

Ms Bethany Rae Fields conduct matter

Investigation into West Yorkshire Police's response to several reports involving Mr Paul Crowther and Ms Fields, prior to Ms Fields' death on 12 September 2019

> Independent investigation report

> Investigation information

Investigation name:	Bethany Fields
IOPC reference:	2019/125197
Investigation type	Conduct matter
IOPC office:	Wakefield
Lead investigator:	Gez Lyons
Case supervisor:	Kim Manning
Director General delegate (decision maker):	Emily Barry
Status of report:	Final
Date finalised:	18 May 2021

The primary purpose of this report is to provide information to the appropriate authority (AA) and decision maker to allow them to perform their obligations under the PRA. Although this report may be disclosed to other parties, its primary audience is stakeholders who have knowledge of the complaints system. Therefore, IOPC/police responsibilities or the detail of the misconduct system will not be explained in this document. For cases using this template, complainants and interested parties will be updated separately in a plain English outcome letter supported by a document explaining the IOPC and the complaints system processes.

In conduct investigation reports, the role of the designated investigator is to provide an accurate summary of the evidence, and attach or refer to any relevant documents for the decision maker.

On receipt of the report, the decision maker will make their CPS referral decision. The decision maker will also reach an opinion about whether there is a case to answer for misconduct, gross misconduct or unsatisfactory performance in respect of any person serving with the police. The report and DM's opinion will then be sent to the AA; upon receipt of the AA's proposals, the decision maker will make their other determinations in accordance with the legislation.

> The investigation

> Background to the investigation

1. On 16 August 2019, Mr A in Leeds, contacted West Yorkshire Police (WYP) by telephone. He reported that Mr Paul Crowther had threatened to take his own life after Mr A had banned him from attending a music studio, due to Mr Crowther making alleged threats to staff.
2. WYP officers located Mr Crowther later that day at which time he informed them that he was fit and well and had no desire to harm himself. The police incident log was closed after WYP officers spoke to Mr Crowther and consulted with a mental health nurse, who confirmed that he was okay to be left on his own.
3. During the late evening of 16 August 2019, Ms Bethany Fields, who was staying in the Derbyshire area at that time, made a telephone complaint to Derbyshire Constabulary, in relation to alleged threats made against her and a male friend named Mr B. Ms Fields said that her ex-partner, Mr Crowther, had sent a text message to her that he was going to beat up and kill Mr B.
4. During the early morning of 17 August 2019, Derbyshire Constabulary transferred this incident to WYP, who attended Mr B's home address. Mr B said he had not had any direct contact with Mr Crowther. He said he felt safe as Mr Crowther did not know his home address and added that he thought Mr Crowther was trying to get a reaction from Ms Fields.
5. A WYP despatcher contacted Ms Fields by telephone, to let her know that Mr B was safe and well. However, due to the poor connection the conversation was cut short. During that conversation Ms Fields stated that she would make a complaint about Mr Crowther in relation to some domestic issues, when she returned to the West Yorkshire area.
6. Later that day, WYP attempted to contact Ms Fields by telephone, but the call was not answered and went straight to Ms Fields' voicemail facility. An appointment was later made for Ms Fields to attend Pudsey police station at 9pm on 19 August 2019.
7. On 19 August 2019, Mr Crowther attended Dewsbury police station where he spoke to WYP officers to admit threats he had made to Mr B. During that visit there appears to have been confusion regarding whether Mr Crowther was making an admission in relation to the alleged threats he had made to Mr B or if he was wanting to report that he was a victim of alleged threats from Mr B. It does not appear that Mr Crowther was interviewed or provided a statement during that visit. It appears that WYP liaised with the force mental health nurse before Mr Crowther left the police station.

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8. On 19 August 2019, Ms Fields made a complaint to WYP and in her statement she described her relationship with her by then ex-partner, Mr Crowther, between October 2017 and June 2019. Ms Fields said Mr Crowther was abusive and controlling towards her and was often threatening towards a man who was her former partner.
9. Ms Fields alleged that during their relationship, Mr Crowther had threatened to punch her and also assault or kill her friends and family if she ever left him. She described Mr Crowther as being obsessed with killing someone and what it would feel like. She suggested she did not know what to do and was scared and frightened of what he might do now their relationship had ended. She added that she was also fearful for others.
10. Whilst providing her complaint, Ms Fields explained that she went to Women's Aid in February 2018, for help and advice and they completed a Domestic Abuse, Stalking and Honour Based Violence (DASH) risk assessment form.
11. On 21 August 2019, Mr Crowther visited the Dewsbury police station help desk and said he was concerned that something had been reported to the police involving him. He was told an officer would contact him.
12. On 27 August 2019, Mr Crowther visited the same help desk and made an allegation that he had been the victim of a common assault perpetrated by Ms Fields and, although not sure of the date, believed it was sometime in May 2019. Mr Crowther explained that he did not report the matter at the time as he did not want it to affect their relationship.
13. On 3 September 2019, Mr Crowther visited the same help desk asking for an update on the assault he had reported. He was told the matter had not yet been allocated but that he would be contacted when it had been. He alleged he had concerns that Ms Fields worked with vulnerable people and did not think she should be able to do this, as she had assaulted him.
14. On 7 September 2019, Mr Crowther visited the same help desk asking for an update. On this occasion WYP explained to him that they were short of staff and asked him to be patient and an officer would contact him as soon as possible.
15. On the same date, Ms Fields' father contacted WYP and expressed concerns for his daughter, as she was being harassed by Mr Crowther. Mr Fields stated that he had seen Mr Crowther that day and he would not leave him (Mr Fields) alone, Mr Crowther had tried to speak to him and started threatening him. Mr Fields asked to be contacted the next day regarding the incident; it does not appear WYP contacted him as per his request.
16. On 9 September 2019, Ms Fields' new partner and work colleague, Mr B, acting on the advice of a friend who was a police officer, contacted WYP and stated that he had been made aware that Mr Crowther had made a number of threats to kill him. These threats were allegedly made to a number of people, but Mr B was sufficiently concerned by the threats to leave the Yorkshire region as he believed Mr Crowther was intent on killing him. It would appear that WYP closed the matter

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with no further police action. A recorded rationale for closing the incident explained this was because the threats were made to third parties rather than directly to Mr B.

17. On 11 September 2019, Mr Crowther reported to WYP that he was being harassed by Mr A who he believed was an ex-partner of Ms Fields. He explained that he had reported him to various authorities after finding out that Mr A had allegedly groomed Ms Fields a number of years previously. He also alleged that Mr A had become aware of this and was making threats towards him.
18. On 12 September 2019, at the request of a WYP officer, Mr Crowther attended Dewsbury police station in relation to his assault complaint against Ms Fields, initiated by his visit to the help desk on 27 August 2019. An officer obtained a statement and completed a DASH risk assessment. WYP then recorded Mr Crowther as a medium risk domestic abuse victim.
19. At 6.12pm on the same date, WYP received a telephone call stating that Mr Crowther had approached Ms Fields outside the Huddersfield Irish Centre and stabbed her with a kitchen style knife. Mr Crowther had then run to his car as several members of the public provided Ms Fields with first aid. Paramedics subsequently declared Ms Fields deceased at 6.37pm.
20. Mr Crowther left the scene in his car, which police subsequently located and pursued. Mr Crowther stopped on a motorway bridge, held a knife to his throat and climbed over the railings. Officers at the scene were able to diffuse the situation and arrested Mr Crowther.
21. WYP dealt with Ms Fields' death as a murder inquiry.
22. On 13 September 2019, WYP made a mandatory death or serious injury (DSI) referral to the IOPC. On 18 September 2019, we decided to carry out an independent investigation. The investigation was initially allocated to an IOPC lead investigator who has since left the organisation. On 10 January 2020, I was appointed as lead investigator.
23. On 8 September 2020, Mr Crowther was sentenced to life imprisonment and was detained in a mental health facility. If the hospital order becomes no longer necessary then he will serve a minimum of 12 years in prison.
24. The IOPC investigation will not seek to determine the cause of Ms Fields' death, which will be a matter for Her Majesty's Coroner.

> Terms of reference

25. To investigate the nature and extent of WYP contact with Ms Fields and Mr Crowther prior to Ms Fields' death on 12 September 2019, including reports WYP received from Mr Fields and Mr B, in particular:
 - a) WYP's response to Ms Fields' complaint against Mr Crowther on 19 August 2019;

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- b) WYP's response to Mr Crowther's complaint of assault and harassment against Ms Fields on 27 August 2019 about an incident in May 2019;
- c) WYP's response to Mr Fields' contact on 7 September 2019 regarding concern for his daughter and ongoing harassment from Mr Crowther;
- d) WYP's response to an allegation made by Mr B on 9 September 2019 that Mr Crowther had made a number of threats to kill him;
- e) WYP's consideration of intelligence it held relating to Mr Crowther from previous incidents and how it used this in risk assessments relating to him;
- f) The decisions and actions of the officers dealing with Ms Fields' complaint against Mr Crowther on and after 19 August 2020;
- g) Whether the decisions and actions of WYP were in accordance with local and national policies and procedures

26. The evidence relating to each of these matters will be presented in this report.

> Subject

27. Following a thorough review of the available evidence, I identified an indication that PC 1 may have behaved in a manner that, if proven or admitted, could justify the bringing of disciplinary proceedings. I completed a severity assessment indicating that PC 1 may have behaved in a manner which could justify misconduct proceedings. On 13 August 2020, PC 1 was served with a Regulation 16 notice of investigation in accordance with the Police (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2012. The Terms of reference for this investigation were amended accordingly and approved by the IOPC decision maker (DM) Emily Barry on 19 October 2020.

Name and role	Brief description of alleged conduct/breach of Standards of Professional Behaviour	Severity	Date notified
PC 1 (probationer officer at the time of the incidents)	The available evidence indicated that his involvement in this incident may have fallen below the standard expected of him in his role; namely that he: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• may have failed to complete the DASH risk assessment correctly and in a manner prescribed by WYP policy when he obtained the witness statement and completed the DASH risk assessment with Ms Fields on 19 August 2019,	Misconduct	13 August 2020

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	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• may have failed to record or consider information regarding Mr Crowther being involved in previous domestic related incidents when completing the DASH risk assessment,• may have failed to record any consultation in respect of this allegation to any healthcare professional or mental health crisis team in order to take positive action to prevent injury to Ms Fields or Mr Crowther; despite information relating to Mr Crowther suffering from mental health issues,• may have failed to accurately record information from his own PEACE notes and the statement he obtained from Ms Fields on to the DASH risk assessment, which may have raised concerns for Ms Fields' safety;• may have failed to consider relevant information relating to Mr Crowther's previous antecedent history as to making a disclosure under the Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme (DVDS – 'Clare's Law'¹);• may have failed to have the DASH risk assessment reviewed by a supervisor prior to submission to the safeguarding unit (SGU), in line with WYP policy;• may have failed to apply WYP policy in relation to crime recording, harassment and stalking, controlling and coercive behaviour offences when provided with additional information from Mr A on 4 September 2019, about Mr		
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¹ The Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme (DVDS) – often referred to as 'Clare's Law' after the tragic case of Clare Wood, who was murdered by her former partner in Greater Manchester in 2009 – was rolled out across all 43 police forces in England and Wales in March 2014 following the successful completion of a 14 month pilot. The Scheme was introduced to set out procedures that could be used by the police in relation to disclosure of information about previous violent and abusive offending by a potentially violent individual to their partner where this may help protect them from further violent and abusive offending.

	<p>Crowther's behaviour toward him, as it related to Ms Fields;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • may have failed to undertake ongoing dynamic risk assessments of the incident or reviewed the original DASH risk assessment of Ms Fields. There is no indication that he escalated this incident to his supervisor or the SGU after receiving additional information from Mr A and Niche checks in relation to Mr Crowther's antecedent history on 8 September 2019. 		
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28. PC 1 provided a detailed written response to his notice of investigation. After considering his response, I had additional questions to put to him. On 8 October 2020, I interviewed PC 1 under the misconduct caution during which he answered the questions put to him. PC 1's written response and interview transcript will be further referred to throughout this report chronology.

> Background information from Mr Crowther's police intelligence records

29. We obtained a copy of Mr Crowther's WYP intelligence record profile and a police national computer (PNC) check. The intelligence profile indicated that Mr Crowther was a named suspect for domestic incidents between 2004 and 2015 in relation to two different partners, not including Ms Fields. He received a harassment warning and was reported on summons for harassment. In November 2015, he pleaded guilty and received a restraining order, which was also recorded on his PNC record.
30. Between 2012 and January 2018, Mr Crowther was reported as a missing person; concern for safety; and/or arrested under the Mental Health Act (MHA) on nine occasions. There were also 11 safeguarding records, which included some of these incidents.
31. We obtained a copy of a WYP chronology which covered the period between 12 April 2013 and 12 September 2019. This chronology indicated 13 more pieces of information about Mr Crowther between 25 February 2015 and 22 June 2019, which were not recorded on the WYP intelligence record profile. This information included 12 concern for safety calls and one incident where Mr Crowther was arrested for a breach of the peace.
32. Two of these incidents were recorded on the intelligence record profile, from 6 September 2016 and 8 January 2018, but the following comments were not placed on Mr Crowther's record:
- 6 September 2016 – Mr Crowther's housemate called WYP and stated that Mr Crowther was going out to 'stab' people tonight
 - 9 January 2018 – Ms Fields called WYP and stated that Mr Crowther had a knife in his bedroom and wanted to stab a paedophile.

33. A further three incidents were also not recorded on Mr Crowther's intelligence record profile:
- 23 April 2017 – Mr Crowther's sister called WYP and stated that Mr Crowther wanted to be tasered by the police and said that he wanted to hurt himself or someone else
 - 13 August 2017 – Mr Crowther called WYP and stated he wanted to kill a paedophile and that he had stabbed a 'copper in 2013'
 - 22 June 2019 – Ms Fields called WYP and reported that Mr Crowther was making threats to hurt himself, other people and that he was making a video for his daughter to have after he took his own life

> WYP's response to Ms Fields' complaint against Mr Crowther on 19 August 2019

> Events in the days leading up to 19 August 2019

> 16 August 2019 – Mr A

34. At 11.26am on 16 August, Mr A contacted WYP and reported that Mr Crowther had threatened to take his own life. We obtained a copy of the WYP Storm incident log².
35. Between 11.26am and 11.32am, the contact officer's log entries indicated that Mr Crowther had visited Mr A's place of work, but Mr A told him he could not come in due to him making threats towards the staff. Mr Crowther apparently told Mr A that he was going home to kill himself and left.
36. The contact officer noted that Mr Crowther had attempted to hang himself two weeks previously, and then carried out police computer checks which indicated that Mr Crowther had mental health and suicide warning markers.
37. We obtained a copy of the telephone call recording and produced a transcript. During the call, Mr A mentioned that Mr Crowther had a '*borderline personality disorder*' and had '*threatened to kill himself on several occasions...*'
38. At 11.32am, the contact officer noted their THRIVE assessment as '*EMG (emergency) SUICIDAL MALE...RISK TO LIFE*'.

² Storm (System for Tasking and Operational Resource Management) provides emergency services with a support infrastructure that manages interaction with the public, logs calls, allocates the appropriate level of response and allows those on the frontline to have access to the information they need when responding to emergency calls.

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39. At 11.36am, incident log entries indicated that PC Adam Empsall found Mr Crowther who said he had *'NO DESIRE TO HARM HIMSELF'*.
40. Between 12.08pm and 12.20pm, PC Empsall's incident log entries noted that he had spoken to the approved mental health professional (AMHP) who carried out Mr Crowther's mental health assessment the day before. The AMHP apparently had no concerns, agreed that the officers could leave Mr Crowther and informed PC Empsall that Mr Crowther had his next meeting with them on the following Monday. PC Empsall noted that a friend of Mr Crowther's arrived as they were leaving.
41. We obtained a copy of the WYP statement recorded from Mr A and we also obtained two statements from him. In those statements, Mr A said that he is the managing director of a music studio engaging with the local community and working with disadvantaged groups.
42. Mr A said he had known Mr Crowther for approximately 20 years, and stated that Mr Crowther said the music studio was *'very vital in helping him with his mental health.'* He explained that around 2015/2016, he recalled seeing a letter indicating that Mr Crowther was diagnosed with a *'borderline personality disorder with psychosis.'* He recalled particular words in the letter to the effect of *'You will never be able to form stable one to one relationships'*.
43. Mr A said Mr Crowther told him about hearing voices in his head and his coping mechanisms and told him about incidents with two previous partners. He said he felt that he got to know Mr Crowther more once he became involved with Ms Fields.
44. Mr A explained that around 2014, Ms Fields became a regular visitor to the music studio and by the end of 2017, she and Mr Crowther appeared to begin a relationship. He stated that they *'seemed to bond over the fact they both had intense OCD'*. Mr A said that in November 2017, Ms Fields told him that Mr Crowther's behaviour *'was controlling'*.
45. He provided details of Mr Crowther's and Ms Fields' relationship including his threats to kill or harm her and others, which resulted in Mr A making contact with 'Women's Aid' in February 2018. Mr A provided a lot of context to the relationship between 2017 and August 2019.
46. He explained that on 12 August 2019, Ms Fields informed him that Mr Crowther had started threatening her new partner (Mr B) and a female friend of hers called Ms C. Mr A advised her to start gathering evidence against Mr Crowther and Ms Fields told him that she and Ms C were going to report Mr Crowther to the police. Mr A said he believed the pair attended Elland Road police station on 12 August, and were told to make an appointment which was subsequently arranged for 19 August.
47. He said that between 10am and 10.30am on 16 August, he saw Mr Crowther at the music studio and told him that he could not let him in as he had a duty to safeguard people and he was aware of the threats made towards Mr B. Mr A said Mr Crowther's actions caused him to be concerned enough to contact the police.

> 16/17 August 2019 – Ms Fields and Mr B

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48. At 11.36pm on 16 August, Derbyshire Constabulary contacted WYP in relation to Ms Fields contacting them, whilst staying in the Derbyshire area, to report her concerns for Mr B's safety. We obtained a copy of the WYP Storm incident log.
49. Between 11.36pm and 11.39pm, the WYP contact officer's log entries noted that Mr Crowther had threatened to beat and kill Mr B and that Ms Fields believed the threats, due to Mr Crowther's mental health issues and history of violence.
50. At 11.43pm, the contact officer noted their THRIVE assessment as '*PRIORITY AS THREATS MADE & REPORTING PERSON STATES SUSPECT HAS MH ISSUE, VIOLENCE & MAY CARRY THEM OUT*'. At the same time, the contact officer transferred the incident log to the dispatchers.
51. Between 11.44pm on 16 August and 12.01am on 17 August, the log entries indicated intelligence checks on Ms Fields and Mr Crowther. This appeared to result in nothing being found on the WYP Niche³ system with '*NO EXACT MATCH FOR PAUL CROWTHER DUE TO LIMITED INFO*'.
52. At 12.19am on 17 August, a WYP dispatcher allocated PC Killeen to the incident, who arrived at Mr B's home at 12.47am.
53. At 1.13am, PC Killeen's log entries indicated that Mr B had not received any direct threats, felt that Mr Crowther was trying to get a reaction from Ms Fields who had already reported him for harassment and Mr Crowther did not know his address so Mr B felt safe at home.
54. At 2.08am, a dispatcher noted that Derbyshire Constabulary had been updated. At 2.14am, Ms Fields was updated and the log entry indicated that she wanted to report domestic issues involving Mr Crowther.
55. We obtained a copy of the telephone call recording and produced a transcript. During the call, the dispatcher asked Ms Fields if she had contacted WYP before. Ms Fields confirmed that she had made previous contact with regard to Mr Crowther's mental health, and she wanted to report domestic issues. The call appeared to end due to the poor telephone signal.
56. At 2.22pm, PS Martin Buchanan's log entries noted his attempt to contact Ms Fields and leaving a voice mail message. PS Buchanan noted there was insufficient information to record a crime at that time, Mr B was safe, the risk was low and there was no direct harm. He then asked for the incident to be passed to the team that dealt with booking appointments in order to make contact with Ms Fields and investigate the matter.
57. At 2.48pm, the appointment team log entry indicated an appointment was arranged for 8pm on 19 August.
58. We obtained a copy of PS Buchanan's statement in which he explained that part of his role was to review any calls for service, whilst identifying and evaluating threat, harm and risk levels. He said after reviewing the incident log, he '*deemed there to be no obvious or immediate risk*' and attempted to contact Ms Fields. He said he then requested the incident

³ Niche is a police records management system.

log to be passed on for Ms Fields' appointment arrangements to be made in order for her to see an officer.

> 19 August 2019 – Mr Crowther

59. At 4.28pm on 19 August, Mr Crowther visited the Dewsbury police station help desk with a friend named Mr D, as Mr Crowther wanted to admit the threats he had made towards Mr B. We obtained a copy of the WYP Storm incident log, which initially incorrectly recorded that Mr Crowther had allegedly been threatened by Mr B.
60. We obtained a copy of a statement WYP recorded from Mr D in which he stated that Ms Fields went to Scotland between 7 and 10 August, with work colleagues including Mr B. During that time, Mr Crowther had 'visions' of Ms Fields and Mr B being together. He went on to explain that on 11 August, Mr Crowther called him; "he was saying things like it's on now", "Mr B needs to look out", "going to destroy Mr B", "Make sure he never comes back to West Yorkshire", "he would pay professionals to make sure he never looked the same or walked the same". Mr D said that Mr Crowther never used the word "Kill" when he was talking to him about what he was going to do to Mr B and said that due to what Mr Crowther had said to him, he called Mr B as he believed what Mr Crowther was saying to be a real threat to Mr B. Mr D said he "knew it was really fucked up but he needed to be very careful as Paul had had paranoid delusions about him and Beth...In my eyes the threat Paul had made to Mr B was real and I advised Mr B to lock his door."
61. We obtained a statement from Mr D in which he said he was with Mr Crowther on 19 August, when PC Sparling met with him and Mr Crowther and stated:
- 'I can then remember that a red headed police woman came to deal with Paul and he showed her a threat he had made towards Mr B on his mobile phone which he had sent via text to Bethany Fields mobile phone. I believe there was one threat on the phone which just said that, "Mr B should run". As I can recall Paul told the police officer that he had made these threats to Mr B via Bethany Fields and he also made her aware of the threats I had heard him make against Mr B. I did not hear him say to the police officer that he had tried to Kill anybody. I remember that the police officer seemed bemused as though she didn't know what to do and I recall her saying. "I don't know what I can do with this". After around 15 minutes she left to do some checks. Paul was pacing about and began ticking and started showing the deterioration in his mental health. Upon her return she told us that there was nothing that she could do because there had been no crime recorded under Mr B. I think she stated that she had made a note on the system in case it got reported so that it could be referenced if it was reported later. I cannot recall the officer saying anything about concerns for Mr B.'*
62. Between 4.29pm and 4.35pm, the help desk log entries incorrectly indicated that Mr B had made threats 'VIA ANOTHER FRIEND...SAYING HE IS GOING TO SMASH HIS HEAD IN'. At 4.33pm, the help desk transferred the incident to the WYP dispatchers and then noted a medium risk THRIVE assessment.
63. At 4.38pm, a WYP dispatcher allocated PC Emily Sparling who arrived at the police station at 4.48pm.

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64. At 5.02pm, PC Sparling's log entries indicated that the information was not correct and it was Mr Crowther who had made the threats towards Mr B.
65. We obtained a Niche system audit for intelligence checks on Mr Crowther between 16 August and 12 September. The audit indicated that between 4.26pm and 5.08pm on 19 August, the help desk, PC Sparling, and PS Richard Kilner all carried out checks on Mr Crowther.
66. Between 5.13pm and 5.34pm, incident log entries appeared to indicate *'it was a mental health issue'*, the incident was linked to Mr A's incident from 16 August and PC Sparling spoke to the police mental health nurse who then updated the incident log:
'PAUL (Crowther) HAS TURNED UP AT THE STATION TO MAKE A STATEMENT [sic] ABOUT HIS VERBAL THREATS. HE HAS BEEN ASKED NOT TO ATTEND THE STUDIO DUE TO HIS BEHAVIOUR. HE SPOKE TO HIS MH (mental health) WORKER TODAY AND AGREED HE WOULD ATTEND THE STATION.'
67. At 6.25pm, a dispatcher closed the incident log for *'NO OCCUR'* (no occurrence required) and indicated PC Sparling was the officer dealing with it.
68. We obtained a statement from PC Sparling who stated:
'CROWTHER initially started to tell my [sic] how he had been banned from a music studio he attended at and how this had upset him because the place was of great importance to him and he wanted help to lift the ban. It was hard to follow what he was saying as he was very back and forth. Eventually I realised that CROWTHER was not the victim in the crime her [sic] had reported but was saying that he had done these things. I tried to clarify this but was having trouble understanding CROWTHER, at this point one of the other males that were [sic] present with blonde hair in a ponytail, who I cannot remember the name of, told me that he worked at the studio CROWTHER had been banned from. He informed me that CROWTHER had text him saying he wished harm on Mr B and said he was going to smash his head in. The male told me that Mr B works at the studio and that this male had informed Mr B and the studio of these. The male informed me that Mr B did not want to make a complaint to police but did want CROWTHER to be banned from attending the studio which is why the ban had been put in place.'
69. PC Sparling went on to say that Mr Crowther mentioned suffering with mental health problems and *'was repeatedly saying he wanted to hurt and kill himself because of the situation and asked for help so he didn't do it. When talking about the studio and wanting to end his own life he became upset and started to cry.'*
70. PC Sparling spoke to PS Kilner and also asked the control room if there had been any reports made in relation to the recording studio, Mr B or Mr Crowther. The control room informed the officer of a call from 16 August for concerns over Mr Crowther threatening to take his own life after being banned from the studio due to threatening staff. PS Kilner told PC Sparling *'that if the victim has not reported the crime and if he has informed his co-worker that he will not involve the police that we could do nothing in regards to the threats CROWTHER was talking about. He told me to get in touch with the Mental Health Nurse in regards to his mental health, threats of killing himself and the threats towards Mr B.'*

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71. The officer contacted the mental health nurse who *'looked into CROWTHER's file and told me that he had contacted his worker earlier and they had told him to talk to the police. They told me they had no concerns with CROWTHER as he was engaging with Mental Health services and contacted his worker regularly. They said to tell him to keep engaging with his worker and that nothing further needed to be done. I asked them to update the log and I informed DCR of this.'*
72. In relation to Ms Fields, PC Sparling stated:
'During my time with CROWTHER he did [should read 'did not'] mention the name of his ex-girlfriend or any information about her other than he had ended the relationship because he found it unfair because of his mental health problems. He said nothing to me that made me think that he wanted to harm her, he only seemed to speak about harming himself. When speaking to mental health they showed no concern. I do not remember seeing or been told that she had made an allegation of harassment. I made no notes in regards to this encounter, I told DCR of updated [sic] and they noted these on the log.'
73. I asked WYP if there was a WYP policy relating to the mental health workers. I received an email response informing me there was no policy but the Safeguarding Central Governance Unit looked at the incident log. Their email response noted that a *'more detailed update on the log would have been helpful'* in relation to what Mr Crowther's community nurse was being told about matters coming to police attention.
74. At 7.21pm on 19 August, PC 1 carried out a Niche check on Ms Fields.
75. We obtained a copy of WYP's review of Ms Fields' mobile telephone. Between 7.48pm and 8.17pm, Ms Fields and Mr A had a text message conversation, in which Mr A advised her of Mr Crowther visiting a police station to admit the threats he had made.
76. Mr A received several text messages from Mrs E and Ms Fields, and had a telephone conversation with Mr D regarding Mr Crowther's police station visit. Within the text messages, Mr A appeared to express concern that Mr Crowther was *'trying to avert prosecution? He won't be admitting coercive control, psychological abuse and the full history of threats I doubt.'*

> 19/20 August 2019 – Ms Fields and Mr B's visit to Pudsey police station and PC 1's involvement

77. On 19 August, Ms Fields attended Pudsey police station accompanied by Mr B.
78. Mr B made a separate complaint to WYP, which is covered later in this report. However, his comments in relation to Ms Fields' visit are detailed below:
'During the appointment Beth told the officer that Paul had made threats to kill her, threats to kill Mr A, threats to kill Ms C and threats to kill myself and whilst she spoke about this the officer was writing somethings down on a sort of diagram on a piece of paper. I recall her telling him a sort of chronology of what had happened. This chronology was something she had previously written down on her Mac Book computer. This took about one hour and then he stated he needed to discuss something with his sergeant and he left the room. He

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returned around ten minutes later and said that because the threats had not been made directly towards me then this could not be dealt with but the threats made towards Beth would be dealt with as harassment. I accepted what the officer had said due to the fact I am not trained in the law and I recalled thinking that this was somewhat strange that the police could not do something when someone had threatened to kill me.'

