data is sufficiently protected.

> Appendix 2: Terms of reference

Terms of Reference

Investigation into the police's management of Mr Usman Khan following his release from prison

Investigation Name:	Operation Aragon
Investigation Type:	Independent
Appropriate Authority:	Staffordshire Police
Case Reference:	2019/128766
Director General (DG) Delegate (decision maker):	Adam Stacey
Lead Investigator:	Richard West
Target Range:	6 - 9 months

Summary of events

This summary is presented on the basis of information presently available to the IOPC. The veracity and accuracy of that information will be considered as part of the investigation and will be subject to review.

Mr Usman Khan was released from prison on 24 December 2018 following his conviction for terrorism offences. Police officers from Staffordshire Police's Prevent Team were involved, along with other agencies, in managing Mr Khan following his release from prison.

On 29 November 2019, Mr Khan travelled to London to attend a 'Learning Together' event run by Cambridge University. At this event, Mr Khan killed two people and wounded others before being shot and killed by armed police officers.

A MAPPA Serious Case Review, an Independent Review of CT MAPPA and a Serious Further Offence review are also taking place.

Terms of Reference

1. To investigate Staffordshire Police's involvement in the decision to allow Mr Khan to travel to London unaccompanied, including:
 - a) what their duties and responsibilities were in relation to his travel arrangements to attend the 'Learning Together' event in London

- b) what relevant policies, protocols or procedures were in place
 - c) what information they were aware of in relation to the assessment of Mr. Khan's risk, subsequent to his release from imprisonment and whether that was shared with the relevant agencies
2. To assist in fulfilling the state's investigative obligation arising under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) by ensuring as far as possible that the investigation is independent, effective, open and prompt, and that the full facts are brought to light and any lessons are learned.
 3. Further to paragraph 21A of Schedule 3 of the Police Reform Act 2002, to assess during the investigation whether any person serving with the police may have committed a criminal offence or behaved in a manner justifying the bringing of disciplinary proceedings (i.e. whether there are any indications of 'conduct matters') and if so, follow the paragraph 21A procedure and make appropriate amendments to the terms of reference of the investigation.
 4. To consider and report on whether there may be organisational learning, including:
 - whether any change in policy or practice would help to prevent a recurrence of the event, incident or conduct investigated
 - whether the incident highlights any good practice that should be shared

The decision maker responsible for oversight of this investigation is Operations Manager Adam Stacey. The decision maker has approved these terms of reference. At the end of the investigation they will decide whether they agree with the appropriate authority's proposals in response to the report.

These terms of reference were approved on 22 January 2020.

> Appendix 3: Glossary

AP	Approved premises
APP	Authorised Professional Practice (issued by College of Policing)
CT	Counter-Terrorism
CTA	Counter-Terrorism Act 2008
CTSIO	Counter Terrorism Senior Investigating Officer
CTU	Counter-Terrorism Unit
DG	IOPC Director General
DSI	Death or Serious Injury
DSU	Dedicated Source Unit
ERG22+	Extremism Risk Guidelines
FIMU	Fixed Intelligence Management Unit
JTAC	Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre
IOPC	Independent Office for Police Conduct
MAPPA	Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements
MI5	The Security Service
OIMU	Operational Intelligence Management Unit
NPS	National Probation Service
RTO	Registered Terrorist Offender
SB	Special Branch
SIO	Senior Investigating Officer
SO15	Specialist Operations – Counter Terrorism Command
SPIN	Staffordshire Police Intelligence Network
TACT	Terrorism Act 2000
ViSOM	Violent and Sex Offenders Managers
ViSOR	Violent and Sex Offenders Register
WMCTU	West Midlands Counter-Terrorism Unit
WMP	West Midlands Police