79. At 8.55pm on 19 August, incident log entries indicated that PC 1 (subject officer) dealt with Ms Fields' appointment. At 9.14pm, he carried out a Niche check on Mr Crowther. At 9.21pm, acting Police Sergeant (A/PS) Scott Bent carried out a Niche check on Mr Crowther. At 9.41pm, incident log entries indicated there was a request to send the incident to Niche *'for harassment'*.
80. Between 9.39pm and 11.14pm, PC 1 obtained a witness statement from Ms Fields. We obtained a copy of that statement, together with a copy of PC 1's PEACE notes (Preparation and Planning, Engage and Explain, Account, Clarify and Challenge) he made when he met with Ms Fields.
81. In her statement, Ms Fields explained that her relationship with Mr Crowther began in 2017, he was threatening towards a previous partner of hers, and that he had said that he wished to *'torture him, film it and send it to his family'* and that if there was any further contact he would *'kill him'*. She also stated that Mr Crowther was controlling, verbally abusive and made her feel ashamed and victimised.
82. Ms Fields explained that in February 2018, she had nowhere else to live so reluctantly moved in with Mr Crowther but the barrage of the abuse intensified and Mr Crowther threatened to punch her and kill or assault her family and friends if she ever left him. She said that Mr Crowther was extremely abusive and threatening and was self-harming. She said he would self-harm, punch himself and tried to strangle himself if they ever argued. All of this resulted in her making contact with Women's Aid who completed a DASH risk assessment.
83. Ms Fields said that on 15 June 2019, she made the decision to end their relationship, and had since *'received a barrage of abuse and threats...He has threatened that he will 'SLICE MY FRIENDS HEAD OFF' and he has an obsession with killing someone and what it would feel like.'* She also added that Mr Crowther had tried to humiliate her and isolate her from her support network.
84. Ms Fields stated that she did not know what to do, was scared and frightened of what Mr Crowther would do, suffered with depression and had felt suicidal due to not knowing of a way out.
85. At 12.04am on 20 August, PC 1 completed Ms Fields' DASH risk assessment, and we obtained a copy of that assessment. He noted that Ms Fields was the victim with Mr Crowther as the perpetrator. The form then provided questions with three answer options *'Yes, No, Other'* and PC 1 noted:
 - Mr Crowther had been involved in previous domestic incidents with Ms Fields
 - Ms Fields was *'very frightened'* and *'depressed'* and had separated from Mr Crowther within the last year

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- The abuse was getting worse
 - Mr Crowther had problems with alcohol and his mental health, and had threatened or attempted suicide
 - Ms Fields appeared to be subject to controlling/coercive behaviour
 - Mr Crowther had turned up unannounced more than three times per week and loitered near Ms Fields' home or workplace
 - Others had been engaged to help
 - Mr Crowther had threatened to hurt or kill Ms Fields or others
86. PC 1 recorded 'no' for Mr Crowther having previous criminal convictions or having been involved in previous domestic incidents. He also recorded 'no' for being able to ask relevant support agencies to contact Ms Fields, or her consent 'ino' [sic] for passing on relevant information to specific agencies for a support plan to be put in place. PC 1 noted the initial risk as medium, and signed the form to '*confirm that I have recorded all criminal offences disclosed during the course of dealing with this domestic incident in line with National Crime Recording Standards and Home Office Counting Rules.*'
87. The form highlighted that it '*must be confirmed by the designated supervisor*', but there is no supervisory name or signature on the form.
88. At the end of the comments section on the DASH risk assessment, there is a section with regard to the police working with other agencies to ensure that everything is done to offer the correct support and interventions to the victim and their family. When asked if other support agencies could be contacted to offer Ms Fields support, a 'no' answer was recorded. Similarly, when asked for consent for the passing of relevant information to specific agencies, which may be discussed in a meeting in order for a support plan to be put in place, a further 'no' answer was also recorded.
89. We obtained a report from the WYP Serious Case Review Team (SCRT) in relation to the completion of Ms Fields' DASH risk assessment and subsequent actions of WYP officers in relation to this incident. The report identified that some of the DASH questions should have been answered with a 'yes' rather than 'no' and that if that had been the case, the DASH risk assessment would have reached a score to be assessed as '*high risk*' and a referral to a Multi-Agency Risk Assessment Conference (MARAC)⁴ would have been made.
90. The report noted that PC 1 completed the assessment on his mobile phablet device and, when assessments are completed in that manner, the officer taking the statement should then electronically task a supervisor, who would be expected to update the Niche occurrence enquiry log (OEL) to confirm it had been checked. There was no supervisory confirmation or Niche task recorded to indicate the DASH risk assessment was reviewed. From the assessment of PC 1's PEACE notes, and Ms Fields' statement, the report noted

⁴ The MARAC is a monthly risk management meeting where professionals share information on high risk cases of domestic abuse and put in place a risk management plan. The MARAC provides a forum for sharing information and drawing up an action plan in order to reduce future harm to high risk survivors and their children.

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that *'Stalking and Coercive and Controlling Behaviour offences would have been more appropriate offences to record to reflect the seriousness of the alleged offending.'*

91. We obtained a copy of the OEL for this incident, which identified Mr A as a witness, Mr Crowther as the suspect, and Ms Fields as the aggrieved party. At 12.03am on 20 August, PC 1 linked Mr Crowther to this OEL incident. This meant that any officer checking Mr Crowther's Niche intelligence profile would be able to see that Mr Crowther was linked to Ms Fields' complaint and would be able to view the documents uploaded to Ms Fields' Niche intelligence profile from that date onwards.
92. At 12.03am on 20 August, PC 1 completed the OEL key investigation summary checklist in which he summarised the incident, and identified Mr Crowther's arrest enquiries and interview as outstanding lines of enquiry.
93. We obtained a statement from PC Dave Jones who works in the WYP Business Readiness Delivery Team assisting in the development and testing of the 'Pronto' mobile device software. He explained that police officers using the Pronto (phablet) devices could complete various forms such as statements, domestic risk assessments, missing person forms and record crimes, whilst away from a police station. Any completed forms could then be submitted to Niche. The device also allowed officers to view incident logs and conduct PNC and biometric searches. The device can also be used as an electronic pocket notebook allowing for text entries and photographs to be recorded in relation to an incident.
94. PC Jones researched PC 1's Pronto records for the incident on 19 August and noted the following:
 - 9.39pm on 19 August 2019 – statement created
 - 11.14pm on 19 August 2019 – crime form created
 - 11.16pm on 19 August 2019 – DASH form created
 - 12.02am on 20 August 2019 – crime form submitted to Niche
 - 12.04am on 20 August 2019 – DASH form submitted to Niche
 - 7.46am on 27 August 2019 – statement submitted to Niche
95. PC Jones could not find any reference to PC 1 submitting Ms Fields' statement earlier than 27 August 2019.
96. On 20 August, Ms Fields emailed Mr B and others to inform them she had filed a crime report against Mr Crowther for harassment, including domestic abuse and threats to her friends, family and a colleague. We obtained a copy of this email in which Ms Fields wrote that it was to be further investigated on an unknown timescale. She asked the email recipients to block Mr Crowther's phone number and report any attempted contact with her via them. She provided the crime (OEL) number and asked them to contact 999 in an emergency.
97. At 11.41am on 20 August, Ms Joanne McCarron's OEL entry noted:

'INCREASED 1st incident DASH Medium score 12 no consent - letter sent to aggrieved - clerical actions complete. From Leeds SGU (safeguarding unit) clerical unable to task to a DVC due to AL/ staff shortages / Clare?s [sic] Law as per discussion with CI Raw

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respectively request that any safeguarding intervention is addressed by the OIC (officer in charge/case)'.

98. We obtained a statement from Ms McCarron in which she explained that she is a clerical officer in the Leeds district SGU. She stated that it was the first incident recorded for Ms Fields and had a DASH scoring of 12, with no consent provided by Ms Fields. In relation to a first domestic incident, Ms McCarron stated that the circumstances would generate a letter and referrals if required, after consent was given.
99. We obtained a copy of the WYP SGU letter sent to Ms Fields on 21 August. The letter outlined that domestic abuse was a crime, provided a contact telephone number to speak to a domestic abuse co-ordinator and outlined that other organisations could also help.
100. We obtained a statement from Detective Chief Inspector (DCI) Allan Raw in which he explained that he has management responsibility for the Leeds District SGU. In July 2019, he assisted in managing *'demand versus capacity'* due to a number of SGU vacancies and resignations. This resulted in an interim plan to ensure that higher risk cases were prioritised over lower risk cases. In relation to medium risk cases, this meant that the OIC (in this case PC 1) would be tasked with safeguarding work.
101. In relation to PC 1 identifying controlling and coercive behaviour and completing the stalking and harassment section on Ms Fields' DASH risk assessment, the SCRT report noted that this resulted in a medium risk grading *'which should have resulted in Increased Interventions being actioned by the Leeds SGU/DVC'*.
102. The report identified that the initial interventions letter was actioned in response to the DASH risk assessment, and the OEL indicated the increased interventions could not be tasked due to annual leave and staff shortages. The SGU review was based on the DASH assessment and OEL entries as Ms Fields' statement and PC 1's PEACE notes were not attached to the OEL at that time.
103. In relation to who would investigate this incident, the report identified it should have stayed in the Leeds SGU for investigation by the domestic abuse team (DAT) or safeguarding team *'as there were heightened risk factors of stalking and coercive and controlling behaviour...it was not low risk Domestic Abuse Crime.'*

> 21 August 2019 – Mr Crowther

104. At 4.51pm on 21 August, Ms Meghan Hughes' OEL entry indicated that Mr Crowther visited the Dewsbury police station help desk with concerns that something involving him had been reported to the police. Ms Hughes obtained his contact number and advised him that an officer would contact him *'if necessary'*.
105. We obtained a statement from Ms Hughes in which she explained she is a help desk officer at Dewsbury police station. She stated that each help desk query is individual and different with people being dealt with on a bespoke basis. She said she *'would not perform a background check on every person who comes into the police station, sometimes the circumstances do not warrant such action.'*

106. Ms Hughes could not recall meeting Mr Crowther on 21 August, nor making the OEL entry. She stated:

'In order to make the entry I can only assume that I have viewed the nominal record of Paul Crowther and found an incident he was referring to. I have then added the text to this incident. I can see from viewing the record now that the Occurrence had not been allocated to an officer at this point and that would account for the reason why I have not tasked anyone in particular with the information.'

> 23 August 2019

107. At 3.10am and 3.16am on 23 August, Ms Sherry Drury's OEL entries indicated that there was a recorded crime of domestic harassment for Ms Fields, it was allocated for a statement, suspect interview, and confirmation sought of any malicious communications against her colleague/partner. If such communication was found and the colleague/partner felt harassed then a further crime would need recording. Ms Drury also noted **'PLEASE COMPLETE OCCURRENCE DATES AND CONSIDER IF THE HARASSMENT SHOULD BE A STALKING OR CONTROLLING/COERCIVE BEHAVIOUR.'**

108. We obtained a statement from Ms Drury in which she explained that she is a WYP Force Crime Management Unit (FCMU) investigator responsible for reviewing crimes and either filing or allocating them for further enquiries. She stated:

'I can state this particular crime was allocated due to being domestic related and required further crimes recording for CDI (crime data integrity) compliance. The rationale for my entry was following a review of the crime, determining the correct crime classification, which in this case was of a domestic related malicious communications but due to there being harassment caused and a course of conduct, assumedly due to the number of calls or persistent behaviour between suspect/victim, a further crime of harassment was also required under the Home Office Counting Rules.(HOOCR) As the substantive offence hadn't been recorded this crime remained as harassment with a request for the further crime recording for the malicious communications. When allocated for further enquiries, it was suggested that if the female's colleague/partner confirmed harassment (victim confirmation) a further crime would need recording for CDI compliance, this must have been mentioned in the initial report/OEL entry for confirmation to be sought.'

109. At 8.33am, Detective Sergeant (DS) Fiona Van Kampen's OEL entry noted there was no victim account (Ms Fields' statement) and it was reallocated **'to patrol'** to obtain the statement. DS Van Kampen noted that if Ms Fields wanted Mr Crowther to be warned then a discussion was required **'with both parties and patrol supervisor, to consider finalisation.'**

110. We obtained a statement from DS Van Kampen in which she explained that she works in a DAT within the Leeds SGU. She explained there was a policy agreement that patrol officers would attend calls for service in the first instance and **'complete the initial or basic investigation** (also referred to as minimum standards). **This means that the attending officer will complete anything they can reasonably complete at the time of first attendance, and at the very minimum there needs to a victim account and a completed DASH form...if either the DASH or the initial account are not completed, the agreement is that the occurrence is reallocated back to patrol for the attending officer to complete the basic investigation.'**

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111. We obtained a copy of the WYP policy agreement which confirmed DS Van Kampen's explanation.
112. DS Van Kampen could not recall much about the OEL, and stated that her entry was '*a typical entry for a crime occurrence which came into the Allocations Inbox without a victim account attached...I seem to recall that the OEL reflected that a statement was taken but hadn't be [sic] attached, but I cannot be sure. Either way, without a victim statement or account, I would have returned it as per policy...returning the case to patrol would have been the fastest option...if a statement had indeed already been taken, we would not go out and retake this statement, unless it was confirmed the original was irrevocably lost.*'
113. She explained that the patrol sergeant would then task an officer and determine any risk through discussing and reviewing the case with the attending officer.
114. In relation to DS Van Kampen's involvement, the SCRT report noted that the tasking for patrol officers to investigate '*was done as it is unclear if the crime was domestic related initially but then reallocated for a victim account to be obtained to satisfy minimum standards of investigation.*' The report noted that DS Van Kampen was unable to look at Ms Fields' statement or PC 1's PEACE notes as they were not attached to the OEL until 27 August 2019.
115. At 10.27am, A/PS Joshua Lowcock's OEL entry indicated that the incident was tasked back to the attending officer (PC 1).
116. We obtained a statement from A/PS Lowcock in which he explained that he worked on a different team and different shifts to PC 1. He stated that the allocation policy was '*to allocate investigations back to the officer who initially attended the incident...due to the amount of allocations that we have to go through I would have looked at the incident...I would not have carried out any further (Niche) checks.*' Due to being on a different team and shifts to PC 1, there was no discussion between them.

> 26 August 2019

117. At 8.09am on 26 August, PS Mark Howarth's OEL entry indicated that he reviewed the investigation and that PC 1 was to '*Contact the victim and inform them that you are the OIC, provide contact details, updates and support. Ascertain their wishes re supporting a prosecution and if applicable; a restraining order.*'
118. PS Howarth also noted that PC 1 should consider speaking with his supervisor about this and for review, and then complete the further actions. Once the lines of enquiry were complete they should be documented on the OEL and further evidence review officer (ERO) advice sought for finalisation. PS Howarth offered to discuss this with PC 1 if required and added a further 28 days for the lines of enquiry to be completed or an update recorded.
119. We obtained a statement from PS Howarth in which he explained that he is a shift sergeant responsible for managing a team of uniformed officers and supervising their attendance to and dealing with calls for service from the public and investigating low level crimes.

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120. In relation to his OEL entry, PS Howarth explained that it was an allocation test that could be amended to add further bespoke comments to each specific crime. As such, he expected PC 1 to discuss this with his sergeant as requested on the OEL entry. He stated that PC 1 was not on duty at the time otherwise he would have personally spoken to him.
121. PS Howarth stated it was his *'opinion that PC 1 would not be dealing with the investigation and it would have been dealt with by the DAT once the MSI had been met.'*
122. In relation to intelligence checks, PS Howarth stated he was not aware of Mr Crowther's previous history apart from any information on the OEL. He did not make any Niche checks when allocating crimes and tasks *'as I would have expected that these would have been carried out on numerous occasions prior to me receiving the crime for allocation and I would have expected that a trained officer would have carried these checks out before hand.'*
123. In relation to arresting Mr Crowther, PS Howarth stated, *'I would not have been considering arresting Mr Crowther because there was no statement attached and the DASH was recorded as being medium. If the DASH had been high then I would have considered the need for his arrest.'*
124. At 12.50pm, Detention Officer (DO) Mike Jeffries carried out a Niche check on Mr Crowther. We obtained a statement from him in which he said he had no recollection of carrying out the check, could not provide a reason for doing this, and was not aware of Mr Crowther nor any complaints in relation to him.

> 26 August 2019– Mr Crowther

125. At 1.11pm on 26 August, Mr F (Mr Crowther's friend) contacted WYP to report his concerns about Mr Crowther due to his girlfriend leaving him, his daughter being ill, and his mental health issues. We obtained a copy of the missing person police Storm incident log.
126. Between 1.17pm and 2.13pm, WYP public enquiry officer Ms Julie Bedford made numerous incident log entries noting Mr F's concerns. She recorded that Mr F last saw Mr Crowther on the previous Friday and then found that he had posted his bank card, house key and garage key through his letterbox when Mr F returned home on Saturday. Mr F checked Mr Crowther's home and garage, and found his car at his home. Mr F was reluctant to provide Mr Crowther's contact number due to thinking that a call from the police would scare him *'AS HE IS CURRENTLY UNDER INVESTIGATION FOR THREATS.'*
127. At 1.20pm, WYP dispatcher Ms Helen Duffield's incident log entry noted that Mr Crowther was *'NOT UNDER INVESTIGATION FOR THREATS, IT WAS IDENTIFIED THAT ALTHOUGH [sic] PAUL HAD MADE THREATS IT WAS DUE TO HIS MH AND HIS MH SUPPORT WORKER WAS SPOKEN TO [sic] GAIN FURTHER CLARITY.'*
128. Ms Bedford's further incident log entries recorded her attempts to check various local hospitals and Mr F asking that officers not park outside Mr Crowther's home and attend his

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home instead due to feeling that Mr Crowther would 'FLIP' if he saw police officers outside his home.

129. We obtained a statement from Ms Bedford in which she stated that Mr F's concerns caused her to carry out PNC vehicle checks for Mr Crowther's car and hospital enquiries.

130. We obtained a statement from Ms Duffield in which she stated:

'The opening of the log stated that the missing person believed he was under investigation for threats. I commenced checks on niche and STORM to clarify this as it would have an impact on how the missing person was graded by the Inspector. On checking Niche, whilst the male was linked to a recent domestic incident in Leeds he was not linked as suspect and the initial stats class was harassment...I then checked STORM to see if there were any logs relating to CROWTHER that were currently open awaiting deployment that may refer to him as being suspect in any threats matters.'

131. Ms Duffield said she found the incident from 19 August, when Mr Crowther reported threats to the Dewsbury police station help desk, and stated the outcome was that Mr Crowther's threats 'were down to his mental health.'

132. At 1.24pm, WYP hub researcher Ms Ami Walker's incident log entries noted her checks on Mr Crowther:

'WARNING MARKERS FOR MENTAL DISORDER (PSYCHOSIS) AND SUICIDAL...PREVIOUS S136 DETENTIONS IN2015, 2016 AND 2018. ALSO PREVIOUSLY A MISPER IN 2015 X 2 AND 2016 X 2...ONLY RECORDED IN 2019 IS PAUL BEING SUSPECT FOR A DOMESTIC REPORTED 16/08/19 INVOLVING HIS EX-GIRLFRIEND BETHANY FIELDS...'

133. We obtained a statement from Ms Walker in which she explained her role involved researching and providing an intelligence overview for subjects involved in live time incident logs, so that the hub inspectors could make an informed assessment of threat, harm, and risk.

134. In relation to this incident, Ms Walker stated that she provided a brief overview to indicate previous mental health concerns and missing person occurrences to assist in identifying 'whether any important, useful information was previously obtained. In this case I felt it important to note Mr Crowther had previously been detained under S136 of the Mental Health Act as this demonstrated there had previously been mental health concerns for the male. I felt this was notable and assisted the Hub Inspector in making the decision as to whether the male be treated as a high risk missing person, which Mr Crowther subsequently was.'

135. Ms Walker included Mr Crowther's phone numbers and most recent Niche records to assist in contacting him and 'to give an idea of the build up to the ongoing reported log.'

136. In relation to Ms Fields, she stated:

'As Mr Crowther had recently been involved in a domestic with his ex-girlfriend this would have also given me cause to check Bethany Fields through on Niche to identify whether there was anything of relevance recorded on her that would assist in locating him.'

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137. Between 1.50pm and 5.07pm, several incident log entries indicate the further enquiries by the control room and officers to locate Mr Crowther, which included searching his home and garage, and making contact with hospitals and Mr Crowther's friends.
138. At 5.13pm, Inspector (Insp) Nicola Brown's incident log entry indicated that she was carrying out a full incident log review.
139. We obtained a statement from Insp Brown in which she stated that she was the Hub commander at the time of this incident and was responsible for all critical incidents and operational police supervision in the Kirklees district. She stated that she decided to wait until the hospital checks had been completed before she made a specific assessment.
140. At 5.20pm, WYP dispatcher Ms Michelle Bemrose noted on the incident log:
'TE ENQ COMPLETED ON PNC FOR THE DATES 19/08 - 26/08 - MALE HAS NOT BEEN SEARCHED PNC OTHER THAN FOR THIS MISPER LOG IN THAT TIME FRAME'.
141. We obtained a statement from Ms Bemrose in which she stated that her responsibilities included doing background research on addresses and persons. Ms Bemrose stated:
'I carried out a PNC check on the missing person, Paul Crowther using a #TE code (transaction enquiry) with the name to see if he had been searched on PNC between 19 to 26 August 2019 and the search returned a no trace apart from the PNC marker for being a missing person.'
142. At 5.38pm, PS Graham Watson's incident log entries noted his contact with Ms Fields who had *'NOT HAD ANY CONTACT WITH THE MISPER SINCE SHE REPORTED AN INCIDENT TO THE POLICE ON THE 20TH OF THIS MONTH. SHE HAS HOWEVER PROVIDED A PHONE NUMBER FOR THE MISPER'S SISTER AND ALSO HIS FRIEND'*. PS Watson then noted the phone numbers and requested PC Emily Brattan to make contact with Mr Crowther's sister.
143. We obtained a statement from PS Watson in which he explained that at the time of this incident, he was the duty sergeant and sent officers to check Mr Crowther's home. He was also aware of the hospital enquiries and, whilst waiting for the results, he contacted Ms Fields. PS Watson could not recall if he *'checked to see if Paul was shown as wanted, however that would have been done as a matter of course when he was reported missing and nothing was mentioned about him being wanted. The Domestic matter will have been held with the Safeguarding team with in Kirklees. My concern at the time of dealing with this matter was to find Paul who had shown a lot of tell tale [sic] signs from going missing that he was vulnerable of coming to harm. I was aware that he had a history of mental illness and needed to be found as soon as possible, he was graded as a High Risk missing person by the duty Inspector and all efforts were being put in to locating him. At that time my concerns for his mental state and the need to locate him were my first priority, with the likelihood that a mental health assessment would be required upon finding him.'*
144. Between 5.48pm and 5.49pm, PC Brattan's incident log entries noted that Mr Crowther texted screenshots of a conversation between him and Ms Fields saying *'THIS IS FOR SAFEKEEPING'* to his sister, who said he had gone missing several times in the past with the last incident being six years ago. PC Brattan noted the Niche number relating to that incident.

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145. Mr Crowther's WYP intelligence profile indicated it was an incident from March 2012, when he placed his keys and a note through a friend's letter box. Mr Crowther prepared a six page suicide note with funeral plans due to his recent split from a previous partner who lived in Bridlington. It also noted he was paranoid and was later taken to Manchester Hospital after being located.
146. We obtained a statement from PC Brattan in which she said she searched Mr Crowther's home with her colleague, completed a missing person report, and obtained a recent photograph of him from Mr F. She also said she then returned to the police station and contacted Ms Crowther to try and obtain further information about her brother.
147. PC Brattan stated that she did not ask any further questions about the messages from Mr Crowther and did not see them. The officer then carried out further office based enquiries, and later became aware that Humberside Police had found Mr Crowther.
148. We obtained a copy of Ms Crowther's WYP statement dated 14 September 2019, which was taken after Ms Fields' death. In that statement she said that on 25 August 2019, her brother sent her nine screenshots *'for no reason of a conversation between him and Beth.'* She also stated that she sent those screenshots to an unidentified police officer on 26 August.
149. At 5.51pm and 6pm, Insp Brown's incident log entries noted that Mr Crowther was a high risk missing person, vulnerable and had *'COMPLETED WHAT COULD BE DESCRIBED AS FINAL ACTS IN THAT HE HAS POSTED KEYS AND BANK CARDS.'*
150. In her statement, Insp Brown explained that after carrying out her review, she *'decided he was a High risk missing person due to all the factors taken collectively.'*
151. At 6.24pm, Insp Brown's incident log entry indicated that the enquiries remained with the patrol officers.
152. Between 6.27pm and 7.50pm, police incident log entries indicated that further enquiries continued, including a request for telephony work to be carried out on Mr Crowther's mobile phone.
153. At 8.11pm, Humberside Police created an incident log for Mr Crowther visiting Bridlington police station and stating he was a WYP missing person. We obtained a copy of that incident log.
154. At 8.20pm, an entry on the WYP incident log entry noted that Mr Crowther was at Bridlington police station.
155. Insp Brown said she was not aware, at the time, of Mr Crowther being a named suspect for domestic related harassment. She went on to say he (Mr Crowther) had not been circulated as wanted and she was not fully aware of Ms Fields' complaint against Mr Crowther. She stated that if he had been circulated then Humberside Police officers would have arrested him and WYP would have dealt with the investigation.
156. At 8.50pm, a Humberside Police incident log entry indicated that WYP *'WOULD LIKE MALE TO SPEAK TO MENTAL HEALTH NURSE AND THEN WEST YORKS WILL*

DECIDE HOW TO GET HIM BACK THERE. THEY ARE SAYING THAT THERE IS A MENTAL HEALTH NURSE IN THEIR CONTROL ROOM BUT HUMBERSIDE CONTROL NEED TO INITIATE THIS.'

> **26 August 2019 – 101 call from Ms Fields**

157. At 9.12pm, Ms Fields contacted WYP. We obtained a copy of that call recording and produced a transcript.
158. Ms Fields wanted to know if Mr Crowther had been found, due to having a *“harassment crime report”* against him, and was concerned that he might be looking for her or the people he had threatened. During the call, the WYP call taker informed Ms Fields that Mr Crowther had attended Bridlington police station and was arrested.
159. Whilst discussing Mr Crowther’s mental health, Ms Fields said:
“In all honesty he should have been sectioned a long time ago now in the last few months the amount of times I have spoken to the police when he has tried killing himself, the amount of death threats he’s made to other people, hence you know the harassment report, he should have been sectioned a long time ago.”
160. We obtained a statement from the WYP call taker Mr Kevin Todd in which he said he could not recall speaking to Ms Fields, but had found the call recording and listened to it to refresh his memory. He said he checked Mr Crowther’s details on the Niche system, found the missing person report, noted that the Niche OEL had been updated and believed that tasks had been sent to the officer or team dealing with the incident.
161. Mr Todd checked Niche for the missing person report and domestic incidents relating to Ms Fields. He stated:
‘I was aware of domestics linked between [sic] Paul Crowther and Bethany Fields, but the [sic] focus of the call [sic] was regarding the missing person aspect. I do not recall updating any separate complaints made by Bethany Fields.’
162. At 10.10pm, a Humberside Police incident log entry indicated that WYP wanted to assess Mr Crowther, who was willing to do that and arrangements were to be made for collecting him from Humberside.
163. At 11.02pm, a further incident log entry indicated there had been some confusion, Mr Crowther had spoken to the mental health nurse, WYP had not facilitated a mental health assessment and a Humberside Police officer was contacting the crisis team for Mr Crowther to be mentally assessed.
164. At 11.27pm, police incident log entries indicated that Humberside officers were dealing with the incident, and Mr Crowther was not to be brought back to West Yorkshire *‘UNTIL THE RISK TO HIS MENTAL AND PHYSICAL HEALTH HAS BEEN NEGATED AS TO NOT DETRIMENT HIS HEALTH.’*

> **27 August 2019**

165. At 2.01am, a Humberside Police incident log entry indicated Mr Crowther was being taken to hospital. At 2.51am, the mental health unit (Miranda House) apparently refused to deal with him.
166. At 5.01am, an incident log entry indicated that Mr Crowther was taken to Hull Royal Infirmary.
167. At 7.46am, PC 1 attached Ms Fields' statement to the OEL for the incident from 19 August.
168. The SCRT report noted that once the statement and PEACE notes were attached to the OEL *'the case had already been allocated to PC 1 to investigate. It would have been reasonable to re-task the Leeds SGU for further evaluation and assesment [sic] of risk as more information in relation to Paul Crowther's alleged offending was available for review.'*
169. We obtained a copy of PC 1's duties and produced a report which indicated he worked a 6pm to 4am shift on 21 into 22 August, and a 7am to 5pm shift on 27 August, with annual leave, rest days, and public holiday making up the rest of the time.

> **PC 1's written response**

170. PC 1 gave a detailed written response following the serving of his regulation 16 notice. In his written response, he asked what part of the DASH risk assessment was not correct or in accordance with WYP policy, and he recalled *'speaking to PS Scott Bent about the grading (which he did) and the Dash risk assessment.'*
171. In relation to the allegation of failing to record or consider information when he completed the DASH risk assessment, PC 1 stated:
'Please note that I am a probationer police officer...I started independent duty officially on 29th July 2019...when I met with Ms Fields, I had worked a total of 13 shifts. On 19/8/19 I was tasked to meet with Ms Fields and Mr A. I recall that they came to see the police to complain about Paul Crowther making threats to Mr A. I recall that I sought guidance from my supervisor after I updated him in relation to the details provided to me. I recall the supervisor was PS Scott Bent. I sought guidance from him as to the appropriate way of dealing with the matter. I recall speaking to him about the Dash risk assessment. At the relevant time I felt I needed supervision and guidance, and I raised this with supervision. I recall that after 19/8/19 I was on leave and returned to work on 7/9/19. In my absence, it seems to me that the matter had been reallocated to me. I think Teams supervision should have delegated the matter to a more experienced officer and should have supervised and managed it accordingly.'
172. The specific information referred to was that Mr Crowther had been involved in previous domestic incidents, had a criminal conviction for harassment, had committed a previous domestic related offence and had previously received a harassment warning. PC 1 stated,

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'I cannot recall the details. In any event, due to my inexperience, supervision should have checked this.'

173. In relation to Mr Crowther's previous mental health issues, PC 1 stated he was not aware that he had to record any consultation with healthcare professionals or the mental health crisis team in order to take positive action to prevent injury to Ms Fields or Mr Crowther. He stated that *'supervision should have checked this.'*
174. PC 1 asked for clarification of what information from his notes and Ms Fields' statement was not on the DASH risk assessment, and he would then be *'happy to provide a further response.'*
175. He said he thought that he had uploaded Ms Fields' statement and his notes with the DASH assessment to Niche. Upon returning to work after his rest days, he was told it had not uploaded and he then uploaded it accordingly.
176. In relation to a supervisor reviewing the DASH risk assessment, he stated:
'I did speak to my supervision about the risk assessment, the grading was carried out by the supervisor. To the best of recollection it was PS Scott Bent but it may have been another supervisor. According to the process, a supervisor will conduct the grading of the domestic incident.'

> PC 1's interview

177. During his interview, PC 1 said that at the time of this incident, it was the third or fourth domestic issue he had dealt with. He said Ms Fields provided third party information about Mr Crowther's threats towards Mr B, and he said he had told her that he could not do anything as those were third party threats. PC 1 said he spoke to Ms Fields *"at length"* because she initially did not want to do anything about Mr Crowther. He did not consider taking a statement from Mr B due to the threats being provided by a third party (Ms Fields).
178. PC 1 said he did not think about recording Mr B's details as it was hearsay evidence from Ms Fields. He said he was given a lot of information and *'may have been flustered about what to do'* whilst spending a lot of time on Ms Fields' statement and his notes.
179. He described his knowledge of the processes and procedures relating to completing PEACE notes, witness statements and DASH risk assessments as *'quite limited'*. He said he did not have much exposure to domestic incidents, and there was not a *'massive input'* about domestic incidents during his training.
180. PC 1 said that at the time of completing the DASH risk assessment form:
"I didn't really have that many people to go to in terms of advice and on reflection they were probably firefighting as they were struggling with the amount of work they were getting".
181. PC 1 said he felt he was not equipped, was not provided with guidance and, in his opinion, was *"set up to fail...an officer outside his ten weeks, shouldn't be single crewed at any"*

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point. Should be double crewed and get exposure". He said that he hated his first year of police service and felt very uncomfortable.

182. When asked if this was before or after taking Ms Fields' statement, he said that it was both before and after but he was not afraid of going to incidents, and had since completed training which helped him.
183. He said at that time he had spoken to his supervision and his team about him struggling, and they would offer to help *'but that never happened.'* He added that this does not happen now as he does not leave work following the completion of his shift until he has spoken to a sergeant.
184. PC 1 said his understanding of a Niche OEL was to record a crime, details, suspects, victims and it was a way of someone understanding what had happened. PC 1 said that he *'felt swamped with his workload'* and, having reflected on what happened, he *'would update the occurrence every time he spoke to his sergeant as this shows he is trying to develop his knowledge.'*
185. PC 1 said that he spoke to PS Bent, looked at Mr Crowther's Niche record on 19 August and *'didn't see anything that was an issue. There was no previous for Bethany and him and based on that the sergeant helped me with the grading.'*
186. During the interview I explained to PC 1 there was no record of him checking Mr Crowther on Niche. PC 1 agreed that PS Bent may have carried out the check, and he could not remember what information he saw or what documents he showed to PS Bent. Evidence has since come to light which shows that PC 1 did perform a Niche check on Mr Crowther.
187. In relation to responsibility for grading a DASH assessment, PC 1 said that it was down to him on his Pronto device, *'however, operationally that is not what happens. Operationally every DASH assessment that is completed is checked by the sergeant and they provide the grading and then the assessment is signed based on that grading.'*
188. When asked what analysis he did to compare Ms Fields' statement and DASH assessment, PC 1 said that, *'details should have gone onto the DASH assessment...he put Bethany's answers on the DASH rather than comparing what he already knew.'* He agreed that he should have compared them to understand the full picture.
189. When asked if he made mistakes when completing the DASH form, PC 1 said:
"Yeah, I think so. I don't think necessarily I did it with intention of not putting that information into that DASH assessment at the time. It's just that I was probably quite flustered and I didn't really fully kind of understand that putting them two into the same document was what I needed to do".
190. PC 1 said he wanted to ensure that the statement was at a good level and accepted that he spent more time on that.
191. PC 1 said that PS Bent gave the DASH form a medium risk assessment:
"I took what he said as gospel really I took what my sergeant said then as right ok he's graded it as this and that's what it is, because he has a better understanding of domestics".

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192. He said he sent the documents via his Pronto device and did not check that they had uploaded correctly and been attached to the crime report. He explained that upon returning to work on 27 August, a sergeant told him the statement had not been sent correctly, so he refreshed his device and resent the statement.
193. In relation to safeguarding, PC 1 said that he advised Ms Fields to not contact Mr Crowther and to inform her family to do the same. He said he felt Mr B was *'well safeguarded because Paul Crowther didn't know where he lived or who he was.'*
194. PC 1 said he had no thoughts of arresting Mr Crowther and was going to *'get him in to talk to him.'* He also said that after that shift he was on leave except for 21 August 2019, when he worked a night shift. He said he was not aware of any errors that day and said it (Ms Fields' complaint) was still with safeguarding. PC 1 added that when he was working on 27 August, he became aware of the failed upload of Ms Fields' statement.
195. He said he accepted that he should have written *'yes'* instead of *'no'* on the DASH risk assessment form for Mr Crowther being involved in previous domestic incidents, when considered against Ms Fields' statement.
196. PC 1 said that due to his inexperience, he was not aware that he needed to do any PNC checks prior to completing the DASH form. He said that if he had checked PNC the answer of *'no'* for Mr Crowther's previous criminal convictions would have been different. In relation to previous stalking or harassment offences, PC 1 accepted that he should have written *'yes'* on the DASH risk assessment form.
197. In relation to Mr Crowther *'controlling'* Ms Fields, PC 1 accepted that he should have written *'yes'*, and accepted that he took Ms Fields' answers and put them straight onto the DASH assessment and went on to say that he should have had his own opinion. He said that he would now look at the victim's answers along with other documents and information.
198. PC 1 accepted that different answers could be given by people in the same situation whilst giving their witness statements and then whilst their DASH risk assessments was being completed. In this case, examples of this could include answers regarding Ms Fields' self-harming or feeling suicidal, third parties being harassed and Mr Crowther threatening to kill Ms Fields or someone else.
199. He said that when he signed the DASH form it meant that he had *"investigated and looked at all the criminal offences and put the retrospective offences on there"*. When asked if he had done that, PC 1 said:
"No, I haven't...At that time, I have completed the form with the best intentions. Obviously looking back at it now there is quite a lot of stuff that isn't in there...At the time I thought I had covered it and I thought that you know again that's kind of inexperience again isn't it but I thought at that time I had completed the form to the best of my ability".
200. PC 1 said he now knew that he should send a task to his sergeant for them to do the DASH grading.

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201. He said he agreed that the incident would have been graded as high if the DASH form and statement had been compared and some of the answers had been different. He said he could not remember going through Ms Fields' statement with PS Bent, and said:

"I'd expect the supervisor to be more robust about it to be honest with you. How they go about grading it that they wouldn't just look at kind of what I said they would look at erm the information that has been put on there. The DASH assessment, the statement. He would have probably spoken to me you know at that point in time and said the statement is not on there".

202. PC 1 said he was not trained in making mental health referrals. He said he had asked his sergeant about doing a referral for someone he had not seen and said he was told *"in reality no you wouldn't"*.

203. In relation to DVDS and Clare's Law, PC 1 said the specifics of Clare's Law were *'unclear to officers...it hasn't been taught in training school'*. He said he thought that an independent team would look at it and decide what would happen with Clare's Law.

204. Following PC 1's interview, I identified that he had checked Mr Crowther's Niche record on 19 August. I asked PC 1, via his Police Federation representative what information he saw, what he was looking for, and what information would have concerned him.

205. PC 1 responded and wrote:

'I can't remember what I specifically looked for as it was so long ago but would think that I would have checked his occurrences to see if there had been any previous incidents between them, although, due to the passage of time, unfortunately, I'm unsure what specifically I saw. With the knowledge that I have developed since, I would now look in detail into Mr CROWTHER looking at his occurrences with Bethany as well as any history of violence or domestics with other relatives/relationships. I would also check PNC to see if there are any offences disclosed that were a concern for me to get a good picture of Mr CROWTHER's character. I would also look for any warning signs that Mr CROWTHER had a problem with such things as mental health or any drug/alcohol misuse.'

> PC 1's training records

206. We obtained copies of PC 1's WYP training records which indicated completion of the following training:

- Niche Case and Charge Course – 19 March 2019
- PNC Mobile Data Course – 13 March 2019
- Niche Update Course – 27 February to 1 March 2019
- Niche General User Courses – certain dates between 28 January and 10 May 2019
- Niche Case File Creation – 17 March 2019
- Crime Outcomes - 16 February 2019
- Use of Police Information and Systems – 31 January 2019

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- Stalking and Harassment e-Briefing - undated
 - Competent as a Constable capable of Independent Patrol – 6 March 2020
207. We produced an investigator's report comparing PC 1's training to the answers he gave during his interview. In relation to completing DASH forms, the training covered a full completion of the form and simply shows what questions will appear and what would happen if they answer yes/no. The training also covered how to send the DASH form to Niche.
208. The use of police information and systems training provided a scenario and guide including how to complete PEACE notes and witness statements. This appears to be at a basic level with a brief overview.
209. The Niche training explained the Niche pathway for creating a case file and the supervision role in starting the workflow. The Niche case file creation training covered the creation of a basic case and how to populate it with information from the OEL.
210. WYP's domestic violence training covered completion of the DASH form but did not go into further detail about domestic violence.
211. PC 1's training record details that he was not capable of independent patrol until 6 March 2020, which was over six months after he took the statement and completed the DASH risk assessment form with Ms Fields.

> A/PS Bent

212. We obtained a statement from A/PS Scott Bent in which he explained that at the time of this incident he was acting up to the rank of police sergeant. He said Ms Fields came to the police station in August 2019 for an appointment with PC 1 but that he could not recall having any conversation with PC 1 regarding Ms Fields. He said he was aware that he had checked Mr Crowther's Niche profile but could not remember why he did so. He said in general he would check Niche to identify any warning markers and look at the individual's history.
213. A/PS Bent said he did not see Ms Fields during her visit on 19 August and he could not remember having any conversations with PC 1 regarding her DASH risk assessment. He said as a result he had no cause for concern regarding her safety.
214. He explained that he was not aware of having a conversation with PC 1 about the email PC 1 received in September 2019 and said he was not aware of any threats Mr Crowther had made to kill, his previous domestic history or his mental health issues.
215. He also said that he could not remember being 'tasked' by PC 1 with regard to Ms Fields' visit and could not remember any conversation with PC 1 about arresting Mr Crowther on 15 September. A/PS Bent added that he was there if PC 1 wanted to speak to him as he was acting up as a sergeant at the time, but was not PC 1's direct line manager. We have been unable to ascertain who PC 1's direct line manager was at the time of this incident.

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216. A/PS Bent said as Ms Fields attended the station in person, it would be up to the officer (PC 1) to complete the appointment and speak to the supervisor for advice if needed.
217. A/PS Bent said he did not recall having any supervisory responsibilities in relation to this incident and did not recall having a specific conversation with PC 1 about him struggling with his workload. He did say, however, that he remembered PC 1 found the transition from tutoring to independent patrol quite difficult.
218. He went on to say that in his opinion the domestic violence training provided to new officers was not as in depth as it should be. He explained that he also thought that domestic violence problems continue to grow on a day-to-day basis and he felt that more training could be provided to support the new officers in their role.

> PC 1's supervisors

219. From information PC 1 supplied to us during his interview, we asked PS Mark Howarth, PS James Harrison, PS Buchanan, and PS Charlotte Maude if they recalled PC 1 asking for assistance, what he requested and what assistance was provided on or around 19 August. We produced an investigator's report in relation to those conversations.
220. Between 10 and 19 August, PS Howarth was on annual leave and then worked one shift on 21 August. He could not recall any conversations with PC 1 about his workload or any issues.
221. In August 2019, PS Harrison was a sergeant on PC 1's response team but did not often work with the team as he was in the process of taking over the Suspect Management Unit. He could not recall PC 1 mentioning that he was struggling with his workload, and offered some observations from working alongside PC 1:
'PC 1 was not long out of tutorship. He was a young in service officer who did request assistance more than others. PC 1 would request supervisors to review and offer support for jobs even before he had started to deal with them. I believe PC 1 was going to be a fine officer he was finding his feet and learning his trade. He was being tasked with appointments so that he could develop in a slower more controlled environment the same as other student officers with his level of service. He would on occasion have to be told to actually speak with the victim and get the information, before requesting a supervisory review or to obtain further advice on how to proceed, this was to reduce the amount of contact between him and supervisors to allow him to gain confidence in his decision making. This was also because until he spoke with the caller we only had a minimal amount of information from a log, and this would be insufficient for a supervisor to review, and make live-time decisions on how to proceed. To me PC 1's struggles with certain aspects of his work were that of a young in service officer who wanted to do their best and get everything right. He was afraid of making mistakes, getting it wrong.'
222. Between 19 and 23 August, PS Buchanan had no contact with PC 1 due to being on a training course.

223. PS Maude confirmed she was an acting sergeant at the time, but she could not recall any conversations with PC 1 about his workload.

> Analysis

224. There had been incidents in the days leading up to Ms Fields making her complaint on 19 August. Those incidents included the complaint she made on 16 August in relation to the threats Mr Crowther was allegedly making towards Mr B, which led to her making her appointment at Pudsey police station on 19 August.

225. Mr Crowther had been the subject of a high risk MISPER on 16 August, when it was reported that he was planning to take his own life after being banned from the Music Studio for allegedly threatening staff. This information was relevant to Ms Fields' complaint and would have been available for PC 1 to view on Mr Crowther's intelligence profile, should he have interrogated it in more depth.

226. Prior to Ms Fields' visit to Pudsey police station on 19 August, Mr Crowther had also visited Dewsbury police station earlier on the same day to admit that he had made threats to Mr B. During that visit he met with PC Sparling. This investigation has found no evidence to suggest that PC Sparling took any action to verify whether or not Mr B wished to make a complaint against Mr Crowther. This information was relevant and may have assisted PC 1 when Ms Fields and Mr B attended on 19 August. PC Sparling should have made attempts to speak to Mr B and ascertain whether or not he wished to make a complaint, which he could have done when he attended Pudsey police station with Ms Fields. This investigation has not identified any evidence to suggest that PC Sparling was aware of Ms Fields' planned visit later that day or made PC 1 aware of Mr Crowther's visit. Mr B did make a complaint to WYP about the alleged threats to him from Mr Crowther which is detailed later in this report.

> PC 1 and A/PS Bent

227. The evidence suggests that prior to Ms Fields' attendance at Pudsey police station on 19 August, Mr A had informed her of Mr Crowther's visit to Dewsbury police station earlier that day.

228. PC 1 was the officer delegated to record Ms Fields' complaint. It should be noted that at the time he was still within his probationary period and had only been working un-tutored and without direct supervision for a period of two weeks. The evidence shows that prior to Ms Fields' arrival, PC 1 and A/PS Bent both conducted a Niche check on Mr Crowther's intelligence profile which included a history of mental health and domestic violence issues. When asked, A/PS Bent could not give an explanation as to why he checked Mr Crowther's Niche profile at that time.

229. PC 1 met with Ms Fields and completed handwritten PEACE notes before taking a witness statement from her and completing a DASH risk assessment. He did this on his police phablet, which is a WYP hand held electronic console which links into the WYP's computer systems, including the Niche intelligence profile system. This allows statements, DASH risk assessments and other documentary evidence to be instantly digitally uploaded to various WYP computer systems.
230. The evidence suggests that when giving her statement, Ms Fields identified several potential warning markers including several threats to kill or harm her or other people, which should have alerted PC 1 that she was a high risk vulnerable person. In addition, she revealed that Mr Crowther had made threats to torture and kill her previous partner, which should have led him to escalate this investigation for supervisory oversight and escalation to the WYP SGU.
231. The evidence shows that PC 1 updated the incident report and classified this potential offence as harassment, then completed a DASH risk assessment on his phablet and graded the risk to Ms Fields as medium.
232. The WYP DASH risk assessment form requires officers to complete a DASH safety risk assessment with all potential victims of domestic violence and asks a number of questions in order to identify the risk to the potential victim. The DASH risk assessment process also requires officers to complete a DASH risk assessment with regard to any potential suspect of domestic violence. Officers are asked to speak to the potential victim/suspect and answer 'yes', 'no' or 'other' from their response. This gives the officer an indication as to the level of risk which may then be determined as:
- High:** where there are identifiable indicators of risk of serious harm. The potential event could happen at any time and the impact would be serious.
- Medium:** where there are identifiable indicators of risk of serious harm with the offender likely to cause serious harm if there is a change in circumstances, failure to take medication, relationship breakdown, substance miscues, if bailed after court appearance etc.
- Standard:** No significant current indicators of risk or serious harm.
233. Mr Crowther's intelligence profile and PNC history shows a history of mental health and domestic violence issues, which would have been readily available for PC 1 and A/PS Bent to view when they checked his Niche profile. This may have provided them with information with regard to the potential threat Mr Crowther posed to Ms Fields. However, in order to access all of the data, they would have to have opened each individual screen on the intelligence profile.
234. The information obtained from Ms Fields' statement should have mirrored her DASH risk assessment answers as far as practicable. PC 1 should have made further enquiries to identify and correctly answer any questions which Ms Fields may not have knowledge on or which may have been stored on WYP computer systems in relation to Mr Crowther's previous history. This would include checking Mr Crowther's PNC record which he did not do.

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235. From examination and comparison of his PEACE notes, Ms Fields' statement and the DASH risk assessment record, the evidence would suggest that PC 1 correctly detailed 'yes' answers to certain questions on Ms Fields' DASH risk assessment form.
236. The evidence also suggests that PC 1 may not have completed the DASH risk assessment accurately in other areas. There are significant inconsistencies on the DASH form when compared against his own PEACE notes, Ms Fields' statement, Mr Crowther's Niche intelligence profile and PNC record. PC 1 detailed a 'no' answer rather than a 'yes' answer to several questions. Had the correct response been inputted, the DASH risk assessment would have been assessed as a high risk and not a medium risk. There is further supporting evidence, which appears to corroborate this suggested view, in the WYP SCRT report.
237. The evidence shows that PC 1 assessed Ms Fields' complaint as one of harassment, which at that time appears to have been incorrect given the information she provided in her statement, her DASH risk assessment, the known history of Mr Crowther and the potentially serious nature of the threat Mr Crowther posed to Ms Fields. The evidence appears to support that offences of 'Stalking and Coercive and Controlling Behaviour' may have been more appropriate given the information available to PC 1 at that time. This view is corroborated in the SCRT report.
238. Although the completion of the DASH risk assessment is open to interpretation and officers are, to a certain extent, allowed and expected to exercise their judgement in determining the individual risk, there appears to have been adequate information available to PC 1 to suggest that his decision to assess the risk to Ms Fields at that time as medium instead of high was incorrect. In addition, this incorrect assessment of the risk may not have adequately safeguarded her and may have fallen short of the standards of professional behaviour (SoPB) expected of him in terms of his duties and responsibilities.
239. WYP policy regarding the completion of the DASH risk assessment form details that it should be sent to a designated supervising officer for the risk to be agreed by the supervisor and for the DASH risk assessment to be signed off.
240. This investigation has not identified any evidence to suggest that PC 1 forwarded Ms Fields' DASH risk assessment to any supervisor or that any supervisor signed it off as per the WYP DASH policy. PC 1's actions in this respect may have fallen short of the standards expected of him and may be contrary to the WYP DASH risk assessment policy as well as the SOPB with regard to his duties and responsibilities.
241. From examination of the OEL checklist, it appears that despite being aware of the content of Ms Fields' statement, the DASH risk assessment and the information on Mr Crowther's Niche intelligence record, PC 1 made an entry on the OEL of 'no' to the question, '*is the victim vulnerable*' and to the question of whether the suspect should be arrested a '*NO BOLO*' (be on the lookout). It is the responsibility of the investigating officer, in this case PC 1, to make a decision as to whether or not to arrest the suspect.
242. Had PC 1 detailed a BOLO on the OEL, which would mean Mr Crowther was wanted for arrest, it may have alerted any other police officer who may have viewed the OEL, Mr Crowther's Niche intelligence profile or who came into contact with him and asked the

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control room to conduct a check on him, that he was wanted for arrest, which could have led to Mr Crowther being arrested and detained.

243. The College of Policing (CoP) Authorised Professional Practice (APP) and the police National Decision Model (NDM) highlights that officers should consider six key elements which are linked together, with the code of ethics at the centre. The NDM states that officers should gather information and intelligence, assess threat and risk and develop a working strategy, consider powers and policy, identify options and contingencies and take action and review what happened.
244. The evidence suggests that due to the seriousness of the offences under investigation and the known facts at this time, it could be considered that PC 1 should have been aware that this incident had the potential to escalate at any point. In order to positively safeguard Ms Fields, Mr Crowther should have been circulated as BOLO, and should have been arrested and detained for questioning with regard to these potential offences at the earliest opportunity. The evidence suggests that PC 1's decision making and lack of positive action to circulate Mr Crowther for arrest may have fallen short of the standards expected of him and which may be contrary to the SOPB.
245. The evidence suggests that PC 1 uploaded Ms Fields' DASH risk assessment to her Niche profile in a timely manner. This meant that from 12.04am on 20 August, when checking Ms Fields' or Mr Crowther's Niche intelligence profiles, which were linked together, any WYP officer or police staff would have been able to view her DASH risk assessment form had they interrogated it in more depth and potentially able consider it against Mr Crowther's previous history.
246. PC 1 did not upload his PEACE notes or Ms Fields' statement to Niche until 7.46am on 27 August. This meant that any WYP officer or police staff, when checking her or Mr Crowther's Niche profile prior to that date, would not have seen her statement and would have not have been able to view and compare her statement and DASH risk assessment form simultaneously. Had they been able to do this they may have been in a position to possibly identify any inconsistencies or warning markers, which may have caused them to escalate this incident and the potential risk to her as high risk. This may have enabled WYP to arrest Mr Crowther and safeguard Ms Fields.
247. We have not identified any evidence to suggest PC 1 re-tasked this investigation back to the SGU for assessment or that he spoke to any supervision at that time in order for the statement and DASH risk assessment to be compared together to re-evaluate the potential risk to Ms Fields.
248. The evidence would appear to suggest that following the uploading of PC 1's PEACE notes and Ms Fields' statement, he perhaps missed an opportunity to re-task this investigation to the SGU in order for them to have the opportunity to re-evaluate the threat to Ms Fields. This meant that the SGU was not aware that the MSI had now been met and that this incident was a potentially serious domestic abuse complaint, which should have been tasked back to them to determine how this investigation should have been progressed. The evidence suggests that PC 1's actions in this regard may have fallen below that which was expected of him and may be contrary to the SOPB.

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249. In his written account, PC 1 said he had spoken to A/PS Bent about the DASH risk assessment as he needed guidance at the time. He also explained that after taking Ms Fields' statement he was on leave until 7 September and that in his absence this investigation had been re-allocated to him. The evidence shows that after taking Ms Fields' statement, PC 1 was on annual leave until 27 August and not 7 September, as he suggested in his written response.
250. The available evidence suggests that PC 1 may not have fully understood his responsibilities with regard to carrying out checks involving Mr Crowther. He was under the impression that this incident would have been allocated to a more experienced officer. He also believed that supervision should have carried out the checks which would have revealed that Mr Crowther had been the perpetrator in previous domestic incidents with a previous partner, had a criminal conviction for harassment with a previous partner, that he had committed a previous domestic related offence, that he had committed a previous offence of harassment and had previously received a harassment warning.
251. He also appears to have been unaware that it was his responsibility to check to see if Mr Crowther had any previous mental health issues and that he had to record any conversations with any mental health officials or the mental health crisis team in order to safeguard Ms Fields.
252. PC 1 appears to have honestly believed he had uploaded Ms Fields' statement and his PEACE notes at the same time as he uploaded the DASH risk assessment to Niche on 20 August. It was not until his return to work on 27 August that he was made aware that the first two documents had not in fact been uploaded.
253. PC 1 maintained that during his training he was not taught *'the operational side of Niche'* including how the system worked and what officers were required to do but he had previously uploaded crime reports under the supervision of his tutor.
254. An examination of PC 1's training record shows that he completed a number of training courses relating to Niche between February and May 2019 which should have allowed him numerous opportunities to ensure he understood what was required of him. Bearing in mind the use of Niche is a fundamental part of his job, it could be suggested that the onus was on him to ensure he was proficient in its use and if he felt he was not, to seek further training.
255. On this occasion, PC 1 successfully uploaded the DASH form and the crime form to Niche which suggests he did know how to complete this task. It is, therefore, unclear why he did not upload Ms Fields' statement and his PEACE notes at the same time. PC Jones' examination of PC 1's Pronto activity confirms that there was no evidence of him submitting Ms Fields' statement earlier than 27 August which could suggest that PC 1 simply forgot to upload it.
256. PC 1 co-operated fully at interview and gave what appeared to be full and frank answers to all of the questions put to him. He admitted all of the allegations as detailed in his regulation 16 notice, which are detailed earlier in this report in the brief description of alleged conduct/breach of SoPB.

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257. During his interview, PC 1 outlined a number of factors which may go some way to explain his apparent failings when dealing with Ms Fields. This included that when he met her it was only the third or fourth domestic violence case he had dealt with and that, in his opinion, there was not a '*massive input*' with regard to domestic abuse in his training. He noted his inexperience, lack of understanding of his training and lack of supervisory support as a result of what he saw as them having little time to devote to the task due to them '*firefighting*' and struggling with the amount of work they themselves were getting at the time. He admitted that he was struggling with his workload both before and after completing Ms Fields' DASH risk assessment and had claimed that he had sought advice and support from his supervisors prior to and after completion of the form.
258. From examination of the statements we obtained from the supervisors PC 1 identified during his interview, we could find no evidence to suggest that any of them could recall him ever asking them for advice or guidance or him ever informing them that he was struggling at that time. However, from some of their respective accounts they do suggest that he was slow to learn, would request assistance more than other officers and would often ask for supervisory opinion before he had even spoken to the victims of crime.
259. The evidence suggests that PC 1's apparent lack of awareness of his responsibilities, a lack of understanding of his training and his lack of confidence at that time, together with the fact that he was not capable of independent patrol at that point, may have been a contributing factor in his apparent failure to complete the DASH risk assessment in a manner prescribed by WYP.
260. The evidence suggests that whilst Pudsey police station was a controlled environment in which to develop his skills, we have not seen any evidence to confirm that PC 1 received any supervision prior to, during or after he met with Ms Fields.
261. PC 1's lack of experience and an apparent lack of supervision may have contributed to his apparent failure to correctly meet the MSI in this case. That apparent failure appears to have had a knock on effect, which in turn may have led to the District WYP SGU being unaware of the potential high risk to Ms Fields.
262. With regard to the completion of the DASH risk assessment, PC 1 accepted that with the experience he had gained since this incident and having seen and compared Ms Fields' statement and DASH risk assessment together, he was now aware that he had answered some of the questions on the DASH risk assessment incorrectly and that as a result that DASH risk assessment should have been assessed as high risk.
263. We have not identified any evidence to suggest that A/PS Bent gave Ms Fields' DASH risk assessment a medium risk score or that he had seen, signed or added comments on it. We have also not identified any evidence to suggest that at any time PC 1 tasked A/PS Bent to complete any supervisory oversight of Ms Fields' DASH risk assessment form. Whilst there is evidence to suggest that A/PS Bent had checked Mr Crowther's Niche intelligence profile prior to Ms Fields' visit, we have not identified any evidence, other than PC 1's account, to suggest that A/PS Bent was provided with PC 1's PEACE notes, Ms Fields' statement or the DASH risk assessment, following completion of them.
264. It should be noted that at interview PC 1 seemed to be confused with regard to his contact with A/PS Bent and appeared to be unsure when he said he had spoken to him or if he had

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shown him Ms Fields' statement and DASH risk assessment together, following her visit on 19 August. It is possible that his recollection of this incident may be clouded due to the time that has elapsed since the incident.

265. PC 1 said he knew he should have sent a task to his sergeant for him to review Ms Fields' DASH risk assessment, but said he was not aware that he should have checked Mr Crowther's previous history including PNC.
266. PC 1 admitted that he had signed the declaration on the DASH risk assessment to confirm that he had recorded all disclosed criminal offences in line with National Crime Recording Standards and Home Office Counting Rules and said this meant he had *'investigated and looked at all the criminal offences and put the retrospective offences on there'*.
267. When questioned, PC 1 readily admitted that he had not checked Mr Crowther's PNC record to identify any previous convictions and that this declaration was inaccurate. He said he completed the form with the best of intentions and thought that he had covered it.
268. The IOPC DM may wish to consider whether PC 1's admissions in relation to this potentially false declaration, was a deliberate act of falsifying a police recording document or may have been a symptom of his inexperience and lack of knowledge at the time.
269. In relation to not referring Ms Fields to any mental health professional or considering a *'Clare's Law'* disclosure to Ms Fields, PC 1 stated that he had not been taught that he should do so during his training.
270. A summary of PC 1's training record and a summary report of the training modules used during his training are detailed earlier in this report.
271. That report details that the training modules and the information given to the officers for the most part appear to be at a 'basic' level. Whilst it can be argued that WYP training courses cannot adequately equip officers with the knowledge to deal with every incident, domestic violence and safeguarding potential victims of domestic abuse should be a high force priority in order to safeguard potential victims and save lives.
272. The WYP domestic abuse policy identifies three high risk warning markers which may pose a significant and serious threat to victims of domestic abuse and which should raise any DASH medium risk to that of a high risk which are:
 - *Threats to Kill*
 - *Previous Domestic Violence*
 - *History of mental health and Suicide*
273. The evidence gathered during this investigation would appear to suggest that the layout of the DASH risk assessment form does not give these three high risk indicators significant prominence and as a result this may affect officers' ability to identify and escalate the risk accordingly.
274. When completing Ms Fields' DASH risk assessment, PC 1 used the *'other'* column on three occasions. Those being questions three and four under the victim current situation

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section and question 13 under the domestic abuse section. The evidence would suggest that these questions should have been marked 'yes'.

275. When completing the DASH risk assessment form the officer completing it is asked to answer 'yes', 'no' or 'other'. The purpose of completing that DASH risk assessment form is to identify the risk to the victim and whilst that form is open to interpretation, it is considered that should the officer identify 15 'yes' answers the victim could be considered to be high risk and should be referred to MARAC. The inclusion of the 'other' column may add an option that is unclear and which does not identify whether or not there is a potential risk to the victim in that individual question. Questions marked 'other' may lead to officers using that option when unsure of the answer rather than investigate further and mark 'yes' or 'no'. This may limit the ability to identify 15 'yes' answers, which may in turn lead to the identification of a 'low' or 'medium' DASH risk rather than a 'high' risk.
276. The evidence suggests that according to PC 1's training status profile at the time of speaking with Ms Fields, he was not capable of independent working until 6 March 2020, which was over six months after he had taken the statement from her. The DM may wish to consider that PC 1 may not have had the necessary skills, training and knowledge at the time to effectively deal with this incident. In addition, to allow him to deal unsupervised with a potentially serious domestic violence investigation and the ensuing apparent failure to adequately assess the risk to Ms Fields and safeguard her, may have been the responsibility of WYP and which, may, in some way limit the responsibility of and explain some of PC 1's actions.
277. In his account, A/PS Bent accepted that he was aware of Ms Field's visit on 19 August, but said that he did not meet her or have a conversation with PC 1 about her DASH risk assessment. There is no corroborative evidence that supports PC 1's account that he discussed Ms Fields' DASH risk assessment with A/PS Bent and that A/PS Bent had graded her as a medium risk.
278. A/PS Bent said that he was unaware of any threats to kill, previous domestic history or mental health issues with regard to Mr Crowther. There is some contradictory evidence in this respect, in that, by his own admission and the documentary evidence we obtained from WYP, he had checked Mr Crowther's Niche profile prior to Ms Fields' visit on 19 August. Mr Crowther's full history, including his previous mental health issues and domestic violence history, together with his PNC would have been available for him to view when conducting this check.
279. A/PS Bent could not recall being made aware of Mr Crowther's previous history. The evidence appears to suggest that in checking his Niche profile prior to Ms Fields' visit and whilst performing an acting sergeant's role at the time, he may have had some supervisory knowledge of this incident. This may, in some part, support PC 1's version of the conversations he allegedly had with him on 19 August. However, it should be noted that at no time did PC 1 'task' A/PS Bent with any actions.
280. This investigation has not identified with any evidence, other than PC 1's own account, that he spoke to A/PS Bent after 19 August in relation to the email PC 1 received in September 2019 or the conversation he says he had with A/PS Bent with regard to Mr Crowther's planned arrest on 15 September.

> **Actions of other officers following PC 1's meeting with Ms Fields and Mr B**

281. Ms McCarron, the clerical officer in the Leeds SGU, reviewed the DASH form on 20 August, less than 12 hours after PC 1 uploaded it. She correctly identified the 'medium' risk assessment grading and that Ms Fields had not provided her consent for her details to be passed on to any third parties. She also noted that she (Ms McCarron) was unable to task a Domestic Violence Co-Ordinator (DVC) due to annual leave and staff shortages and that any safeguarding intervention should be addressed by the OIC, who at that point was PC 1. Ms McCarron's decisions and actions were made following examination of Ms Fields' DASH risk assessment, as, at that time, PC 1's PEACE notes and Ms Fields' statement had not been uploaded. As Ms McCarron was working in a clerical role, her actions seem to have been reasonable at that time and given the information available to her.
282. Ms McCarron took positive action by sending Ms Fields a letter informing her that domestic abuse was a crime and provided several supporting contact numbers. This appears to have been in line with her role and responsibilities
283. CI Raw's evidence appears to confirm Ms McCarron's view that the Leeds District SGU was experiencing resourcing issues at that time due to a number of SGU vacancies and resignations, as well as annual leave issues. Whilst the evidence suggests that high risk cases were still being dealt with by the SGU, there is evidence to suggest a deviation from the accepted domestic abuse interventions policy, in that, at that time, an interim local agreement was put in place. This meant that some medium risk cases that should have remained within the SGU, were to be dealt with by front line officers, in this case PC 1, due to the staffing shortages within the SGU.
284. As Ms Fields' DASH risk assessment was given a medium risk rating, the force policy identified in the SCRT report indicated that this incident should have stayed with the DAT or safeguarding team *'as there were heightened risk factors of stalking and coercive and controlling behaviour...it was not low risk Domestic Abuse Crime'*.
285. The evidence suggests that at the time of this incident the Leeds District SGU was experiencing staffing issues and that any decisions taken by Ms McCarron and CI Raw were made from the information available to them at the time, which was Ms Fields' DASH risk assessment and without having the opportunity to view and consider her statement or PC 1's PEACE notes.
286. The evidence suggests, however, that this was still at least a medium risk incident and in passing this incident back to PC 1 to lead rather than take ownership of it themselves, in what could potentially still be a serious case of potential domestic abuse, may have been contrary to the WYP common interventions policy and may have fallen below the standards expected of WYP. The policy states that medium and high risk domestic abuse cases should stay within the SGU. The evidence suggests that this case should have been reviewed by the DVC regardless of any staffing issues. Given the staffing problems at the time of the incident, the DM may wish to consider that this was a potential Force issue rather than an individual one.

287. When PC 1 completed the DASH risk assessment with Ms Fields she apparently answered 'no' when asked if other agencies could be contacted to offer her support. Had she answered 'yes' the police could have worked with other agencies to ensure that everything was done to offer the correct support and interventions to her and her family. She also apparently answered 'no' to giving consent to the passing on of relevant information to specific agencies, which may then have been able to discuss her case in a meeting in order for a support plan to be put in place. This would have limited WYP's ability in setting up a MARAC and making enquiries with other agencies such as Woman's Aid and also their ability to obtain Ms Fields' DASH risk assessment completed by them in February 2018.
288. DS Van Kampen correctly noted on the log the minimum standards had not been met as a result of Ms Fields' account being absent from the log. She correctly identified that this case should be re-allocated back to PC 1 to obtain a victim account and to then be sent to the patrol supervisor for finalisation.
289. DS Van Kampen's actions appear to have been reasonable given the fact that PC 1 had not met the MSI in line with the DASH risk assessment policy. However, whilst domestic related crimes can be allocated for investigation outside the SGU, only low risk domestic related crimes should be allocated for investigation. Where there are heightened risk factors such as stalking or coercive and controlling behaviour or a MARAC referral, the investigation should be undertaken by the SGU or DAT as per the force common interventions policy. The evidence suggests that DS Van Kampen tasked this case back to PC 1 in order to meet the MSI as it appears to have been unclear to her if the crime was domestic related. Once the minimum standards had been met by PC 1, he should have been tasked to re-allocate this case back to the SGU for investigation by the SGU or the DAT.
290. In all the circumstance, the evidence suggests that this case should have stayed within the Leeds SGU or the DAT as there were heightened risk factors of alleged stalking and coercive and controlling behaviour and this was not a low risk domestic abuse case. This was not allocated to a safeguarding specialist as per the Force domestic allocation policy for an assessment of threat, risk, harm and history in order to assess the suitability of this investigation being dealt with outside the SGU. There is no evidence to suggest that a safeguarding specialist or DVC had made any such assessment as required by policy.
291. On 26 August, PS Howarth conducted a supervisory review of this incident. In doing so, he would not have been aware that PC 1 had already obtained Ms Fields' statement, as he had not uploaded it to Niche at that point. The evidence suggests that PS Howarth reviewed the available information and provided correct advice to PC 1 with regard to this incident in tasking him to contact Ms Fields, identify her wishes regard to the progression of the case, document the outstanding lines of enquiry on the OEL and ensure that a further review should be undertaken by a supervisor. Had PC 1 followed PS Howarth's instructions, the correct risk Mr Crowther posed to Ms Fields may have been identified, at the supervisory stage, which in turn may have led to this case being re-allocated back to the SGU.

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292. The evidence suggests that through no fault of his own, PS Howarth was not aware of the full picture and that in the circumstances his advice and actions appear to have been reasonable.
293. There was an unaccounted for delay of six days from PC 1 uploading Ms Fields' DASH risk assessment to her Niche intelligence profile on 20 August and PS Howarth's allocation of this incident back to PC 1 on 26 August. The accounts obtained by this investigation identify staffing and annual leave issues within the WYP SGU at that time and that even though the MSI were not met by PC 1, these issues may have affected their ability to promptly deal with this incident.
294. Mr F made a cause for concern telephone call to WYP on 26 August in respect of his friend Mr Crowther and an incident log was created which indicated he was a missing person (MISPER).
295. Ms Duffield, updated the incident log in her capacity as a WYP despatcher, that Mr Crowther '*was not under investigation for threats and that it was identified that although Mr Crowther had made threats it was due to his MH*' and '*his MH support worker was spoken to in order to gain further clarity*'. Ms Duffield's comments appear to have been taken from the Storm log of 19 August in relation to Mr Crowther's previous police visit.
296. She also checked STORM to see if there were any open logs relating to him or awaiting deployment that may refer to him as being a suspect in any threats matters.
297. The evidence appears to suggest that when Ms Duffield checked Mr Crowther's Niche and STORM incident logs she was aware that he was linked to a recent incident of harassment in Leeds but she did not believe he was a suspect in that incident and did not see or comment further on Ms Fields' complaint on 19 August, where, although Mr Crowther was not listed as 'BOLO', he was a suspect in that investigation. It should be noted that at that time Ms Duffield was carrying out her duties in an attempt to locate and safeguard Mr Crowther and although in doing so, became aware of Ms Fields' complaint against Mr Crowther, her primary focus was to identify any information which may assist in locating and safeguarding Mr Crowther.
298. At that time, Ms Duffield would not have been aware of Ms Fields' statement as it had not yet been uploaded by PC 1. As a result, she would not have been aware of the inconsistencies in Ms Fields' DASH risk assessment and would not have had the opportunity to compare that with her statement. The evidence suggests that Ms Duffield's actions appear to have been reasonable in the circumstances bearing in mind that Mr Crowther was not wanted for arrest at that time.
299. Ms Walker conducted Niche checks on Mr Crowther in her capacity as a WYP hub researcher in order to identify any information which would assist the hub inspectors to make an informed assessment of potential threat, harm, and risk to him. She correctly noted Mr Crowther's mental health, suicidal tendencies and his previous detentions under the Mental Health Act and his missing person reports in 2015. She also correctly noted that the only recorded incident in 2019 was as a result of Ms Fields' report on 16 August.
300. The evidence suggests that the information Ms Walker included on the log would give any officer viewing Mr Crowther's Storm log or Niche intelligence profile adequate information

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to be aware of the domestic abuse complaint by Ms Fields on 16 and 19 August. This may have provided some context to WYP as to the potential reasons why Mr Crowther may have been reported as a high risk MISPER and take appropriate action in order to safeguard him. However, it should also be noted that at that time, Mr Crowther was not circulated for arrest and Ms Fields' statement had still not been uploaded to Niche by PC 1. As Ms Walkers' role was that of a WYP hub researcher and that her primary role would have been to provide information to allow WYP to locate and safeguard Mr Crowther she would not have been expected to conduct investigations into Ms Fields' complaint against him. Therefore, the evidence suggests she acted appropriately and in line with her role.

301. The evidence shows that WYP made several attempts to locate Mr Crowther including checking local hospitals.
302. PS Watson spoke to Ms Fields in an attempt to locate Mr Crowther, who said she had not had any contact with him since she had reported him to the police earlier that month. PS Watson stated that he was aware that Mr Crowther was now a high risk MISPER and that he should be located as soon as possible and that was his priority. The evidence suggests that PC Watson's actions were reasonable in the circumstances as his primary focus was to locate and safeguard Mr Crowther and not to investigate Ms Fields' complaint. His actions appear to be in line with his role and appropriate in the circumstances.
303. The evidence suggests that Insp Brown correctly identified that Mr Crowther's disappearance made him a high risk MISPER as he had completed, what she described as, final acts.
304. Mr Crowther was subsequently located a few hours later having voluntarily reported to Bridlington police station, which falls under the jurisdiction of Humberside Police.
305. Insp Brown confirmed that she was not fully aware of the circumstances of Ms Fields' complaint and that if Mr Crowther had been circulated for arrest she would have expected Humberside Police to arrest him. Insp Brown's primary focus at the time would have been to locate and safeguard Mr Crowther and, apart from trying to identify any intelligence which may assist the police in locating Mr Crowther, it was not Insp Brown's role to investigate Ms Fields' complaint. As PC 1 had not circulated Mr Crowther for arrest, Insp Brown could not have been expected to make arrangements for Mr Crowther to be arrested when located.
306. At 9.12pm on 26 August, Ms Fields contacted WYP by telephone and spoke to a WYP call taker, Mr Todd. Ms Fields wanted to know if Mr Crowther had been found and was concerned that he may have been looking for her or the people he had previously allegedly threatened. Ms Fields informed Mr Todd that, in her opinion, Mr Crowther should have been sectioned a long time ago, had tried killing himself and had made death threats to other people, hence her harassment report.
307. Mr Todd informed Ms Fields that Mr Crowther had been found and was at Bridlington police station and checked Mr Crowther's details on Niche. Mr Todd said that he was aware of the domestic incidents between Mr Crowther and Ms Fields but that the focus of her call was regarding Mr Crowther's status as a MISPER.

308. Mr Todd provided Ms Fields with confidential information regarding Mr Crowther, which may have been in contravention of the General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR). However, it appears that he may have done so in an attempt to re-assure Ms Fields that Mr Crowther had been located and was not, at that point, a threat to her or the people he had allegedly threatened. Any potential GDPR breach is a matter for WYP and not this investigation.

> WYP's response to Mr Crowther's complaint of assault and harassment against Ms Fields on 27 August 2019 about an incident in May 2019

> 27 August 2019

309. Help desk officer Ms Hughes created three OELs in relation to Mr Crowther's allegations of domestic assault and criminal damage against Ms Fields. We obtained copies of those three OELs.
310. At 3.06pm on 27 August, Ms Hughes noted that there was no Storm incident log due to Mr Crowther reporting to the Dewsbury police station help desk. Mr Crowther's allegations related to an incident from May 2019 when he was having a minor row with Ms Fields in the living room, he went to the bedroom to get away from her and she followed him into the bedroom and allegedly slapped him several times across the face and upper body. Ms Hughes also detailed that Ms Fields allegedly said "*I'm sick of you and your head*" (apparently referring to some mental health issues Mr Crowther had) and that she then allegedly punched the wall twice causing two knuckle marks on the wall. She also noted that Mr Crowther had said that he did not report this at the time as he did not want it to affect their relationship and noted that they had since split up.
311. Ms Hughes noted that Mr Crowther stated he had mental health issues, there was no statement obtained and no witnesses.
312. We obtained a statement from Ms Hughes, in which she said that the incident stuck in her mind because when Mr Crowther attended, she thought he was just counteracting the earlier report made by Ms Fields. She noted that the offence he was reporting had happened some three months earlier and this made any injuries he had allegedly sustained difficult to see. She said '*in all honesty*', she viewed the report with some scepticism, be that right or wrong, and that was why she remembered it.
313. She said she searched for Mr Crowther's record and linked it to the Niche crime but could not recall if he was linked to any other crime or incident at that time. Ms Hughes said she could not recall if she checked Ms Fields' record but felt she would have done so in order to add her to the crime.
314. Ms Hughes said she '*did not have any concerns...it's not uncommon to deal with such domestic situations at the counter. In addition, Paul Crowther had stated the couple were no longer together so there was no immediate threat or concern to highlight.*' She said she then sent the crime report to the FCMU for officer allocation to investigate

315. She said she could not recall exactly why she carried out Niche checks on Mr Crowther and Ms Fields on 28 and 30 August. She said she believed she checked him on 28 August to see if the OEL had been allocated to an officer and she had completed everything as expected. She said she believed her check on 30 August may have been down to Mr Crowther being repeatedly talked about in relation to his police station visit.

> 29 August 2019

316. At 1.55pm on 29 August, DC James Singleton's FCMU review OEL entry indicated there were linked occurrences, and the crime was allocated to safeguarding for investigation as the suspect needed to be interviewed.

317. We obtained a statement from DC Singleton in which he explained that his role was to review the FCMU tasked OELs and to make primary investigation making decisions as to whether this investigation should be allocated for further investigation or could be finalised.

318. DC Singleton said he reviewed the OELs and allocated them to the SGU. He stated:

'It was clear from the record that this was a domestic violence related matter with a named suspect and a victim subject to self-harm and mental health markers. Due to the nature of the incident and the likelihood of further harm occurring, there was clearly a need for and [sic] investigation, the victim wished to make a complaint and the suspect should be traced and interviewed. I tasked the investigation to Kirklees Safeguarding Unit because FCMU policy is to allocate by task all domestic violence related crime to a specialised unit to allow a more complex review and assessment by specialised officers in order to investigate the allegation.'

319. DC Singleton said at the time of allocating the investigation to the SGU, he was unaware of Ms Fields' complaint against Mr Crowther. He went on to say that if he had been aware of the allegation at the time of his involvement, *'it would not have affected my decision to task this enquiry to Kirklees Safeguarding Unit for further investigation.'*

320. At 3.45pm, DS Lecomber's OEL entries noted that it could be dealt with as one report for the assault and damage, and tasked the crime for patrol officers to deal with.

> 2 September 2019

321. At 1.09pm on 2 September, SGU clerical officer Ms Sophie Wilkinson carried out a Niche check on Mr Crowther. We obtained a statement from Ms Wilkinson in which she explained that her role involved reviewing all the domestic and non-crimes for any required intervention. The Kirklees domestic abuse crime download included the OELs which she searched for on Niche.

322. She stated:

'when I first looked at these two occurrences on 2 September 2019 there was insufficient information recorded on that date to make a qualified assessment including no DASH.'

323. Ms Wilkinson explained that once an officer has attached the DASH form and recorded all other appropriate information, the Domestic Abuse Hub would receive an automated Niche task. This would then be sent to the clerical staff so that the domestic crime could be looked at again.
324. She stated she did not check Mr Crowther to see if he was wanted for arrest or voluntary interview as it was not part of her role. In relation to Ms Fields' complaint against Mr Crowther, Ms Wilkinson said she did not review their domestic history due to having no further involvement with the OELs. She stated that she would usually have done that if she had dealt with the matter on 2 September.

> 3 September 2019

325. At 2.58pm on 3 September, public enquiry officer Ms Colette Hartley's OEL entry indicated that Mr Crowther visited the Dewsbury police station help desk requesting an update. Ms Hartley informed him that the crime had not yet been allocated and he would be contacted once it had been. She noted Mr Crowther's concern that Ms Fields should not be allowed to work with vulnerable people given that she had allegedly assaulted him.
326. We obtained a statement from Ms Hartley in which she explained;

'I checked the Niche record and informed him that the crime had not yet been allocated and he would be contacted by an officer once it had. He stressed that he was concerned that the suspect, Bethany Fields worked with vulnerable adults and I needed to make a note of this as she should not be allowed to work with vulnerable people as she had assaulted him. He mentioned that he had Mental Health Issues and when she had assaulted him she stated she "was sick of him and his mental head". Mr Crowther then made circular gestures with his hands to his head and he then told me she had slapped him round the face. At the time he didn't seem under any distress.'

> 4 September 2019

327. At 10.09am on 4 September, Mr A emailed PC 1. We obtained a copy of that email. Mr A asked PC 1 for advice on how to proceed with Mr Crowther's threats, allegations, and malicious communications. Mr A wrote: *'It seems he will not stop until he is stopped and I believe that's a matter for the police.'*
328. At 12.18am, Ms Fields emailed PC 1. We obtained a copy of that email which was in relation to her complaint on 19 August 2019, and she informed PC 1 of the following:
- Mr Crowther made contact with several of her family members, friends and ex-colleagues
 - On 28 August, Mr Crowther sent an email to her old workplace containing screen shots of personal conversations and *'defamatory accusations'* towards Mr A
 - On 3 September, Mr Crowther sent similar screen shots and accusations to her parent's phones, and further emails and texts to at least three friends

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- Mr Crowther was *'attempting to falsely accuse (Mr A) of grooming...This is causing a great deal of distress for both Mr A and myself. Whilst in a relationship with Paul, Mr A was subject of Paul's threats of violence for many months as he attempted to isolate me from one of my most trusted confidants [sic]. Paul would persistently and graphically threaten Mr A as a means of control and continually attempted to convince me that Mr A was in some way inappropriate'*
 - Mr A would be contacting the police to make his own complaint, and Ms Fields felt this information was relevant to her harassment report on 19 August 2019.
329. She also detailed that she had not heard anything from the police about that investigation and wondered whether she would receive an update, or whether PC 1 could offer advice on how to proceed with the information provided
330. At 11.28am, WYP intelligence indexer Ms Elizabeth Greenough carried out a Niche check on Ms Fields. We obtained a copy of Ms Fields' WYP Niche intelligence profile. We obtained a statement from Ms Greenough in which she explained that her role included recording and indexing information from internal and external sources for Niche processing.
331. In her statement, Ms Greenough referenced carrying out checks on Mr Crowther. There is contradictory evidence in this respect as we have not obtained any evidence to suggest that she did access Mr Crowther's Niche profile, but there is evidence to suggest that she accessed Ms Fields' Niche profile, which includes Mr Crowther's threats from 16 August. She stated that she did this whilst indexing an intelligence report relating to Ms Fields to clarify the recording studio address.
332. She stated:
- 'I would have opened up Paul Crowther's Niche from the domestic reports linked to her (Ms Fields). This forms part of my role as an Intelligence Indexer – to research and make the correct links. I did not make any checks on Mr Crowther to see if he was wanted for arrest or for a voluntary interview and I was not aware of the complaint made against Paul Crowther by Bethany Fields or any other complaints that had been made in relation to Paul Crowther or Bethany Fields.'*
333. Ms Fields' intelligence profile indicated that Mr A allegedly groomed Ms Fields between 2010 and 2013 giving her money and gifts, and on one occasion putting his hand on her leg whilst in a car. This appears to be the report that Ms Greenough apparently researched.
334. At 12.51pm, Ms Fields emailed Mr A, her father, and others. We obtained a copy of that email in which she wrote that she was awaiting an update from her harassment report on 19 August, that Mr Crowther had continued his harassment *'in the form of defamatory accusations aimed at Mr A'* and she had emailed the officer and copied the email contents into this email.
335. In relation to the grooming allegation, Ms Fields wrote *'Paul is trying to paint me as a victim of grooming. I am a victim of domestic abuse and harassment, the perpetrator of which was Paul. I am the victim of nothing else.'*

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336. At 2.50pm, PC Joanne Armstrong carried out a Niche check on Mr Crowther. We obtained a statement from PC Armstrong, who works in the Incident Management Unit (IMU), in which she stated that she had no recollection of why she accessed Mr Crowther's Niche record.
337. At 6.43pm, PS Carrie-Ann O'Keefe carried out a Niche check on Mr Crowther.
338. At 8.26pm, PS O'Keefe's OEL entries indicated that she allocated PC Samuel Logan to speak with Mr Crowther and obtain a statement if he wished to prosecute Ms Fields, complete a DASH form regardless of Mr Crowther's wishes and when this was done to then allocate it to the DAT for investigation.
339. We obtained a statement from PS O'Keefe, whose daily duties included crime allocation ensuring that officers complete the MSI so that the relevant department can conduct an investigation, in which she said she allocated the OEL to PC Logan to meet the MSI.
340. PC Logan invited Mr Crowther to the police station and then asked PC Ashleigh Rae to deal with the matter on his behalf. PS Logan had consulted PS O'Keefe who stated that she did not have any problem with PC Rae taking Mr Crowther's statement, which PC Rae obtained on 12 September 2019.

> 6 September 2012

341. At 12.32am on 6 September, PC Mandy Geary carried out a Niche check on Mr Crowther. We obtained a statement from PC Geary, who is a patrol officer based at Dewsbury police station, in which she said she could not recall why she carried out the check. She believed that she had not previously dealt with Mr Crowther or Ms Fields and was not aware of their complaints against each other. She stated that she routinely looked at her colleague's workloads during any down time, and may have carried out the search due to PC Logan being on her team.
342. At 9.39pm, PC Logan carried out a Niche check on Ms Fields.

> 7 September 2019

343. At 4.59am on 7 September, PC Logan's OEL entry noted:
- 'I have again been unable to progress this investigation due to extremely low levels of staffing and public demand. I have requested a workload day in order to progress this and my other investigations but this has not been granted as yet due to the extremely low staffing levels and demand for service.'*
344. At 12.31pm, public enquiry officer Ms Mary Lewis OEL entry indicated that Mr Crowther visited the Dewsbury police station help desk to ask for an update, and she told him about the shortage of staff, asked him to be patient, and an officer would contact him.

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345. We obtained a statement from Ms Lewis in which she recalled Mr Crowther telling her that he suffered from mental health problems. She stated:

'I made a record of Mr Crowther's visit on the OEL and sent a task to the officer in case (OIC) to let them know...I did not check Mr Crowther on the Niche system to see if he was wanted because he was the victim and there was no reason to do a check and I was not aware of any complaints made against Mr Crowther by Bethany Fields.'

346. We obtained a statement from PC Logan, who is a patrol officer covering the Kirklees area, in which he explained that at 8.29pm on 4 September, he received the task to obtain a statement and DASH risk assessment from Mr Crowther, and then to forward it to the DAT.

347. He said the task was sent to him in the middle of his 4pm to midnight shift when he did not have the chance to check his work record. He said on 5 September, he worked a 10pm to 7am shift when he was one of two officers available to cover the Batley and Spen area, due to staff shortages. He said he was busy all night and did not have the chance to check his work record.

348. He said at 9.38pm on 6 September, he checked the Niche OEL details but was unable to carry out any enquiries during that night shift due to other incidents and being one of only three officers on duty.

349. He concluded by saying that at 4.59am on 7 September, he updated the OEL with the reason for being unable to progress the investigation and added that after finishing his night shift, he was on rest days until his next shift at 7am on 11 September. He stated:

'there was no obvious risks highlighted to myself as the allegation was a historical incident. In relation to my first entry on the OEL about not being granted a workload day and staffing levels I can state that on my team these had been low for some time and this meant that we did not get sufficient time to conduct enquiries into any of our investigations.'

> 8 September 2019

350. At 8.48pm on 8 September, PC 1 carried out a Niche check on Mr Crowther.

351. At 9.03pm, PC 1 replied to Mr A's email from 4 September. We obtained a copy of that response in which PC 1 thanked Mr A for his email, and wrote that Mr A's and Ms Fields' issues were two separate crimes and they should be recorded as such. He also said that having spoken to his supervision he was advised that Mr A go through the correct channels to report his crime so that he would get an independent police officer to investigate and who will look after his specific case. He also said that the best solution for Mr A would be to report the crime using the police telephone 101 system and then an officer would then be in touch regarding his case.

> 9 September 2019

352. At 10.07pm on 9 September, WYP contact officer Ms Emma Rhodes contacted Mr A about his email to WYP. We obtained a copy of the call recording and produced a transcript. Mr A

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told Ms Rhodes that Mr Crowther was insinuating ‘*sort of sexual allegations*’ and had sent him two emails. Mr A explained that Mr Crowther took:

“any kind of rejection extremely badly...He thinks you’re his worst enemy...he’s aware that I am aware of the abuse that’s been going on in his relationship with Beth for 18 months...So he knows that I’ve got knowledge that he doesn’t want me to have so he’s trying to discredit me...I’ve been advised to take it up with the safeguarding adult safeguarding team.”

353. At 10.11pm, Ms Rhodes created a Storm incident log in relation to Mr A receiving a number of emails from Mr Crowther which insinuated sexual assault by him.
354. We obtained a copy of the incident log, in which Ms Rhodes entries noted that Mr A believed Mr Crowther had taken being banned from the music studio personally, others had received similar emails and Mr Crowther had made threats of violence towards studio employees.
355. Ms Rhodes noted that Mr Crowther had mental health issues and Mr A had received advice about the adult safeguarding team taking the case to ‘*tie all the threads around Paul Crowther together.*’ The incident log does not mention Mr Crowther being aware of Mr A’s awareness of the alleged abuse, or that Mr Crowther was trying to discredit him.
356. At 10.18pm, Ms Rhodes’ THRIVE assessment log entry noted that it was malicious communications with ‘*NO IMMEDIATE RISK OR HARM*’.
357. We obtained a statement from Ms Rhodes, in which she said she could not initially recall the incident. She added that she reviewed the incident log and listened to the recording of her phone call to Mr A to refresh her memory.
358. Ms Rhodes said she called Mr A after seeing his email in order to gain additional details for a crime report. She stated that Mr A was calm and whilst concerned, he did not appear distressed by the incident. She said she ascertained that this was not an emergency nor was it something that required immediate action and added that as this log was routine, she sent the log on completion to ‘TEL’, who she thinks was for telephone officers, who then take on the investigation.
359. She stated that she did not investigate any crimes and did not carry out any checks on Mr Crowther due it not being within her role profile. She said she would carry out a check if the phone call was lacking in detail that may be held on police systems but ‘*that was not the case in this report.*’
360. In his statements, Mr A made reference to meeting Mr Crowther and Ms Fields in May 2019. He stated:
- ‘Crowther was very agitated and concerned that he was not welcome at Old Chapel due to an incident when I had told him I didn’t want to speak to him. He took this as complete rejection and was attacking me as having designs on Beth, and was visibly annoyed. I recognised this as a symptom of his illness, as had Beth, and we both reassured him he was still welcome and his accusations were groundless. Once he knew he could return to the studio he became calm and I subsequently spoke to him at Old Chapel with no problems.’*

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361. He said on 28 August, he received Mr Crowther's first email containing screenshots of conversations between Mr Crowther and Ms Fields and which included *'Beth saying to Paul that I had groomed her'*. He said he sent the email to Ms Fields for an explanation.
362. He added that on 4 September, Ms Fields sent an email to everyone that Mr Crowther had emailed and she had explained Mr Crowther's reasons for falsely accusing him of grooming her. He said on the same day he had contacted Ms Fields seeking clarification about the threats Mr Crowther made towards him. He stated:
- 'Beth told me that these threats were about cutting throats and he was talking graphically about cutting people apart. Beth said he had talked about this in a meeting with a psychiatrist and that he was smiling at the time. I don't know what meeting Beth was talking about.'*
363. Mr A said he was aware that PC 1 was dealing with Ms Fields' complaint, and stated that Ms Fields was concerned due to not being updated *'and it was looking like Crowther's behaviour was deteriorating.'* Mr A said he discussed this with Ms Fields, and they agreed that he could update PC 1 about the threats and allegations towards him, which led to both of them emailing PC 1 on 4 September.
364. He explained that he read PC 1's response on the morning of 9 September, by which time he had made an appointment to discuss things with Mr G, who was a friend that used to be a police officer. That meeting will be mentioned in more detail later in this report.
365. Mr A stated that he completed an anti-social behaviour report form on the WYP website at 9.12pm on 9 September, which generated a copy email. WYP then contacted him at 10.11pm as a result of that email. Mr A could not recall WYP contacting him or what conversation he had with them.

> 10 September 2019

366. At 4.24am on 10 September, PC Fiona Bennett's incident log entry noted that Mr A needed contacting to obtain full details, there were a number of victims, and Mr Crowther was recorded on Niche. The incident log then remained open with no further log entries made until 17 September, when it was closed due to officers dealing with Ms Fields' death.
367. We obtained a statement from PC Bennett, who works in the WYP IMU in a support role dealing with non-urgent incidents, in which she said she read the incident report, which she said appeared to be a report of an offence of Malicious Communications. She explained that she would usually contact the caller (Mr A) to take full details and record a crime with Mr A as the victim. On this occasion, she stated that she did not make contact with Mr A due to accepting the incident log at an unsociable hour, and made the log entry requesting contact at a more reasonable hour of the day.
368. At 4.25am and 4.29am respectively, PC Bennett carried out Niche checks on Mr Crowther and Ms Fields. The officer said she could not recall if those checks revealed anything, and stated *'if there had been anything that raised my concerns about the situation or the urgency of our response to it, I would have at minimum spoken to a supervisor.'*

> 11 September 2019

369. At 11.16am and 11.18am on 11 September, PC Mohammed Anwar carried out Niche checks on Ms Fields and Mr Crowther.
370. We obtained a statement from PC Anwar, who at the time of this incident was a crime manager, in which he said he carried out the checks after being aware that Mr Crowther's statement was arranged for the following day. He said he checked Mr Crowther to see if he had any warning markers to ensure his and his colleague's safety. PC Anwar stated:
'I cannot categorically say if I was aware that Crowther was a suspect for a domestic related matter as this incident occurred quite some time ago. However I can say that if he was shown as a suspect at the time then on the balance of probabilities I would have noticed it. I may have discussed this with my colleagues in relation to this matter but I cannot recall the exact nature of the conversation. I did not take any action against Crowther himself (i.e. interview/ arrest) because I wasn't the officer in the case.'
371. At 1.39pm, WYP public enquiry officer Ms Collette Hartley carried out a Niche check on Mr Crowther.
372. At 2.01pm, Ms Hartley created an OEL in relation to Mr Crowther allegedly being harassed by Mr A. We obtained a copy of the OEL, in which Ms Hartley noted that Mr Crowther had reported Mr A:
'TO VARIOUS AUTHORITIES REGARDING CSE ON HIS EX-GIRLFRIEND BETHANY FIELDS BECAUSE HE STATES SUSPECT WORKS WITH VULNERABLE CHILDREN AND SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO. VICTIM SAYS SUSPECT HAS FOUND OUT THAT HE WANTS TO MEET HIM AS HE WANTS TO DEAL WITH THIS AWAY FROM POLICE. VICTIM STATES HE IS A VULNERABLE ADULT WITH MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS AND THIS IS CAUSING HIM TO BECOME EXTREMELY DISTRESSED. SUSPECT HAS BEEN CONTACTING VICTIM'S CARER – Mr D.'
373. We obtained a statement from Ms Hartley, in which she explained that she first dealt with Mr Crowther on 3 September. In relation to dealing with him again on 11 September, she recalled that Mr Crowther wanted to make a harassment complaint against Mr A.
374. Ms Hartley stated:
'I gathered from the conversation we had that Mr A was now seeing his ex-girlfriend Bethany Fields...He said Mr A had groomed her when she was only 15yrs old and added that Mr A worked with vulnerable children and he shouldn't be allowed to as he had "groomed" Bethany when she was still a child. He said that since he had reported him, Mr A was now constantly ringing and texting his friends to ask Mr Crowther to meet him and to deal with this away from any police and this was making him extremely distressed as he was a vulnerable adult with Mental Health Issues. He gave me the number of his carer, Mr D and stated Mr A was also texting him...Mr Crowther mentioned that he had an appointment the following day with an officer regarding his earlier complaint about the assault on him by Bethany Fileds [sic]. I advised him to mention this latest complaint at this appointment and he said he would attend the interview with his carer, Mr D. I did not make

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any checks on Paul Crowther and was unaware that there was a complaint made against him.'

375. At 4.29pm, Mr Crowther contacted WYP by telephone. Ms Kay Jones, a WYP contact officer, spoke to Mr Crowther, who handed the phone over to Mr D. We obtained a copy of the call recording and produced a transcript. During that conversation Mr D said that third parties were contacting him about Mr Crowther, which was 'harassment' and he wanted to report the messages being sent to his phone.
376. Mr D said he told Mr A he did not want to talk to him and he then received a number of messages. He said Mr Crowther then took over on the call and said the police were investigating Mr A for grooming an underage person and he was in a position of power with vulnerable people. He indicated that Mr D wanted the messages being sent to his phone stopping.
377. Mr D then came back onto the call and explained he was Mr Crowther's friend, who cared for him. He said that he had told Mr A to stop sending him messages the previous day (10 September) and he had not received any more messages since. He indicated that Mr A was using him as mediation, the messages he received from Mr A were not threatening and that Ms Fields had complained about Mr Crowther, which was having a detrimental effect on Mr Crowther's mental health.
378. Ms Jones questioned why she needed to take a report from Mr D when the messages had stopped and had not been aimed at him. Mr D then read out one of Mr A's messages:
"So it says I'm taking some advice on whether its possible to prevent prosecution and seek a way to resolve matters to everyone's satisfaction. Beth has made a statement explaining how she erm, said what she said which makes Paul position worse in the harassment charge. Erm, there is no substance to any grooming I have never wanted to or what Paul thinks, I only want what's best for Beth. We all had massive I don't get this bit, we all had massive banter before we realised the harm it was doing to him. So he's also aware that he is doing harm. Erm, I don't want to inflate Paul anymore until he is stable and better I just think talking is better than prosecution if possible."
379. Mr D indicated Mr Crowther was being persecuted "*there's been this witch hunt of a vulnerable adult, they just need to stop.*" He also indicated that Mr A did not want to take it any further "*because he's starting to get investigated.*".
380. Ms Jones said that she would add a note to the ongoing harassment case, and Mr Crowther came back onto the call and said:
"What were dealing with today is the fact he is contacting people around me and I want it to stop. He's speaking to Nige (Mr D), he's offering his services to other people saying if Paul needs to contact me he knows where I am, I'll speak to him, I care for him. He's really distressing me and I don't know what his intentions are, I want him to stop, I want it to be official that he needs to stop because although he's not contacted in the last, it's been under 24 hours since Nige sent that message he could still contact again. I don't want to risk him contacting me again."

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381. Ms Jones explained it was the same crime and the details needed to go onto the ongoing harassment case. Ms Jones told Mr D that she would get someone to call him, and the information had gone to the police crime department.
382. We obtained a WYP statement from Mr D, who worked at the music studio between 2013 and 2015. He stated:
- 'I was working with Paul to help him stay strong as he was building a case against Beth and also Mr A...in relation to Mr A grooming Beth and Beth assaulting Paul and causing criminal damage...I knew there was abuse between Beth and Paul during their relationship and there were lots of arguments...I never really saw anything personally it was what Beth told me, so it was word and mouth really.'*
383. In relation to Mr A contacting him, Mr D stated:
- 'The messages that Mr A sent me were about the fact that he was taking advice on whether it's possible to prevent a prosecution and seek a way to resolve matters to everyone's satisfaction, and he was saying that there was no substance to the grooming and that there was a statement from Beth explaining how and why she said and did what she did and that it made Paul's position worse in the harassment charge.'*
384. In relation to Mr Crowther's mental health, Mr D recalled being on a long walk with Mr Crowther around May/June 2019 after he had made threats towards Ms C. He explained that Mr Crowther talked about hearing voices, referenced 'Azaris' as one of the voices, wanted to kill himself on a daily basis and that it was not him it was the voices. Mr D stated:
- 'I remember Paul saying that he could never harm Beth but could destroy/hurt everyone around her...I would have described him as never being a threat to me, but a very ill human being in a mental sense, as he was deluded, paranoid and obsessive.'*
385. At 4.36pm, Ms Jones carried out Niche checks on Mr Crowther and Ms Fields. At 4.37pm and 4.38pm respectively, PC Logan also carried out Niche checks on Ms Fields and Mr Crowther.
386. At 4.39pm, PC Logan's OEL entries indicated he was made aware of Mr Crowther's visit to the help desk whilst he was dealing with another matter. He noted that he tried to ring Mr Crowther at 4.38pm, left a voicemail message and would attempt to call him the following day (12 September) *'when I might be given some time for clerical.'*
387. In his statement, PC Logan explained he was unable to make any enquiries about Mr Crowther's complaints due to being busy with other victims. He said he tried to contact Mr Crowther just before going off duty at 5pm to arrange an appointment.
388. At 4.42pm, Ms Jones' OEL entry noted Mr D's contact and that he would appreciate a call back.
389. We obtained a statement from Ms Jones in which she said she accessed the OEL to assist with her recall. She explained that she would normally task the OEL to the OIC but, due to the OEL being created by the help desk, it was in the process of being allocated to an officer at the time of her involvement. She explained that it was not her responsibility to

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make in depth checks or undertake an initial investigation and said she was not aware of Ms Fields' complaint against Mr Crowther.

390. At 5.02pm, Mr Crowther contacted WYP in response to PC Logan's call. We obtained a copy of the call recording and produced a transcript. Mr Crowther provided WYP communications officer Mr Simon Kitchener with his and Ms Fields' details and said that his call was in relation to assault and criminal damage. Mr Kitchener explained that PC Logan was going to try and contact him the following day.

391. At 5.03pm, Mr Kitchener carried out a Niche check on Mr Crowther.

392. At 5.06pm, Mr Kitchener's OEL entry noted Mr Crowther responding to PC Logan's call and that PC Logan hoped to make contact the following day.

393. We obtained a statement from Mr Kitchener in which he said that he received a call from Mr Crowther at 5.04pm, informing him that he was returning a call. Mr Kitchener said he attempted to make contact with PC Logan, updated the OEL and could not recall making any Niche checks. He stated:

'I do not recall being aware of Ms Fields complaint and think it unlikely that I would have been while on this call, as Mr Crowther identified himself as the aggrieved party, negating the need for me to view reports in which he was shown as anything other than the aggrieved...Had there been anything brought to my attention at the time of handling this report that would have hinted at any risk to her (Ms Fields) life or that of any other, please rest assured that I would have taken every step available to me to prevent that loss from ever happening.'

> 12 September 2019

394. At 8.17am and 8.39am on 12 September, PC Logan carried out Niche checks on Mr Crowther.

395. At 8.25am, PC Logan's OEL entry indicated he had spoken to Mr Crowther and made arrangements for him to come to the police station to provide a statement and DASH assessment.

396. In his statement, PC Logan explained that he had another appointment and made arrangements for PC Rae to obtain Mr Crowther's statement and DASH assessment. He then contacted Mr Crowther and arranged for him to visit the police station that morning.

397. At 9.07am and 9.08am respectively, PC Rae carried out Niche checks on Ms Fields and Mr Crowther.

398. We obtained a copy of the police statement obtained from Mr Crowther. That statement was obtained between 12.17pm and 1.40pm on 12 September. In that statement Mr Crowther said he believed that the alleged assault and damage by Ms Fields happened on 14 July, and stated:

'I supported BETH with parts of her past which she told me about. BETH confided in me about some grooming she had been victim of as a child...The male responsible for this

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worked with us both in the rehearsal [sic] studio. This would cause issues in our relationship almost every week as I was trying to support BETH. I have separately reported this to the police, on behalf of BETH. BETH told me that she had been involved in a previous domestic violent relationship where she assaulted her partner and they had both caused damage in their property. I told BETH that I would not accept any domestic violence in our relationship.'

399. In his statement Mr Crowther indicated that he was a vulnerable person diagnosed with emotional unstable personality disorder, and stated:
- 'The diagnosis can give me low moods and anxiety, thoughts of suicide and self harm [sic] and can make me paranoid. I generally manage this quite well, I have a variety of coping mechanisms and a large support network and I am prescribed medication to alleviate my symptoms. My CPN (Community Psychotherapy Nurse) considers me to be stable.'*
400. He recalled three separate occasions when he alleged that Ms Fields assaulted him 'by hitting my arms on two occasions, causing bruising'. He also said on another occasion she threw a mobile phone at him that hit him in the chest and caused bruising. The third occasion was the alleged incident on 14 July which he described.
401. The statement identified that Mr Crowther sent five photographs to PC Rae of the damage to the wall. Mr Crowther also identified a text conversation screenshot with Ms Fields on 12 August, which 'shows BETH saying "WOW. FUCKING WOW. I HIT A WALL IN FRUSTRATION [sic] BECAUSE YOU WERE MENTALLY TORTURING ME. AND I SLAPPED YOUR ARMS BECAUSE YOU WERE STRANGLING YOURSELF AND I WANTED TOS TOP YOU HURTING YOURSELF BECAUSE I WAS DESPERATE."
402. At 1.41pm, PC Rae's OEL entry indicated that she did not take a victim personal statement from Mr Crowther.
403. At 1.54pm, PC Rae completed Mr Crowther's DASH risk assessment. We obtained a copy of the DASH form. PC Rae answered 'yes' to indicate the following:
- Ms Fields had been involved in previous domestic incidents with Mr Crowther, and previous partners
 - The current incident had resulted in injury
 - Mr Crowther was '*very frightened*' and felt isolated from family and friends
 - He felt depressed and was having suicidal thoughts
 - He had separated or tried to separate from Ms Fields within the past year
 - Ms Fields tried to control everything and/or was excessively jealous
 - Ms Fields was saying or doing '*anything of a sexual nature that makes you feel bad, or that physically hurt you or someone else*'
 - There were other people threatening Mr Crowther or that he was afraid of
 - Ms Fields had previously caused injury to him or anyone else
 - Ms Fields had threatened or attempted suicide.

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404. Within the DASH form details, PC Rae noted there had been no previous police involvement for the previous assaults between Ms Fields and Mr Crowther. Within the comments section, PC Rae made expanded notes to the above 'yes' answers, which indicated Mr Crowther's injuries, his fears, and his mental health situation. PC Rae identified her initial risk assessment as medium.
405. At 2.06pm, PC Rae's OEL entry indicated completion of Mr Crowther's statement and DASH form, and she would attach the floor plan, damage photographs, and screenshot when she received them from Mr Crowther. At 2.12pm, PC Rae noted Mr Crowther's wishes regarding Ms Fields:
- 'Wishes for Beth to be interviewed and cautioned or charged as she has assaulted a vulnerable person. Beth works with vulnerable people and Paul wants the vulnerable people to be safe and for her to learn it is not ok to assault anyone.'*
406. We obtained a statement from PC Rae, who explained that she agreed to assist PC Logan and carried out the Niche checks on Mr Crowther and Ms Fields to safeguard herself prior to meeting with Mr Crowther, to gather intelligence on them and to understand their background. PC Rae said she made her line manager (PS O'Keefe) aware that she was taking Mr Crowther's statement, and then discussed the details of the completed statement and DASH form with PS O'Keefe, to agree on a risk assessment.
407. PC Rae stated:
- 'At the time of taking the statement I was aware that FIELDS had made a complaint against Crowther. This related to a harassment, which I was aware was being investigated out of Kirklees by another officer. I cannot exactly remember the nature of this complaint or the actions I took in respect of it...Crowthers' [sic] mood was up and down throughout our meeting. He cried on more than one occasion. I was aware of this and wanted to ensure that he left our meeting in a good mood. We spoke about the support he has in place and I offered for him to talk to our district mental health nurse, which he declined. Crowther appeared to be in a good mood when he left and explained he was going to meet friends.'*
408. In his statement, PC Anwar said that PC Rae asked him to sit in the room next door whilst she obtained Mr Crowther's statement. He said after a few minutes he checked that everything was alright, PC Rae told him that everything was fine and he then intermittently checked on PC Rae's welfare and had no further involvement.
409. At 2.30pm and 2.31pm respectively, PS O'Keefe carried out Niche checks on Mr Crowther and Ms Fields.
410. At 2.32pm, PS O'Keefe's OEL entry indicated that she agreed with Mr Crowther's DASH medium risk assessment, and noted:
- 'No previously recorded incidents but the situation seems to be escalating [sic] due to a recent separation. Victim states he feels depressed but has a CPN and good support network in place.'*
411. In her statement, PS O'Keefe explained that she based the risk assessment on what PC Rae told her and what was in Mr Crowther's statement. She stated that Mr Crowther had not had contact with Ms Fields since 16 August, the incident was from July, he had not reported any previous domestic incidents with Ms Fields and he did not make any

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suggestion that he wished to harm her. She explained that these were the reasons why she did not deem this to be high risk.

412. She said she saw that Mr Crowther was not wanted for arrest, and if he had been she would have told officers to arrest him on his arrival at the police station. She added that PC Rae told her about Mr Crowther's support network, and that he was meeting a friend to play boules, which she said did not give her any concerns regarding Ms Fields. She said she did not recall looking into the crime reported by Ms Fields so she cannot say if she was aware or not. The evidence suggests that when PS O'Keefe carried out a Niche check on Ms Fields, her complaint against Mr Crowther would have been available to view at that time. Ms Fields' statement and DASH risk assessment would have been available on Niche for her to view.

413. PS O'Keefe stated:

'Nothing that PC Rae said to me or nothing in the statement or risk assessment from Mr Crowther that I reviewed gave me any indication that Mr Crowther would cause such harm to Ms Fields and I was utterly shocked when I discovered that Mr Crowther was suspected of murdering Ms Fields.'

414. At 2.35pm on 12 September, Mr Crowther called WYP to check that PC Rae had received his emails. The call taker assured him that the emails would have been received. We obtained a copy of the call recording and produced a transcript. At 10.54am on 17 September, PC Rae attached the photographs, floor plan and screenshot to the OEL.

415. At 3.08pm on 12 September, PC Logan's OEL entry indicated that the MSI were met by obtaining Mr Crowther's statement and DASH assessment, and it was tasked to the DAT.

416. PC Logan stated that once PC Rae had obtained Mr Crowther's statement and DASH assessment, his task was complete and the OEL was sent to the DAT for further investigation. He stated:

'Due to him not being shown as wanted for harassment and there was nothing recorded on Niche to cause me any concerns that would warrant his arrest, I did not consider arresting him. If I did have concerns, I would have considered arresting him.'

417. At 5.01pm, PC Emma Wylde carried out Niche checks on Mr Crowther and Ms Fields.

418. We obtained a statement from PC Wylde, who works in the Kirklees domestic abuse hub, reviewing domestic incident for the Kirklees area, in which she said she researched Mr Crowther's and Ms Fields' Niche records to refresh her memory due to having no recollection of reviewing any crimes or complaints involving them. At the time of researching Ms Fields' Niche records, her statement and her DASH risk assessment would have been available to view.

419. She stated:

'I believe that I would have looked at these crimes and persons linked from the "KD CLERICAL ABUSE" queue whilst preparing to assist for the following day. I have not taken any action on the crimes as I would have updated the crime report and taken appropriate action. I note that PS Bradbury reviewed this on the 13th September and the crime report updated. To my knowledge, I have never spoken to Paul Crowther or had any other

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contact with him. Bethany Field lived in Leeds therefore I would not have completed any safeguarding for her.'

420. At 5.19pm, FCMU investigator Mr Graham Lund carried out a Niche check on Mr Crowther.
421. We obtained a statement from Mr Lund, whose role is to review recorded crimes, check that they are crime data integrity (CDI) compliant and review for finalising or allocating for further enquiries to be made. He said he reviewed Mr Crowther's harassment report, carried out the Niche check to see if he had any vulnerability markers and then allocated the crime report to the Kirklees district patrol officers. He said he was not aware of Ms Fields' complaint against Mr Crowther or any other allegations made against him. At the time of Mr Lund carrying out his Niche check on Mr Crowther, Ms Fields' complaint would have been linked to him and Ms Fields' statement and DASH risk assessment would have been available to view on her Niche profile.
422. At 6.12pm, WYP received an emergency call reporting that Ms Fields had been stabbed. We obtained a copy of the Storm incident log which identified Mr Crowther as the suspect. At 6.39pm, log entries noted that Ms Fields had died and, at 7.09pm, noted Mr Crowther's arrest.
423. PC 1's duties indicated that he worked on 27 and 28 August, and then was on training or leave until 7 September. He then worked between 7 and 10 September with 11 September being a rest day.

> PC 1's written response

424. In relation to Mr A's email from 4 September, PC 1 stated:

'I spoke to my supervision about emails received from Mr A and Ms Fields. I acted on advice from supervision. I cannot recall which supervisor I spoke to. I spoke to supervision because I was concerned about my work loads and the daily tasks. I asked for support and guidance daily.'

425. In relation to there being no indication that he escalated the incident to his supervisor or the SGU after receiving Mr A's email and Niche checks, in relation to Mr Crowther's antecedent history on 8 September, PC 1 stated, *'I did speak to a supervisor about this, as above, I did ask for support and guidance. I recall that I spoke to PS Scott Bent.'*

> PC 1's interview

426. PC 1 said that he returned to work on 10 September, and spoke to PS Bent about arresting Mr Crowther when he returned to duty after his rest days. He recalled *"it was PS Bent who said they would arrest Paul Crowther...after PC 1 finished in custody. This was on the 15 September."* When asked where this was documented on the OEL, PC 1 said *"It isn't documented, that's one thing that I didn't do."*
427. PC 1 explained that he was worrying about his workload, needed supervision advice, felt overwhelmed with his workload and did not feel he had time to sit and talk it through. He

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explained that due to not looking at Mr Crowther's PNC record *'he had not seen the bigger picture'* but would now that he is more experienced would have circulated Mr Crowther as BOLO.

428. He said he could not remember what tasks he was doing on 7 and 8 September, but did remember answering Mr A's email after seeking advice from his sergeant. He said he could not remember who that sergeant was, and could not remember carrying out a Niche check on Mr Crowther.
429. PC 1 said he could not recall why he checked Mr Crowther, and said *"I think I had taken both emails as that there had been an escalation and that's why I spoke to my supervisor"*. He explained that it was his inexperience that led to him to not consider revisiting the DASH assessment.
430. He admitted he did not reply to Ms Fields' email. He said he had made a draft email but did not send it as he was seeking advice from a sergeant who he did not name. He recalled receiving a second email from Ms Fields on 9 September but did not look at it in detail as he wanted supervisor advice.
431. PC 1 explained that he should have taken a more direct approach with his sergeant and sat down to look at the email with them. He said that after he had spoken to his sergeant about Mr Crowther on 10 September he did not return to work again until 15 September.
432. In relation to updating crime reports at that time, PC 1 explained he had done some with his tutor, but *'he would have only really known how to put a crime on...in training school you aren't taught the operational side of NICHE for example, how the system works and what you should do'*.
433. He said he did not have any contact with Ms Fields after 19 August, and explained that he had not informed her that he was the officer on the case as he did not realise he had been set any case tasks.
434. In relation to documenting that he and A/PS Bent were going to arrest Mr Crowther on 15 September, PC 1 admitted that this was not documented, and accepted that he should have documented this to keep the OEL updated and keep a record of what he has done. He said, *"its sort of frowned upon to put comments such as I asked to talk to discuss workload and request decline and stuff"*. He said at the time he did not feel confident in documenting asking for help and not being given it.
435. PC 1 said he was not aware of Mr Crowther contacting the police and visiting police stations. He stated that the only awareness he had prior to receiving his IOPC interview disclosure was from reading the OEL about Mr Crowther visiting a police station on 21 August, which he said he spoke to his supervisor about.
436. I asked PC 1 if he accepted the allegations on his misconduct notice, and he replied *"yeah"* to all of them. I then asked if he had anything that he wished to add, and PC 1 said:
"I have been reflecting on this for over a year and in reality, you know I feel, obviously Bethany's death was horrible and really, really sad. It's something that will remain with me certainly for the rest of my career. My thoughts are with the family in terms of what's

happened...At the time I tried my best to answer or to investigate as best as I could the incident and you know that I'm sorry that it got to that point".

> Analysis

437. On 21 and 27 August, Ms Hughes was working on the Dewsbury Helpdesk when Mr Crowther attended to make complaints against Ms Fields. This investigation has found no evidence to suggest that either a statement or DASH risk assessment was completed with Mr Crowther at that time.
438. Although Ms Hughes was reacting to Mr Crowther's complaint, it was not her role to investigate Ms Fields' complaint against Mr Crowther, to take a witness statement from Mr Crowther or complete a DASH risk assessment. She made various checks on Mr Crowther's and Ms Fields' Niche profiles, which at that time would have included Ms Fields' witness statement and DASH risk assessment, together with Mr Crowther's historical mental health and domestic violence issues. However, Ms Hughes' primary focus was responding to Mr Crowther's complaint and she may not have had the capacity or responsibility for reading and comparing Ms Fields' statement and her DASH risk assessment whilst investigating Mr Crowther's complaint.
439. The evidence suggests that Ms Hughes acted in accordance with her responsibilities as a help desk officer in logging Mr Crowther's complaint, checking his details on Niche and forwarding his complaint to the FCMU.
440. DC Singleton's role was to review the FCMU OELs. The evidence suggests that at 3.35pm on 28 August, he correctly noted that this was a domestic violence matter and the victim had a history of self-harm and mental health issues. The evidence suggests that DC Singleton correctly identified that there was a potential for further offences and that this investigation should be sent to SGU. This investigation has found no evidence to suggest that DC Singleton carried out any Niche checks on Mr Crowther or Ms Fields. DC Singletons actions appear to have been reasonable in the circumstances and in line with his role.
441. Ms Wilkinson, a SGU Clerical Officer, carried out a Niche check on Mr Crowther. Her role includes reviewing all domestic and non-crimes for intervention. She correctly noted that there was insufficient evidence for her to make a qualified assessment and that once the necessary documentation, including a DASH risk assessment, was completed this investigation could be re-assessed by the SGU team. Ms Wilkinson's actions appear to have been reasonable in the circumstances as her role was a clerical role rather than an investigative role.
442. When Ms Wilkinson checked Mr Crowther's Niche profile it would have shown a history of mental health and domestic violence issues. His profile would have been linked to Ms Fields' Niche profile, and, at that time, her statement and DASH risk assessment would have been available to view and compare. However, it should be noted that Ms Wilkinson's primary focus was Mr Crowther's complaint and she may not have had the capacity or responsibility for comparing Ms Fields' statement and her DASH risk assessment whilst investigating Mr Crowther's complaint.

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443. At 10.09am on 4 September, Mr A sent an email to PC 1's work email address. He asked PC 1 how he should deal with Mr Crowther's threats, allegations and malicious communications.
444. At 12.14pm that same day, Ms Fields also sent an email to PC 1's work email address. She stated that Mr Crowther had made false and defamatory comments with regard to Mr A, that Mr A had also been the victim of threats from Mr Crowther and that Mr Crowther had tried to isolate her from one of her most trusted confidants.
445. At 11.28am on 4 September, WYP Intelligence Indexer Ms Greenough carried out a Niche check on Ms Fields. In her account, she said she also checked Mr Crowther's Niche profile and detailed her rationale. She stated that she accessed Mr Crowther's record from domestic reports linked to Ms Fields, whose intelligence profile includes her complaint from 19 August, in an attempt to clarify the address of the recording studio in line with her role.
446. There is contradictory evidence in this respect. Whilst there is evidence that Ms Greenough carried out a check on Ms Fields' Niche profile on 4 September, we have not identified any evidence to suggest that she carried out a check on Mr Crowther's Niche profile on the same day or any other day. The evidence shows that there were three 'unknown' checks on Mr Crowther's Niche profile made, one of which was on 26 August and the other two on 11 September. We have not been able to identify which officer made those checks or why.
447. The evidence suggests that when Ms Greenough carried out a search of Ms Fields' Niche profile, her statement and DASH risk assessment would have been viewable and Mr Crowther was also linked to Ms Fields' complaint of 19 August 2019. However, the evidence suggests that it was not her responsibility to compare Ms Fields' statement and her DASH risk assessment whilst investigating Mr Crowther's complaint as her role was an administrative one rather than an investigative role. Her actions appear to have been reasonable and in line with her role as an indexing officer.
448. At 2.50pm on 4 September, Ms Armstrong, who works in the WYP IMU, carried out a Niche check on Mr Crowther, although she had no recollection of why she did so. At the time of her carrying that Niche check, Mr Crowther's Niche profile showed his previous mental health issues, previous domestic violence history and that he had been linked to Ms Fields' complaint of 19 August. At that time, PC 1's PEACE notes and Ms Fields' witness statement and DASH risk assessment had been uploaded to her Niche profile and were available to view. This investigation has found no evidence to identify why Ms Armstrong carried out that Niche check on Mr Crowther or if she took any further action as a result.
449. At 6.43pm on 4 September, PS O'Keefe carried out a Niche check on Mr Crowther, before tasking PC Logan to obtain a statement from him, complete a DASH risk assessment and pass the investigation to the DAT. The evidence shows that PC Logan asked PC Rae to take the statement from Mr Crowther on his behalf.
450. The evidence suggests that PS O'Keefe dealt with this matter expeditiously and in line with WYP policy. Mr Crowther's Niche intelligence profile was available to view and showed his previous history and PNC record, including previous mental health and domestic violence history. Mr Crowther had been linked to Ms Fields' complaint of 19 August by that time which meant her intelligence profile, including PC 1's PEACE notes, her witness statement and DASH risk assessment would also have been available to view. However, it should be

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noted that PS O'Keefe's primary focus was Mr Crowther's complaint and he may not have had the capacity or responsibility for comparing Ms Fields' statement and her DASH risk assessment whilst investigating Mr Crowther's complaint.

451. The evidence shows that at 12.32pm on 6 September, patrol officer PC Geary, and at 9.39pm on the same day, PC Logan, both conducted Niche checks on Mr Crowther. PC Geary could not account for why she carried out the check, other than to suggest it was because she worked on the same team as PC Logan and often looked at other officers' workloads during any downtime. The evidence suggests that when checking Mr Crowther's Niche intelligence profile, his previous history and PNC record, including previous mental health and domestic violence history were available to view. Mr Crowther had been linked to Ms Fields' complaint of 19 August by that time which meant her intelligence profile, including PC 1's PEACE notes, her witness statement and DASH risk assessment would also have been available to view. However, it should be noted that PC Geary and PC Logan's primary focus was Mr Crowther's complaint and they may not have had the capacity or responsibility for comparing Ms Fields' statement and her DASH risk assessment whilst investigating Mr Crowther's complaint.
452. At 12.31pm, Mr Crowther again visited Dewsbury police station to ask for an update on his complaint. He was told about the shortage of staff and that an officer would contact him. The OEL was updated accordingly.
453. In his account, PC Logan explained the various operational reasons which prevented him from progressing this enquiry, which the evidence shows he detailed on the OEL and made arrangements for PC Rae to take Mr Crowther's statement. The evidence suggests that PC Logan's actions were reasonable and in line with his duties.
454. At 8.48pm on 8 September, PC 1 checked Mr Crowther's Niche profile. At 9.03pm, he replied to Mr A's email of 4 September. In his account he said that after speaking with his supervisor he replied to Mr A saying that that his and Ms Fields' complaints were two separate crimes, should be recorded as such and for Mr A to report his complaint through the police 101 system.
455. The evidence shows that at 10.07pm on 9 September, Ms Rhodes, who is a WYP contact officer, telephoned Mr A regarding his email to PC 1 on 4 September. Mr A told Ms Rhodes of the sexual allegations Mr Crowther had made with regard to him.
456. Ms Rhodes created a Storm incident log with regard to Mr Crowther's sexual allegations against Mr A. The evidence shows that she also noted on the log that Mr Crowther had made threats of violence towards studio employees, that Mr Crowther had mental health issues and that Mr A had received advice about the adult safeguarding team taking his case to *'tie all the threats around Mr Crowther together'*.
457. The evidence shows that Ms Rhodes conducted a THRIVE assessment and noted on the incident report that Mr A's complaint was a *'malicious communications'* with *'no immediate threat of harm'*. Ms Rhodes did not carry out any further checks on Mr Crowther and said it was not her responsibility to do so. The evidence shows that Mr A submitted an anti-social behaviour report on the WYP website on 9 September and received a telephone call back the same day from Ms Rhodes. Ms Rhodes actions appear to be in line with her role and appear to have been reasonable in the circumstances.

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458. At 4.24am on 10 September, PC Bennett, who works in the IMU in a support role with responsibility for non-urgent incidents, noted on the incident report that Mr A needed contacting to obtain full details, as there were a number of victims and that Mr Crowther was recorded on Niche. The evidence obtained by this investigation shows that PC Bennett checked Mr Crowther's Niche profile at 4.25am on 10 September and that she checked Ms Fields' Niche profile at 4.29am that same day. PC Bennett could not recall if those checks revealed anything but said:
- 'if there had been anything that raised my concerns about the situation or the urgency of our response to it, I would have at minimum spoken to a supervisor'.*
459. PC Bennett said she did not make contact with Mr A due to the unreasonableness of the hour and made a log entry that Mr A should be contacted at a more reasonable time of day. Her actions in this respect seem to have been reasonable.
460. Although PC Bennett works in a support role, she updated the incident report and would have been aware of the alleged threats made by Mr Crowther towards studio employees and Mr Crowther's mental health issues. She has also checked both Mr Crowther and Ms Fields' Niche profile.
461. The evidence suggests that when PC Bennett checked Mr Crowther's and Ms Fields' Niche intelligence profile, his previous history and PNC record, as well as his previous mental health and domestic violence history, would have been available to view. She would also have been aware of Ms Fields' complaint of 19 August and her Niche intelligence profile including PC 1's PEACE notes, her witness statement and DASH risk assessment, would have also been available to view. The evidence suggests that PC Bennett worked in a support role rather than an investigative role and may not have had the capacity or responsibility for interrogating Ms Fields' intelligence profile further and comparing her witness statement and DASH risk assessment together.
462. The evidence suggests that at 11.16am and 11.18am on 11 September, PC Anwar, a WYP Crime Manager, carried out Niche checks on Ms Fields and Mr Crowther. The evidence suggests that he did so to identify any possible warning markers prior to Mr Crowther attending to give his witness statement to ensure his and his colleague's safety.
463. PC Anwar said because of the lapse of time he could not categorically say that Mr Crowther was a suspect in a domestic related matter, but said if he was, on the balance of probabilities he would have noticed it and may have discussed it with his colleagues but could not remember the exact nature of the conversation.
464. At the time of checking Mr Crowther's and Ms Fields' Niche profiles, Mr Crowther's previous history and PNC record, as well as his previous mental health and domestic violence history, would have been available to view. Had PC Anwar viewed these he may have also been aware of Ms Fields' complaint of 19 August. Her intelligence profile, including PC 1's PEACE notes, her witness statement and DASH risk assessment would also have been available to view. As PC Anwar said he was looking for any warning markers prior to Mr Crowther attending for his statement, this may possibly have been a missed opportunity for him to read and compare Ms Fields' statement and her DASH risk assessment. Had he done so, he may have been in a position to escalate this incident to his supervisor, which may have led to WYP being able to arrest Mr Crowther and

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safeguard Ms Fields. However, it should be noted that PC Anwar's primary concern was Mr Crowther's complaint, and not to review and compare documents submitted by a colleague.

465. The evidence shows that on 3 September Ms Hartley checked the WYP Niche crime records and informed Mr Crowther that his crime had not yet been allocated and that he would be contacted when it had been. She then updated the OEL accordingly. At 1.39pm on 11 September, she updated the OEL with details regarding his complaint against Mr A. In her statement she said she did not make any checks on Mr Crowther and was unaware there had been a complaint made against him
466. There is contradictory evidence in this respect in that information obtained by this investigation by WYP shows that at 1.39pm on 11 September, Ms Hartley accessed Mr Crowther's intelligence profile.
467. The evidence suggests that when Ms Hartley checked Mr Crowther's Niche profile, his previous history and PNC record, as well as his previous mental health and domestic violence history, would have been available to view. At that time Mr Crowther had been linked to Ms Fields' complaint of 19 August, which meant that Ms Hartley would have also been able to view Ms Fields' intelligence profile, including PC 1's PEACE notes, her witness statement and DASH risk assessment. However, Ms Hartley is in an administrative role rather than an investigative one, whose primary focus was Mr Crowther's complaint against Mr A and Ms Fields and she may not have had the capacity or responsibility for interrogating Ms Fields' intelligence profile and comparing her witness statement and DASH risk assessment.
468. At 4.29pm, Mr Crowther telephoned WYP with regard to him wanting to make a harassment complaint against Mr A and his allegations that Mr A had groomed Ms Fields. That call was taken by WYP contact officer Ms Jones. Mr Crowther was supported by his friend Mr D during this conversation. The evidence shows that at 4.36pm, Ms Jones carried out Niche checks on Mr Crowther and Ms Fields. At 4.37pm and 4.38pm, PC Logan also carried out a Niche check on Ms Fields and for the second time checked Mr Crowther's Niche profile, before attempting to call Mr Crowther before he went off duty. PC Logan updated the incident report accordingly.
469. The evidence shows that as no officer had been allocated to this incident at that time, so Ms Jones would not have been able to task the OIC. In her account, Ms Jones said she did not make any further investigations as it was not her role and was not aware of Ms Fields' complaint against Mr Crowther. Her actions seem to have been reasonable in the circumstances.
470. At 5.02pm, Mr Crowther telephoned WYP in response to the earlier telephone call by PC Logan. PC Logan was off duty at this time and the call was taken by WYP communications officer Mr Kitchener. During that call Mr Crowther provided Mr Kitchener with the details of his complaint against Ms Fields.
471. The evidence suggests that when Ms Jones and PC Logan carried out their respective checks of both Mr Crowther's and Ms Fields' Niche profiles, Mr Crowther's previous history and PNC record, as well as his previous mental health and domestic violence history, would have been available for them to view. By that time, Ms Fields' linked complaint of 19

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August and her intelligence profile including PC 1's PEACE notes, her witness statement and DASH risk assessment, would also have been available to view. However, at the time of making those checks, Ms Jones' and PC Logan's primary focus was Mr Crowther's complaint and they may not have had the capacity or responsibility for interrogating Ms Fields' intelligence profile and comparing her statement together with her DASH risk assessment.

472. At 8.17am and 8.39am on 12 September, PC Logan carried out further Niche checks on Mr Crowther. He updated the OEL and arranged for Mr Crowther to attend Dewsbury police station in order to provide a witness statement with regard to his complaint against Ms Fields. PC Logan detailed on the incident report that he had another appointment and that PC Rae would take Mr Crowther's statement.
473. At 5.03pm, Mr Kitchener checked Mr Crowther's Niche profile after receiving a telephone call from Mr Crowther in relation to an earlier missed call which he thought might have been from WYP. In his account, Mr Kitchener said that when he checked Mr Crowther's Niche profile it would only have told him at a glance if Mr Crowther was wanted for arrest and he would have had to manually review each occurrence to obtain further information which he said was outside of his role.
474. The evidence suggests that Mr Kitchener's actions were reasonable in the circumstances. However, when he carried out a check of Mr Crowther's Niche profile, his previous history and PNC record, as well as his previous mental health and domestic violence history, would have been available for him to view. By that time, Mr Crowther had been linked to Ms Fields' complaint of 19 August, which would mean that Ms Fields' intelligence profile including PC 1's PEACE notes, her witness statement and DASH risk assessment, would also have been available to view. However, it should be noted that Mr Kitchener was in an administrative role rather than an investigative one and that he may not have had the capacity or responsibility for interrogating Ms Fields' intelligence profile and comparing her statement and DASH risk assessment together.
475. At 9.07am and 9.08am on 12 September 2019, PC Rae carried out Niche checks on Mr Crowther and Ms Fields before taking a witness statement from Mr Crowther, which was completed at 1.40pm. In his statement he outlined his complaint against Ms Fields and he also informed PC Rae that he was a vulnerable person diagnosed with emotional unstable personality disorder
476. The evidence shows that PC Rae conduct Niche profile checks on Mr Crowther and Ms Fields and completed a DASH risk assessment for Mr Crowther and, although aware of Ms Fields' complaint against Mr Crowther, she said she did not know the details of that complaint. In her account PC Rae said Mr Crowther's mood was up and down during the meeting and that he cried on more than one occasion. PC Rae said she asked Mr Crowther if he wanted to talk to the force mental health worker, which he declined and said he appeared to be in a good mood when he left saying he was going to meet some friends.
477. The evidence suggests that following the completion of Mr Crowther's statement and DASH risk assessment form PC Rae discussed her DASH risk assessment of medium with her supervisor PS O'Keefe. At 2.30pm and 2.31pm respectively, PS O'Keefe carried out Niche checks on Mr Crowther and Ms Fields. The evidence shows that PS O'Keefe updated the incident report and agreed with PC Rae's medium DASH risk assessment. In

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her account, PS O'Keefe said that she was aware that Mr Crowther was not wanted for arrest and if he had been she would have made arrangements for him to be immediately arrested. At that time Mr Crowther was not circulated for arrest.

478. PC Rae gave her rationale for the medium risk assessment which appears to have been reasonable in the circumstances noting that this was a historical incident going back to July and that Mr Crowther had no recent contact with Ms Fields since 16 August. The evidence also suggests that the grading of Mr Crowther's complaint by PC Rae and approved by PS O'Keefe as medium risk was correct in the circumstances as they were grading the risk to Mr Crowther and not the risk to Ms Fields.
479. The evidence suggests that when PC Rae and PS O'Keefe carried out their respective checks of both Mr Crowther's and Ms Fields' Niche profiles, Mr Crowther's previous history and PNC record, as well as his previous mental health and domestic violence history would have been available for them to view. In doing so they would have been able to view Ms Fields' complaint of 19 August which was linked to Mr Crowther at that time. Ms Fields' intelligence profile, including PC 1's PEACE notes, her witness statement and DASH risk assessment, would have been available to view. However, PC Rae and PC O'Keefe's primary focus would have been Mr Crowther's complaint, he was not circulated for arrest and they may not have had the capacity or responsibility for interrogating Ms Fields' intelligence profile and comparing her statement, PC 1's PEACE notes and her DASH risk assessment together.
480. At 3.08pm, PC Logan noted on the incident report that the MSI had been met and correctly tasked the investigation to the DAT. He maintained that he had not read any information which would have warranted arresting Mr Crowther.
481. Whilst PC Logan was correct when he said that Mr Crowther was not wanted for arrest, there is evidence that he had already checked both Mr Crowther and Ms Fields' Niche profiles, the details of which are provided earlier in this analysis section of the report.
482. At 5.01pm, PC Wylde, who works in the Kirklees Domestic Abuse Hub, carried out Niche checks on Mr Crowther and Ms Fields. She said she would have looked at this case from the clerical abuse queue to assist for the following day. The evidence suggests that when she carried out the respective checks, Mr Crowther's previous history and PNC record, as well as his previous mental health and domestic violence history would have been available to view. PC Wylde would have been able to view Ms Fields' complaint of 19 August which was linked to Mr Crowther at that time. Ms Fields' intelligence profile, including PC 1's PEACE notes, her witness statement and DASH risk assessment, would have been available to view. However, PC Wylde's primary focus would have been Mr Crowther's complaint, he was not circulated for arrest, and she may not have had the capacity or responsibility for interrogating Ms Fields' intelligence profile and comparing her statement, PC 1's PEACE notes and her DASH risk assessment together.
483. At 5.19pm, FCMU investigator Mr Lund carried out a Niche check on Mr Crowther. He said his role was to review recorded crimes, check that they are CDI compliant and review for finalising or allocating for further enquiries to be made. He said he reviewed Mr Crowther's harassment report, carried out the Niche check to see if he had any vulnerability markers and then allocated the crime report to the Kirklees district patrol officers. He said he was

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not aware of Ms Fields' complaint against Mr Crowther or any other allegations made against him.

484. The evidence suggests that when Mr Lund checked Mr Crowther's Niche profile, his previous history and PNC record, as well as his previous mental health and domestic violence history, would have been available for him to view. Ms Fields' complaint of 19 August 2019 had been linked to Mr Crowther's complaints at that time which meant that Ms Fields' intelligence profile including PC 1's PEACE notes, her witness statement and DASH risk assessment, would also have been available for Mr Lund to view. However, it should be noted that Mr Lund's primary focus was Mr Crowther's complaint, he was not circulated for arrest, and he may not have had the capacity or responsibility for interrogating Ms Fields' intelligence profile and comparing her statement and PEACE notes together.

> PC 1's response and actions following receipt of emails from Mr A and Ms Fields.

485. In his written response and account at interview, PC 1 said that although he could not specifically remember who he spoke to, he indicated that he had spoken to A/PS Bent. He said he had spoken to a supervisor, following receipt of the emails from Mr A and Ms Fields, as he was concerned about his workload, his daily tasks and asked for support and guidance on a daily basis.

486. There is evidence to suggest that on 8 September PC 1 replied to Mr A's email, but by his own admission and the lack of any supporting documentation, this investigation has found no evidence to suggest that he replied to Ms Fields' email of 4 September, which Mr A added his own comments to and sent to PC 1 on 4 September. The evidence shows that PC 1 informed Mr A that his and Ms Fields' complaints were two separate complaints and that he should go through the 101 online process, for an officer to be allocated to each specific case.

487. The evidence shows that PC 1 checked Mr Crowther's Niche profile at 8.48pm on 8 September. At interview, PC 1 said he could not remember conducting this check, but thought there had been an escalation and that was why he spoke to his supervisor. He added that due to his inexperience he did not re-visit Ms Fields' DASH risk assessment.

488. He also admitted that he did not read Ms Fields' email of 9 September. He said that after speaking to an unnamed sergeant on 10 September, he was not on duty again until 15 September.

489. He also said that on his return to work on 10 September, he spoke to A/PS Bent and they decided that Mr Crowther would be arrested on 15 September. He confirmed that he was aware of his responsibilities to document this course of action, however, admitted that he did not do so.

490. This investigation has found no evidence to confirm that PC 1 spoke to A/PS Bent or any other supervisor or escalated this incident to the SGU following receipt of Mr A's email on 4 September, or undertook any dynamic review of Ms Fields' DASH risk assessment.

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491. Apart from his own account, this investigation has found no evidence to suggest that following receipt of the emails from Mr A and Ms Fields on 4 September and Ms Fields' email on 9 September, PC 1 spoke to A/PS Bent or any supervising officer. A/PS Bent did not recall any similar conversation with PC 1. There is no documentary evidence to suggest that PC 1 carried out any dynamic risk assessment of Ms Fields' DASH risk grading, after receiving the first emails on 4 September from Mr A and Ms Fields and on checking Mr Crowther's Niche record on 8 September, or that he re-tasked this case back to the SGU. PC 1's actions in this respect may be in breach of his duties and responsibilities under the SOPB.
492. This investigation has found no evidence to suggest that PC 1 updated Ms Fields' Storm incident log or made arrangements to follow PS Howarth's instructions, or that he took any positive action to progress this case in a meaningful manner. This included contacting Ms Fields to inform her that he was the OIC, to offer support and to ascertain her wishes regarding supporting a prosecution and or a restraining order. PC 1's actions in that respect may be in breach of his duties and responsibilities under SOPB.
493. During the period 28 August until 10 September, PC 1 had five full working days in which to progress this investigation. Those being 28 August and 7-10 September inclusive. This may suggest that PC 1 had time to re-visit this incident and take the necessary actions, or seek advice from a supervisor. However, this would not have been his only task during this period. He maintained that during that period he was concerned about his daily workload and tasks, but apart from his own account, this investigation has not identified any documentary evidence to confirm that he spoke to any of his supervisors in this regard.
494. The evidence suggests that when PC 1 checked Mr Crowther's Niche profile on 8 September, his previous intelligence history and PNC record, as well as his previous mental health and domestic violence history, would have been available for him to view. Having completed his own PEACE notes, as well as taking the witness statement from Ms Fields in relation to her complaint against Mr Crowther and completing her DASH risk assessment, PC 1 would have been aware of the full circumstances surrounding Ms Fields, her relationship with Mr Crowther and Mr Crowther's previous intelligence history. This included several warning markers of mental health issues and previous domestic violence, which should have alerted PC 1 to the potential risk Mr Crowther posed to Ms Fields.
495. The evidence suggests that this should have led PC 1 to dynamically re-assess and upgrade Ms Fields' DASH risk assessment to that of a high risk. It also suggests he should have documented and immediately escalated this incident up the chain of command to a supervisor and to the SGU/DAT as per the force common interventions policy and DASH risk assessment process. This apparent failure may have possibly been a missed opportunity for PC 1 and WYP to arrest Mr Crowther and safeguard Ms Fields. The evidence suggests that PC 1's actions in this respect may have fallen below the standards expected of him and which may be contrary to his duties and responsibilities under the SOPB.

> **WYP's response to Mr Fields' contact on 7 September 2019 regarding concern for his daughter and ongoing harassment from Mr Crowther**

496. Mr A stated that Mr Fields contacted him on 7 September about a confrontation with Mr Crowther and he told Mr Fields to report it to the police.
497. At 9.37pm on 7 September, Mr Fields contacted WYP and spoke to PC James Hemsley. We obtained a copy of the call recording and produced a transcript.
498. Mr Fields reported an incident under the OEL number for Ms Fields' harassment report from 19 August. He explained there was harassment between his daughter, her ex-partner, his boss, and six other people. He also explained that at approximately 2.30pm that day, he and a friend walked into the 'Northern Guitar' café bar in Leeds, and his friend made him aware that Mr Crowther was there. He said they left the café bar and went to other places before going back. He said Mr Crowther was still there and that Mr Crowther said he wanted to talk to Mr Fields before he went outside. Mr Fields said he thought Mr Crowther had left, but he was stood outside when they walked out and again said that he needed to talk to Mr Fields.
499. Mr Fields said he could not talk to him so Mr Crowther confronted him and accused Mr A of the allegations Mr Crowther made in the crime report. Mr Fields described that Mr Crowther stood between him and his friend and it "*became quite threatening.*"
500. PC Hemsley asked when Mr Fields would be available to speak to an officer and he replied that he was available at any time the following day. Mr Fields told PC Hemsley there was an assigned officer who had just been on holiday and he was back at work that day.
501. At 9.40pm, PC Hemsley created a Storm incident log, and we obtained a copy of that log. The officer's log entries noted the content of Mr Fields' call and identified no immediate risk. At 9.44pm, PC Hemsley carried out a Niche search for Mr Fields and checked the Storm log for Ms Fields' complaint, provided to him by Mr Fields, before he transferred the incident log to the WYP dispatchers. Information obtained from WYP suggests that Mr Fields' Storm incident complaint was not linked to Ms Fields' complaint of 19 August, which Mr Crowther was also linked to.
502. We obtained a statement from PC Hemsley, who, at the time, was seconded into the WYP contact centre for four months. He stated:
- 'Given the case that was already on going and the circumstances surrounding it, I decided to log the matter for a Police Officer to speak to ██████████ FIELDS to discuss the matter further. There may have been further offences committed by CROWTHER which needed looking into and the full circumstances establishing... Given there was nothing currently on going, no immediate risk to the caller or anybody else and given the fact that FIELDS did not want to be seen until the next day I graded this as a standard grade response and passed the log to dispatch... Once the log goes to dispatch they either dispatch an officer, pass the log for a call back, or book an appointment depending on the circumstances or the nature of the incident.'*

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503. At 9.47pm, a dispatcher accepted the incident log transfer and then deferred the incident until 7.48am on 8 September.
504. We obtained a statement from Mr Fields, who, at the time of seeing Mr Crowther at 'Northern Guitars', was aware that Ms Fields had made police statements about their relationship, Mr Crowther had made third party threats and Ms Fields was no longer in a relationship with him.
505. Upon returning home, Mr Fields contacted WYP. He stated:
- 'I told the call taker what had happened and the call taker told me someone would call me back. They never did. I expected the police to call me back and give me some advice. I would have also provided them with the crime number that Beth was given so they could tie it all together. I didn't go into great detail with the call taker, I just wanted to speak to a police officer who could help me...I can confirm that the police did not come and see me at home or work and did not call me back either. I didn't ring them again.'*

> 8 September 2019

506. At 8.05am on 8 September, dispatcher Ms Amy Thomas accepted the incident log transfer. Her log entries indicated there was a medium risk DASH assessment for Ms Fields, Mr Crowther had mental health and suicide warning markers and there were previous domestic incidents between them.
507. At 8.08am and 8.14am, Ms Thomas carried out Niche checks on Ms Fields. At 8.09am, she carried out a Niche check on Mr Crowther. The evidence suggests that at the time of her carrying out the Niche check on Ms Fields, her statement and DASH risk assessment had been uploaded to Niche and available to view.
508. At 8.17am, Ms Thomas noted a low risk THRIVE assessment, that Mr Crowther had previous harassment incidents with Ms Fields and he had harassed and threatened Mr Fields. There is no further apparent incident log activity until 7.49am on 9 September. When Ms Thomas carried out a Niche check on Ms Fields, her previous complaint including her statement and DASH risk assessment form from her complaint on 19 August, had been uploaded to Niche and available to view and Mr Crowther had also been linked to Ms Fields' complaint.
509. We obtained a statement from Ms Thomas, who stated:
- 'one of my primary roles as a despatcher is to run checks on WYP computer systems to establish if any previous incidents have occurred or if there are any warning markers for nominals involved and addresses. This information should then be made readily available on the log for any person who reads the log to see...All of the information I placed on the log was obtained from reviewing nominals and addresses on Niche and PNC.'*
510. In relation to her THRIVE assessment, Ms Thomas stated it was based on there being no suggestion of further harassment to Ms Fields and the threats made were not disclosed on the log.

511. Ms Thomas was aware of Ms Fields' complaint against Mr Crowther due to checking that OEL to find Ms Fields' DASH assessment, and stated:

'No action was taking [sic] in relation to this crime as Mr Fields was reporting harassment against himself.'

512. In relation to no further activity on the incident log until 7.49am on 9 September, Ms Thomas stated this was due to the:

'log had a standard grading and low thrive score and other more urgent logs would have taken precedent over this log'.

513. As mentioned earlier in this report, PC 1 carried out a Niche check on Mr Crowther and responded to Mr A's email on 8 September.

> 9 September 2019

514. At 7.49am on 9 September, incident log entries indicated the incident log automatically transferred to HQ Supervision for action due to the timer expiring.

515. At 8.12am, WYP dispatch supervisor Ms Beverley Cathersides accepted the transfer for action.

516. At 8.34am, a log entry indicated that all the police units were committed to other incidents, there were over 100 open incident logs and supervision were aware this log was still to be dealt with.

517. We obtained a statement from Ms Cathersides, who was the only dispatch supervisor working on the early shift on 9 September, in which she stated:

'The pressure on me that day was immense as the workload is not easily managed by one. The desk in question had over 100 logs in as open incidents. The other three areas had similar numbers of open incidents and the call volume was incredibly high. On that day we were on over 350 live logs...When my numbers are shown on the log it is a system generated alert that comes to supervisors every 24 hours. At this point I would try to review the 24 hour logs and check for unidentified risk etc. On a day when I was the only supervisor it would be impossible for me to read these logs and check systems for any unidentified risk. Given the number of outstanding live logs the number of system alerts was consequently very high.'

518. In relation to carrying out any intelligence checks, Ms Cathersides explained this was done at 8.10am on 8 September. She stated:

'When checking the systems we do not do in depth research but check for warning signals...I was not aware of any other linked logs and had no further dealings with the log. The control room now has a supervisor looking at standard logs in recognition of the hidden risk in the logs and to try and get logs actioned according to risk. This was implemented in November 2019.'

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519. Mr A stated that between 3pm and 3.30pm, he, Mr Fields, Ms Fields and Mr B met with their friend Mr G, who used to be a police officer, to get advice on how to deal with the police in order to assist Ms Fields. Mr A stated:
- 'Mr G advised us to ring 999 if Crowther rapproached [sic] any of us. Mr G told Mr B to return to the Police and file a report of threatening behaviour and he also advised me to contact Adult Safeguarding via 101 as he believed they were involved with the mental health side of things. Mr G was of the opinion that if we all made separate complaints these could be attached to Beth's report and this would support and strengthen her complaint. He also stated that he believed that we should contact Adult Safeguarding and they would also provide a multi-disciplined approach to the issue.'*
520. We obtained a statement from Mr G, who is the manager of the 'Business Against Crime' crime reduction partnership in Leeds. Due to using the recording studio, he is a friend of Mr A's and Mr Fields, and he knew of Mr Crowther but could not recall ever meeting him.
521. In relation to his meeting with Mr A, Ms Fields and Mr Fields, he stated:
- 'Mr A explained to me that Crowther had been making threats towards him and nasty comments about his (Mr A's) relationship with Beth. Mr A told me he had tried to reason with Crowther but was worried what could happen. I then spoke to Beth. She told me she had received some really nasty threats towards her and that she had reported this to the Police. She stated that since her initial report the threats had continued and that she was fearful about what Crowther was capable of. Her friend who's [sic] name I cannot remember was also worried. I next spoke to ██████████ Fields who told me that Crowther had approached him in Leeds city centre over the weekend and had been verbally abusive and threatening towards him.'*
522. Mr G advised everyone to report each incident to the police 'so that they would get the overall picture of how Crowther's threats had made people feel'. He said that Ms Fields told him she had tried to do this but had been told it was to be treated as an ongoing incident and would be added to the original report.
523. He stated:
- 'I told her that this was unacceptable and that West Yorkshire Police had really good safeguarding people policies in place and to insist on them taking individual reports on each incident as it would help if they wanted to go down the road of something like a restraining order.'*
524. Mr G contacted Mr Christopher Joyce (WYP crime reduction team) to see if he had missed any advice, and Mr Joyce advised that Ms Fields should contact the Leeds safeguarding team as soon as possible to report the incidents directly to them. Mr G then passed this information to Ms Fields and told her to mention she had spoken to him as he knew people that worked on the safeguarding team.
525. We obtained a statement from Mr Joyce, in which he recalled contact with Mr G with concerns about an ongoing issue but could not remember the content of their conversation. Mr Joyce said his concern was that the matter should be reported to WYP for it to be recorded, escalated to the appropriate officers or team, and actioned or investigated accordingly. He explained that he had no experience in crime management, investigation

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or safeguarding processes, and risk assessment. He stated that from working with officers and colleagues over the years, he knew *'that the direction from them is that matters should always be called in and reported, so that they can be logged and actioned'*. Mr Joyce said he did not personally speak to anyone at WYP about this.

526. At 5.23pm, Ms Fields sent a 'WhatsApp' message to Ms C asking her if she would complete a 101 report to the police for threats to kill against Mr Crowther. We obtained a copy of a spreadsheet from WYP that detailed Ms Fields' messages to Ms C between 5 September 2018 and 12 September 2019.
527. At 6.04pm, Ms Fields emailed PC 1 and we obtained a copy of that email. Ms Fields informed PC 1 of Mr Crowther having contact with her father who had reported it to WYP. She also wrote that Mr B and the others, who had received threats of violence, should report them separately regardless of whether the threats were made to them directly or indirectly. She said she had also been advised that they should pass on the information of all these incidences to the safeguarding unit, which Mr A would be doing the following morning. She asked if PC 1 could give her an update on what, if any, investigations had been occurring over the previous three weeks.
528. We have not been identified any indication that PC 1 responded to this email. During his interview, he said he did not respond to the email as he wanted supervisory advice.

> 10 September 2019

529. At 8.34pm on 10 September, dispatcher Ms Caroline Gilligan's incident log entry indicated that all police units were committed to other incidents, there were over 100 open incident logs, supervision were aware and this incident was still to be dealt with. This was the last incident log entry prior to Ms Fields' death.
530. We obtained a statement from Ms Gilligan, in which she explained that the outstanding call incident list was very high, the police radio traffic was very busy and she was not in a position to deal with each outstanding standard incident. She said that before handing over to the night shift dispatchers she updated the incident log to show no units were available, that patrol supervision were aware and that no officer had been allocated.
531. Ms Gilligan stated:
- 'Patrol supervision on the night were aware of how busy the division was, however, their attention was not drawn to this particular log. This log was recorded on the 7 September 2019 and it was still in the divisional open list on the 10 September 2019, which was the day I read it and endorsed the log. Several other despatchers had been on the desk within this time. I did not have any further dealings with this log. On reviewing the log and the information on it at that point, (the caller's daughter's ex had harassed him in the street) it appeared to be low risk. Intelligence had already been added to the log by colleagues on previous shifts and as I did not have the capacity to deal with the log, I did not research any further intelligence.'*
532. In relation to Mr Fields' incident, the SCRT report noted that DASH risk assessments should be completed in relation to non-domestic related harassment and stalking, and

'it would have been appropriate to undertake separate DASH risk assessments with Bethany's Father...in relation to the non-domestic harassment...experienced in relation to Paul Crowther and for the relevant Niche Crime Occurrences/Non Crime Occurrences to be created on Niche with the DASH risk assessment attached.'

533. West Yorkshire Demand Management Policy identifies the levels and grading's of WYP response times to various incidents according to their importance. WYP Demand Management Policy categorises incident responses as, Emergency, Priority and Standard.

Emergency incidents – Are the most serious incidents which may be potentially life threatening incidents or other serious incidents and require a police response within ten minutes for urban areas and twenty minutes for rural areas.

Priority incidents – Although these incidents are serious, the incident does not warrant an immediate attendance but does require a response within 1 hour.

Standard Incidents – Incidents which based on the information provided by the caller and any supporting information, the necessity for a response is less critical and non-urgent, but where there is a need to visit the caller. Standard incidents require attendance within forty eight hours.

> Analysis

534. At 9.37pm on 7 September, Mr Fields, Bethany Fields' father, contacted WYP by telephone, following an earlier conversation he had with Mr A.

535. During that conversation Mr Fields spoke to WYP call handler PC Hemsley. Mr Fields informed PC Hemsley of the harassment complaint Ms Fields made against Mr Crowther on 19 August and his incident with Mr Crowther earlier that day. He also noted that Mr Fields had said he could be contacted the next day. PC Hemsley told Mr Fields that there was an assigned officer to this investigation who has been on holiday and would be back on duty today. PC Hemsley's actions appear to have been reasonable, especially as Mr Fields indicated that he would be free the next day.

536. At 9.40pm, PC Hemsley created a Storm log and it identified the risk to Mr Fields '*no immediate risk*'. At 9.44pm, He carried out Niche checks on Mr Fields. His grading of the risk to Mr Fields' call could be considered correct in the circumstances.

537. At 8.05am on 8 September, dispatcher Ms Thomas accepted the incident log transfer and carried out Niche checks on Ms Fields and Mr Crowther. Her log entries indicated there was a medium risk DASH assessment for Ms Fields, Mr Crowther had mental health and suicide warning markers and there were previous domestic incidents between them. She also noted that Mr Crowther had threatened and harassed Ms Fields and noted the low risk THRIVE, which she said was based on there being '*no suggestion of further harassment to Ms Fields*' [sic] (possibly Mr Fields).

538. The evidence suggests that Ms Thomas was primarily recording the risk to Mr Fields and was aware of Ms Fields' complaint against Mr Crowther, but reasonably assessed that this case was being investigated by another officer.

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539. In relation to no further activity on the incident log until 7.49am on 9 September, Ms Thomas stated this was due to the *'log had a standard grading and low thrive score and other more urgent logs would have taken precedent over this log.'*
540. The evidence suggests that whilst Ms Thomas' decision to take no action on the log until 9 September, appears to have been the correct decision for the grading of this log, she had previously correctly identified the mental health and suicide markers for Mr Crowther. She was aware that Mr Crowther had threatened and harassed Ms Fields, which suggests that she may have incorrectly assessed the risk to Mr Fields as low due to the overall circumstances that were known at the time. However, it should be noted that Ms Thomas' primary concern was the safety of Mr Fields.
541. The evidence suggests that when Ms Thomas checked Mr Crowther's Niche profile, Mr Crowther's previous history and PNC results, which included mental health issues and a previous history of domestic violence would have been available to view. Also when checking Ms Fields' Niche profile, PC 1's PEACE notes, Ms Fields' witness statement and DASH risk assessment had been uploaded and would also have been able to view. However, Ms Thomas' primary focus would have been Mr Fields' complaint, and that Mr Crowther was not circulated for arrest, and she may not have had the capacity or responsibility for interrogating Ms Fields' intelligence profile and comparing her statement, PC 1's PEACE notes and her DASH risk assessment together.
542. At 8.34pm on 10 September, dispatcher Ms Gilligan noted on the incident log that all police units were committed to other incidents and that there were over 100 open logs. There is corroborating evidence in this respect in Ms Gilligan's account, which noted the very high incident list, very busy radio traffic and that as a result she was not in a position to deal with outstanding incidents. Further evidence is provided in her account when she said that upon handing over to the night shift, she updated the incident log to show no units available and that supervision were aware that no officer had been allocated. The evidence shows that Ms Gilligan updated the incident log accordingly and her actions appear to have been reasonable in the circumstances due to the high demand at that time.
543. One of Ms Cathersides' responsibilities was to create Storm markers for vulnerable people and to ensure callers receive a call back in a timely fashion. The evidence suggests that she was working on Mr Fields' complaint and did not check Mr Crowther's or Ms Fields' Niche profiles.
544. However, in her account Ms Cathersides listed the reduction in normal supervisory staffing and the high level of demand that day, which resulted in over 100 open logs. By her own account, she would not have the time to read the logs but only update them and that the time demands on her may not have allowed her any time to examine this incident in more detail or check Mr Crowther's and Ms Fields' Niche profiles.
545. Mr Fields' complaint log was graded as (P4) - Standard. This grading meant that Mr Fields should have been contacted within 48 hours in line with the WYP Demand Management Policy, to discuss his complaint and, as per the DASH risk assessment process, a DASH risk assessment should have been completed in respect of Mr Fields. We have found no evidence to suggest that WYP completed a DASH risk assessment in relation to him and his complaint against Mr Crowther.

546. The WYP SCRT report confirmed that a DASH risk assessment should have been completed in relation to Mr Fields and attached to the relevant Niche record.
547. The evidence obtained by this investigation suggests that WYP did not contact Mr Fields following his initial telephone call within a 48 hour period or at any time after his initial complaint. This was not in accordance with response times expected of them. However, it should be noted that there is corroborating evidence to suggest that WYP did consider allocating a resource to contact Mr Fields on 10 September, but that they had demand management issues, with over 100 open logs still to resource that day. Following that note on the incident report, there are no further notes on the log with regard to WYP making attempts to allocate a resource to Mr Fields on 11 or 12 September.
548. Had WYP been able to contact Mr Fields, they may have been able to complete a DASH risk assessment with him. He may also have provided them with further information in relation to his, Mr B's and Ms Fields' complaint against Mr Crowther and compare any further information with Ms Fields' complaint. This may have prompted further investigation by WYP into Ms Fields' complaint against Mr Crowther and is perhaps a missed opportunity to gather further intelligence on the threat Mr Crowther posed to Ms Fields.
549. According to Mr A's account, on 9 September, he, Mr Fields, Ms Fields and Mr B met with Mr G to discuss how to progress Ms Fields' complaint against Mr Crowther.
550. Mr Joyce advised them to contact the Leeds SGU. The evidence suggests that although Mr Joyce was previously a serving WYP officer, he was not acting in any official capacity at this time and was merely providing his advice from his experience of being employed as a police officer, to assist a friend and had no official responsibility for conducting any enquiries in relation to this incident.

> WYP's response to an allegation made by Mr B on 9 September 2019 that Mr Crowther had made a number of threats to kill him

> August 2019

551. In Mr D's statement obtained by WYP and the statement we obtained from him, he detailed the conversations he had with Mr Crowther, the threats Mr Crowther made to Mr B and his and Mr Crowther's visit to Dewsbury police station on 19 August. Those statements are detailed earlier in this report.

> 9 September 2019

552. At 11.55pm on 9 September, dispatcher Ms Amy Mills created a malicious communications Storm incident log from an email Mr B sent to WYP. We obtained a copy of the incident log, in which Ms Mills noted the content of Mr B's email with the incident date shown as 11

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August. Information obtained from WYP suggests that Mr B's incident complaint was linked to Ms Fields' complaint of 19 August.

553. At 11.57pm and 11.58pm, Ms Mills' log entries noted Mr B's email content:

- Mr Crowther had harassed Ms Fields *'over a long period of time'*
- Mr D had contacted Mr B to ask if Ms Fields was with him and, if she was, Mr Crowther had been threatening him
- Mr D told him *'if I were you I'd leave Yorkshire'* because *'Paul can be a very nasty man when he means to be'*
- Mr D told Ms Fields that Mr Crowther said to him *'that he's going to kill Mr B and that he should leave West Yorkshire. And that if he isn't stupid enough to kill himself, he'd get someone else to do it, that he knows some nasty fuckers and he'd bury him'*
- Mr Crowther had been to Ms Fields' mother's home, and told her and her partner that Mr B *'need to be taught that I can't disrespect people in the future, that he was going to go round and sort me out and if Beth had been at mine, he was going to hurt me. He also said that he might not necessarily do it himself'*
- Ms Fields spoke to Mr Crowther after Mr D's call, and Mr Crowther questioned her about her whereabouts and her relationship with Mr B. During that conversation, Mr Crowther *'made various threats to either kill me or cause harm to me'*
- On 16 August, Mr B was at the recording studio in a room away from Mr Crowther. Mr A escorted Mr Crowther from the building, and told Mr B about his concerns for Mr B's safety and wellbeing
- On the same day, Ms Fields contacted Mr B about a message Mr Crowther sent her saying *'Mr B should run'* which was reported to the police who then checked on Mr B's safety
- On 19 August, Mr B went to the police station with Ms Fields to report Mr Crowther's harassment of Ms Fields *'including domestic abuse and threats to her friends and family'*
- Mr Crowther's threats to Mr B *'were not taken down as a separate report'* but, after Mr G's advice, he was reporting it online
- Mr B provided the crime number for Ms Fields' harassment report from 19 August, and provided names and contact details for witnesses to the incident
- Mr B had felt unsafe for a couple of weeks after the threats and felt that if the threats returned he would take them seriously due to Mr Crowther having a *'violent past'*
- Mr Crowther suffered with a personality disorder and other mental health conditions *'that I know affect him in a way where he is unstable and I wouldn't be able to assess [sic] his capabilities or if he intends to follow through with the threats'*

> 10 September 2019

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554. Between 5.20am and 5.22am on 10 September, PC Richard Miller's incident log entries noted:
- 'APOLOGIES BUT I CANNOT MAKE ANY SENSE WHAT SO EVER OF THIS LOG. CALLER KEPS MENTIONING MORE AND MORE PEOPLE THROUGHOUT. I CANNOT FIND CALLER ON NICHE. THIS WILL REQUIRE CONTACT BY IMU/TEL TO SPEAK WITH CALLER DIRECT AND ASCERTAIN JUST EXACTLY WHAT HE IS REPORTING AS INITIALLY READS AS 3RD PARTY REPORTING FOR A FRIEND BUT THEN APPEARS HE IS BEING TARGETTED [sic]. CANNOT DO A FULL THRIVE AS AS [sic] PREVIOUSLY STATED THE LOG MAKES NO SENSE. WILL PUT A TAGE ON FOR CONTACT DURING DAY DUE TO THE COMMENTS ON LOG.'
555. We obtained a statement from PC Miller, who at the time, was carrying out the role of incident management officer. He said at 5.16am, he accepted the incident log to read through it and put a triage assessment on it. He could not give a reason for why the incident was not taken onto their list prior to that time.
556. PC Miller stated:
- 'As I have mentioned on the log it was quite confusing with the caller referring to several parties in name only. The information and intelligence I was aware of was basically what was on the log. The assessment was that of Potential Threats to life albeit reported by the caller as third party information, this in itself is potentially very serious. My working strategy was therefore to make sure we got the correct details on the log and that the incident had supervisory oversight. At the time my sergeant, PS Perry was away on annual leave and I was mindful of powers and policies such as TAG in for supervision, handover process and the code of ethics, which in my mind negated re-contacting the caller at 5.20am in the morning. I considered my options and trying to contact the caller at that time was likely to be unsuccessful. This would mean that when the shift took over at 7am, supervision would be made aware and relevant comments or actions could be added. This was done in order to highlight the concern with regards comments made by the caller in order for a full debrief at a more suitable time and also to clarify details of parties involved in order to complete a thorough workable THRIVE assessment which was not an unreasonable delay.'*
557. At 9.41am and 9.43am, PC Ibrahim Rafiq contacted Mr B by telephone. We obtained copies of the two call recordings and produced transcripts. When PC Rafiq first contacted Mr B, he explained his confusion over what Mr B wanted to report. Mr B said that he was told he should report the threats made to him again, PC Rafiq sought clarification over what had been previously reported and then told Mr B he would call him back.
558. At 9.42am, PC Rafiq carried out a Niche check on Mr Crowther.
559. When PC Rafiq called Mr B back, he asked him to explain from the beginning what had happened to him. Mr B explained the circumstances around Mr Crowther's threats, that Mr Crowther had not directly threatened him and the threats were from one month ago.
560. PC Rafiq asked why he was reporting it now rather than when it happened. Mr B explained that when he and Ms Fields reported the harassment case to PC 1, he told Mr B that it would not be two separate cases.

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561. Mr B told PC Rafiq that Mr Crowther had made threats to kill him or harm him “*because erm he wants to get back Beth’s attention essentially.*”
562. PC Rafiq asked what PC 1 had specifically said, and Mr B explained that PC 1 “*went and spoke to his sergeant I think and then he said it would come under one crime*”. The officer explained that Mr B was a separate victim, should not have been told that, it should have been separately recorded and he apologised to Mr B.
563. Mr B said he had not seen PC 1 since reporting this and he thought that PC 1 had been on holiday. PC Rafiq then arranged an appointment for Mr B to visit Pudsey police station at 9pm the following day and asked Mr B to bring any messages or screenshots of the threats with him. He also told Mr B to try and make some notes to form a chronology.
564. Between 9.44am and 9.54am, PC Rafiq’s incident log entries noted his contact with Mr B. In relation to being told about PC 1, he noted ‘THE THREATS ARE A MONTH OLD AND CALLER WAS APPARENTLY INITIALLY TOLD BY A POLICE OFFICER NOT TO REPORT THESE THREATS...THE OFFICER G HUNT HAS APPARENTLY TOLD REPORTING PERSON THAT HE SHOULDNT [sic] REPORT THE THREATS...APOLOGIES – DOESN’T NEED TO REPORT THE THREATS...AS IT WILL ALL FALL UNDER HIS FRIENDS [sic] CRIME...THIS INCORRECT – AS PER CDI ONCE [sic] VICTIM ONE CRIME’.
565. We obtained a statement from PC Rafiq, who works in the contact management centre, in which he said he could not recall the incident and looked at the incident log to refresh his memory. He stated:
- ‘unfortunately, I am really struggling to remember this incident at all. I do not dispute I have remarked on the log but I cannot recall anything at all...The only thing I can comment on is where I have remarked on the log in relation to CDI. For every crime reported, if there are multiple victims or separate incidents then a new crime report in most cases must be opened per victim. This is the general principle however there are exceptions...I would estimate I deal with hundreds of logs a week and I cannot say this really sticks out.’*
566. At 1.09pm and 1.10pm, PC Laura Benn-Smith carried out Niche checks on Mr Crowther and Ms Fields.
567. We obtained a statement from PC Benn-Smith who is the Elland Road safeguarding office manager. Her duties include monitoring and dealing with incoming emails, answering about 90% of the calls that come into the office at the sergeant’s desk, and assisting the clerical staff. In her statement she said she could not explain why she carried out the Niche checks on Mr Crowther and Ms Fields and said that it could have been from a phone call, an incident log, another officer or connected to an email but she did not have any notes in her day book to show why.

> 11 September 2019

568. Between 11.09pm and 11.12pm on 11 September, PC James Lowde’s incident log entries noted that Mr B had kept his appointment, he had not been in contact with Mr Crowther, third parties had told him about the threats, he had not personally received anything of a

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threatening or offensive nature and there was no contact between Mr B and Mr Crowther at the recording studio. PC Lowde advised Mr B to ring 999 if he felt in any fear of violence and then noted that the incident log could be closed.

569. We obtained a statement from Mr Lowde, who left his employment with WYP a short time after this incident. He said that at the time of dealing with Mr B, he was still in his probationary period and due to leaving the police he had no access to the police computerised systems and could not recall the incident or the appointment with Mr B.
570. Mr A stated that both Mr B and Ms Fields went to the appointment, and Ms Fields then texted him that Mr B had been advised that the police would not take another report as the threats were not made directly to him, but via Ms Fields. Mr A said that Ms Fields had told him that the police officer she met made sense and then added that she felt ill.
571. We obtained a statement from Mr B, in which he said that he became aware that Ms Fields and Mr Crowther's relationship had finished and at some time after that he started a relationship with her. Mr B added that in August 2019, Ms Fields told him about her relationship with Mr Crowther and what he had been doing since they split up.
572. Mr B stated:
- 'She told me things like he had constantly threatened to kill himself if she did not do anything he wanted...She told me about the threats he had made to kill an ex-boyfriend of hers called [redacted], the threats he had made to kill Mr A and the threats he had made to kill her close friend Ms C. At the time I did not believe he was going to carry out these threats and was more concerned for Beth as I thought he was trying to manipulate her to keep in contact with him. I was of the opinion that Beth was scared and stressed but she was trying to remain in control.'*
573. Mr B said Mr D informed him of Mr Crowther's threats and he recalled Ms Fields speaking to Mr Crowther about the threats. He said on 16 August he gave Ms Fields his home address details so that the police could visit him. He stated:
- 'I remember they asked me if I was safe and if I needed them to do anything and I explained to them about the threats he had made. I think I told them about the harassment that Beth had previously reported and I also told them about the threats that Paul Crowther had made to kill me which Beth had heard and Mr D had told me. I was of the opinion that Beth had already made a report because she and Ms C had gone to the police. At the time I told the officers that I didn't feel in any fear cause Paul did not know where I lived. I am not sure of the length of time but they could have been with me for around 30 minutes to one hour.'*
574. Mr B said on 19 August he was with Ms Fields for her appointment with PC 1. His account of that meeting is detailed earlier in this report.
575. Mr B recalled the meeting with Mr G on 9 September, who advised them to make individual online reports; the phone call from WYP on 10 September and the appointment set for 11 September.
576. Ms Fields went to the appointment with Mr B, who stated:

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'When we attended the appointment we spoke to a different officer and both of us told him what had happened and the fact Beth's report didn't appear to have been dealt with as nobody had been in touch with her. I remember the officer told us that the report Beth had made had not been sent off or uploaded properly and it was still on the other officer's personal device and had not been sent off to anyone else and this was why nobody had dealt with it. He also told us that the officer was on holiday. Upon hearing this I remember feeling really angry and shocked about what I was being told. Beth also appeared really angry and shocked about this. The officer told us that Paul had been in a cell in a police station during this period of time due to the fact he had been reported missing and this made it worse as I was thinking that they had him and he wasn't dealt with cause [sic] the information had not been sent. I can't remember which police station the officer said he had been in. This officer then appeared to take a report from me and he recorded a chronology of events what I gave to him on his electronic device. He then left the room so he could speak with his sergeant to get advice as to what he could do and he returned shortly afterwards and said that due to the threats not being said directly to me they could not file a report. I felt extremely annoyed at this and both Beth and I tried to argue the point that it should be treated seriously. We both informed him that Paul had done malicious communications before and he was doing this to get to us. We also had a discussion with the officer about Paul's mental health and I became even more frustrated that they would not write a report about the threats made against me. I can recall saying to the officer, "So you are telling me that there is a man out there who we know is unstable, threatening to kill us and you are saying the police can't do anything about it".'

577. He said the officer sought further advice from his sergeant *'because he said he wanted to investigate it but when he returned he told us there was still nothing that could be done because of the threats not being made directly to me. Before we left the officer told us both to call 999 if we saw Paul Crowther.'*

578. In relation to Mr B's incident, the SCRT report noted it would have been appropriate for a separate DASH risk assessment to be undertaken and a Niche occurrence to be created with the assessment attached.

> Analysis

579. At 11.55pm on 9 September 2019, dispatcher Ms Amy Mills created a malicious communications Storm incident log from an email Mr B sent to WYP. At 11.57pm and 11.58pm, she updated the incident log, noting the contents of Mr B's email, which included Ms Fields' original incident log number in relation to her complaint against Mr Crowther on the incident log. Ms Mills' actions appear to have been reasonable in the circumstances and in line with her role.

580. Following advice from Mr G, and after making an online 101 email report to WYP, Mr B and Ms Fields attended Pudsey police station on 11 September, to attend a pre-booked appointment. According to Mr B's account they spoke to a different male officer and was informed that Ms Fields' original complaint had not been uploaded properly and that the officer dealing with it was on holiday.

581. In his account Mr B said he and Ms Fields were really angry after being informed that this case had not been progressed and that Mr Crowther had been in a police cell after being

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reported missing during that period. Mr B said following a discussion with the officer he (the officer) spoke to a supervisor before informing them that there was nothing he could do about it as the threats were not made directly to him and was told to call 999 if approached by Mr Crowther.

582. Between 5.20am and 5.22am on 10 September, PC Miller updated the incident report. The evidence suggests that PC Miller recognised the potential for harm to Mr B and considered that this was a potentially serious incident, even though the report was made through a third party. Due to the lack of information provided to him and the unreasonableness of the hour PC Miller's decisions and actions appear to have been reasonable in the circumstances.
583. At 9.41am and 9.43am, PC Rafiq contacted Mr B by telephone and at 9.42am he conducted a Niche check on Mr Crowther before calling Mr B back at 9.43am.
584. The evidence shows that PC Rafiq tried to resolve the initial confusion on the incident report and made substantial efforts to obtain the full details of Mr B's complaint. He also took advice from a supervisor before correctly informing Mr B that he should make a separate complaint in relation to the '*one victim one crime*' policy. He also made an appointment for Mr B to attend the police station the next day to obtain his statement. The evidence suggests that PC Rafiq acted reasonably in this regard in the circumstances and in a manner prescribed by WYP.
585. When PC Rafiq checked Mr Crowther's Niche profile, his previous history and PNC results, which included mental health issues and a previous history of domestic violence, would have been available to view. Mr Crowther had also been linked to Ms Fields' complaint of 19 August. Ms Fields previous history including PC 1's PEACE notes, her witness statement and DASH risk assessment, had been uploaded and available to view. However, PC Rafiq's primary focus would have been Mr B's complaint, Mr Crowther was not circulated for arrest and he may not have had the capacity or responsibility for interrogating Ms Fields' intelligence profile and comparing her statement, PC 1's PEACE notes and her DASH risk assessment together.
586. PC Benn-Smith could not explain why she carried out Niche checks on Mr Crowther and Ms Fields. The evidence suggests that when she checked their Niche intelligence profiles, Mr Crowther's previous history and PNC record, as well as his previous mental health and domestic violence history would have been available to view. She would also have been aware of Ms Fields' complaint of 19 August and that her intelligence profile, including PC 1's PEACE notes, her witness statement and DASH risk assessment, would have been available to view. However, PC Benn-Smith's primary focus would have been Mr B's complaint, Mr Crowther was not circulated for arrest and she may not have had the capacity or responsibility for interrogating Ms Fields' intelligence profile and comparing her statement, PC 1's PEACE notes and her DASH risk assessment together.
587. Mr B attended for his appointment at Pudsey police station on 11 September and was met by PC Lowde. PC Lowde's log entries noted the nature and extent of their meeting.
588. We have not obtained any evidence to suggest that PC Lowde completed a DASH risk assessment during their meeting and the failure to complete one with Mr B appears to have been contrary to the WYP domestic abuse policy. Had one been completed it would

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have been available to any officer of staff viewing Mr B's Niche profile and may have assisted with any future policing decisions in relation to him.

589. At the time of speaking to Mr B, PC Lowde was still in his probation period and left his employment with WYP police shortly after this incident. In his account he said he not recall any rationale for the decisions he made when he met with Mr B as he did not have access to WYP records to refresh his memory.

> WYP's consideration of intelligence it held relating to Mr Crowther from previous incidents and how it used this in risk assessments relating to him

590. The WYP Niche system holds known intelligence of individuals. WYP officers and police staff are able to interrogate Niche to identify any information of value or warning markers when investigating complaints or crimes reported to WYP.

591. In order to access these systems, an officer would need to type in the name of the person concerned. This would then bring up a screen with information relating to that individual including their date of birth if known and a profile photograph if available. This screen will also include individual documents, which are detailed below the main event heading tabs in a list format, which can be easily accessed by clicking on that individual document to reveal the detail of the document. Although not exhaustive, these documents may include; previous offences, safeguarding referrals, domestic violence history, any statements the person has provided, any DASH risk assessments, PEACE notes, interview, hospital notes, intervention report forms, evidence of bad character, arrest records etc.

592. Above the list page there are a number of further tabs which can be accessed by clicking on that individual tab to bring up the information stored beneath it. This may include;

- Occ events/reports
- Warnings/flags (*filtered*)
- ID numbers
- Occ. Offences
- Contacts/employment (*filtered*)
- Contact for
- Current address
- Occur
- Case
- Assoc (*filtered*)
- Active prop/vehicle
- Tasks

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593. This investigation obtained a front page screen shot of the known intelligence profile documents in relation to Ms Fields. Her statement and DASH risk assessment together with PC 1's PEACE notes can clearly be seen upon accessing the front page of her Niche profile. It would only take one more click to access these documents.
594. This investigation obtained a front page screen shot of the known intelligence profile documents in relation to Mr Crowther. His previous history can also be easily seen and accessed on his Niche profile.
595. The audit trail for Ms Fields' Niche profile indicates WYP officers and police staff checked her record 60 times between 16 August and 12 September, including during the hours after Mr Crowther killed Ms Fields. During that period, PC 1 accessed her Niche profile on one occasion, at 7.21pm on 19 August.
596. The Niche audit trail for Mr Crowther's record indicates WYP officers and police staff checked his Niche profile 114 times between 20 August and 12 September, including during the hours after he killed Ms Fields. During that period, PC 1 accessed Mr Crowther's Niche profile on two occasions at 9.14pm on 19 August and at 8.48pm on 8 September.
597. After PC 1 uploaded Ms Fields' DASH risk assessment to Niche on 20 August and prior to uploading her statement on 27 August, WYP records indicate that WYP officers and police staff checked Mr Crowther's Niche profile 21 times. During this period, Mr Crowther's full intelligence profile, including his history of mental health issues, previous suicide attempts and a history of domestic violence was available to view,
598. Between 20 August and 27 August, WYP records indicate WYP officers and police staff checked Ms Fields' Niche profile eight times.
599. Between 27 August and prior to Ms Fields being killed by Mr Crowther on 12 September, WYP records indicate WYP officers and police staff checked her Niche profile 17 times. During this time, PC 1's PEACE notes, Ms Fields' statement and DASH risk assessment had been uploaded and were available to view.
600. Within that same period WYP records indicate WYP officers and police staff had checked Mr Crowther's Niche profile 31 times, during which, Ms Fields' statement and DASH risk assessment had been uploaded and available to view. This was in addition to Mr Crowther's full intelligence profile, which included a history of mental health issues, previous suicide attempts and a history of domestic violence with regard to two previous partners.
601. We produced an investigator's report reviewing the combined WYP Niche checks on Ms Fields and Mr Crowther, and confirmed the following checks, which were not carried out by PC 1:
- 16 August 2019 - Three checks on Mr Crowther in relation to Ms Fields' concern call
 - Between 19 and 23 August 2019 - Ten checks on either Mr Crowther or Ms Fields in relation to Ms Fields' harassment complaint
 - 26 August 2019 - 17 checks on either Mr Crowther or Ms Fields in relation to Mr F's concern that Mr Crowther was missing

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- 26 August 2019 – One unknown check on Mr Crowther
 - 27 August 2019 - One check each on Mr Crowther and Ms Fields in relation to Mr Crowther's assault complaint
 - 2 September 2019 – One SGU check on Mr Crowther
 - 4 September 2019 - Two checks on Mr Crowther in relation to his assault complaint
 - 7 September 2019 – One check on Mr Crowther in relation to his assault complaint
 - 8 September 2019 – One check each on Mr Crowther and Ms Fields in relation to Mr Fields' complaint
 - 10 September 2019 – One check each on Mr Crowther and Ms Fields in relation to WYP contacting Mr A about his complaint email
 - 10 September 2019 – One check on Mr Crowther in relation to Mr B's complaint
 - 11 September 2019 – Two checks on Mr Crowther in relation to his harassment complaint against Mr A
 - 11 September 2019 – Three checks on Mr Crowther in relation to his assault complaint
 - 11 September 2019 – One check on Ms Fields in relation to Mr Crowther's harassment complaint
 - 11 September 2019 – One unknown check on Ms Fields
 - 11 September 2019 – Two unknown checks on Mr Crowther
 - 12 September 2019 – Five checks on Mr Crowther in relation to his assault complaint
 - 12 September 2019 – Three checks on Ms Fields in relation to Mr Crowther's assault complaint
602. Between 16 August and 12 September, there were a total of 13 Niche checks made, but there is no explanation as to the identity of the officer or police staff carrying out those checks or the reason for them.
603. WYP's person profile for Ms Fields includes her harassment report from 16 August with crime notes added as:
'SUSPECT AND VICTIM WERE BOYFRIEND AND GIRLFRIEND UNTIL BREAKING UP IN JUNE 2019. VICTIM HAS BEEN PERSISTANTLY [sic] THREATENED THAT HE WILL KILL FRIENDS AND FAMILY IF SHE DOESNT [sic] GET BACK IN A RELATIONSHIP WITH HIM.'
604. WYP's person profile for Mr Crowther includes Ms Fields' harassment report against him from 16 August, his harassment complaint against Mr A, his assault and damage complaints against Ms Fields and his missing person incident on 23 August.
605. Mr Crowther's PNC record showed he pleaded guilty to a harassment charge in 2015 and was given a restraining order.

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606. On 26 August, Ms Walker researched Mr Crowther's record for the missing person incident and she identified historic records of his attempts to take his own life and mental health issues, when he had been previously sectioned under the Mental Health Act.
607. On 12 September, PC Rae completed a DASH risk assessment for Mr Crowther when she obtained his statement. There is nothing recorded on that DASH form to indicate whether Mr Crowther had any previous convictions.
608. DC Helen Riley from WYP's Professional Standards Directorate (PSD) confirmed that no one at WYP conducted PNC searches for Ms Fields or Mr Crowther between 16 August and 12 September.
609. We obtained information regarding persons accessing Ms Fields' witness statement and DASH risk assessment record once they were uploaded to her Niche profile and produced an investigator's report. That report shows that no WYP officer or police staff viewed and compared both documents together and would therefore have been unable to identify any inconsistencies between them and potentially dynamically re-assess the risk Mr Crowther posed to Ms Fields as a high risk.
610. The report details the officers who accessed either Ms Fields' witness statement or DASH risk assessment record in isolation:

Ms Fields' Statement spreadsheet breakdown

9.49am on 4 September – WYP Researcher Mr Derek Hindle accessed Ms Fields' statement.

9.26pm on 11 September – PC Lowde accessed Ms Fields' statement.

8.40am on 12 September – PC Logan accessed Ms Fields' statement.

Ms Fields' DASH risk assessment spreadsheet breakdown

8.08am on 8 September – Ms Thomas accessed the DASH risk assessment report.

> Mr I

611. Although not strictly covered within the terms of reference for this investigation, I intend to cover the incident detailed below in respect of Mr I, a former WYP PCSO (police community support officer), as I believe it is relevant to this investigation.
612. The following incident was not recorded on Mr Crowther's WYP profile after Mr Crowther allegedly stabbed Mr I.
613. At 10.31am on 18 September, Mr I emailed WYP PSD to inform them of an incident where Mr Crowther stabbed him approximately four years ago. Mr I wrote:
- 'I do not feel that this incident was dealt with properly and no arrest was made for his stabbing me, this has now escalated and a young girl has lost her life due to it.'*
614. The email was forwarded to us with an explanation that Mr I was a serving WYP PCSO at the time of the alleged incident. WYP had initially carried out searches of the Niche and

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Storm systems and had not found anything in relation to the incident. However, we subsequently obtained WYP Occurrence log 13200433282.

615. We obtained a statement from Mr I in which he explained that he had known Mr Crowther since 1996 or 1997 when he was in the same school class as Mr Crowther's older brother. He said he lost contact after leaving school, and then struck up a friendship with Mr Crowther in 2001. Mr I said that Mr Crowther had a history of acting violently
616. Mr I said that in 2012/2013, he allowed Mr Crowther to stay at his home. He said on 5 April 2013 a fight broke out with Mr Crowther attacking his brother. Mr I added that Mr Crowther also attempted to fight with him, which he said had also happened on previous occasions. It was during this fight that Mr I said he was stabbed in the leg by Mr Crowther.
617. The incident was reported to the police – Mr Crowther alleged that Mr I had assaulted him, as well as admitting he had stabbed Mr I. Mr I detailed that he was worried about how the incident would impact on his role as a PCSO, and it appears no further action was taken by the police.
618. The evidence shows that according to the WYP occurrence log, this incident occurred on 6 April 2013. However, the WYP incident log shows that it was reported on 28 August 2020 and closed on 1 December 2020.
619. At 1.17am on 6 April 2013, the incident log entries indicated that Mr Crowther potentially gave the name '[redacted]' to WYP, when he reported he had been in a fight and thought his friend might have a stab injury.
620. At 1.20am, a log entry identified that one of the people involved was a serving PCSO. At 1.22am, a log entry identified that Mr I had not been stabbed.
621. At 4.36am, log entries noted 'APPEARS THAT THE INJURIES HAVE BEEN SUSTAINED FROM A FALL RATHER THAN AN ASSAULT.' The incident log was then delayed for the officer to make a follow up call on their next shift.
622. On 8 April 2013, log entries noted that Mr I 'HAS SINCE FAILED TO BE AVAILABLE FOR THE OFFICERS TO SPEAK TO INCLUDING NOT ANSWERING [sic] THEIR CALLS OR REPLYING TO MESSAGES LEFT.'
623. At 12.40pm on 28 August 2020, WYP PSD created an OEL for Mr I's assault allegations against Mr Crowther. We obtained a copy in which the incident summary noted; '*...it is documented on the log Paul that speaks to officers stating that he has been in a fight and claims that he was not the aggressor, officers speak to both parties and no allegations were made and it is noted that the complainant Mr I [sic] was NOT stabbed but rather sustained his injuries [sic] as a result of a fall. However, the complainant Mr I [sic] now states that he was stabbed in this incident [sic] and wishes to report. The complainant is aware that Paul Crowther has recently been convicted of a serious offence and is currently in prison. Paul Crowther was spoken to by officers at the time of the incident and denied the offence.*'
624. It is not within the remit of the IOPC or this investigation to further investigate Mr I's complaint against Mr Crowther or WYP. I have detailed Mr I's alleged incident with Mr

Crowther, as it contains potential intelligence, which I believe should have been recorded on WYP computer systems and is relevant to this investigation.

> Analysis

625. The evidence shows that between 2004 and 2015, WYP had known intelligence with regard to Mr Crowther's previous domestic abuse history which included that he had a history of domestic violence with two of his previous partners, had been reported for summons for harassment and had received a restraining order. His previous offending was recorded on his PNC record.
626. Between 2012 and January 2018, WYP had known intelligence with regard to Mr Crowther's mental health issues which included that he was reported as a missing person, concern for safety and/or arrested under the Mental Health Act on nine occasions and that there were also 11 safeguarding records.
627. The chronology of information held by WYP and obtained by this investigation covering the period 12 April 2013 to 12 September 2019, shows that there were 13 pieces of information, which were not recorded on Mr Crowther's WYP profile, 12 of which were concern for safety calls.
628. The WYP person profile for Mr Crowther includes:
- Ms Fields' harassment report against him from 16 August 2019
 - his harassment complaint against Mr A as well as his assault and damage complaints against Ms Fields
 - his missing person incident on 23 August 2019
629. The WYP person profile for Ms Fields includes;
- 'SUSPECT AND VICTIM WERE BOYFRIEND AND GIRLFRIEND UNTIL BREKAING UP IN JUNE 2019. VICTIM HAS BEEN PERSISTANTLY [sic] THREATENED THAT HE WILL KILL FRIENDS AND FAMILY IF SHE DOESNT [sic] GET BACK IN A RELATIONSHIP WITH HIM.'*
630. The WYP chronology of information shows that two of the aforementioned incidents were recorded on Mr Crowther's intelligence profile as expected, but the following information was not uploaded to Mr Crowther's intelligence profile:
- 6 September 2016 – Mr Crowther's housemate called and stated that Mr Crowther was going out to 'stab' people tonight
 - 9 January 2018 – Ms Fields called and stated that Mr Crowther had a knife in his bedroom and wanted to stab a paedophile
 - 23 April 2017 – Mr Crowther's sister called and stated that Mr Crowther wanted to be tasered by the police and said that he wanted to hurt himself or someone else

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- 13 August 2017 – Mr Crowther called and stated he wanted to kill a paedophile and that he had stabbed a ‘copper in 2013’
 - 22 June 2019 – Ms Fields called and reported that Mr Crowther was making threats to hurt himself and other people and that he was making a suicide video for his daughter.
631. The evidence suggests that from 19 August, when Ms Fields made her initial complaint to WYP, until her death on 12 September, no WYP officer or police staff have been recorded as checking Mr Crowther’s PNC record. This appears to have been a failure to identify any warning markers in respect of Mr Crowther and is in breach of the DASH risk assessment and force interventions policy.
632. The evidence appears to suggest that WYP may have initially failed to timely or correctly record known intelligence information already held on their respective systems onto Mr Crowther’s Niche profile in relation to:
- the allegations from Mr I that Mr Crowther had stabbed him
 - the allegations that Mr Crowther had allegedly made threats to kill and stab people.
633. The evidence would appear to suggest that if that intelligence information had been uploaded to Mr Crowther’s Niche intelligence profile, that intelligence may have provided WYP officers or police staff with further information of the potential threat Mr Crowther posed to Ms Fields and other members of the public. This may have enabled them to arrest Mr Crowther and safeguard Ms Fields.
634. The evidence suggests that despite the aforementioned alleged intelligence failures, the Niche profile information already held by WYP may have provided WYP officers and police staff with sufficient information to identify the potential risk to Ms Fields. This could have been identified when checking either Mr Crowther’s or Ms Fields’ Niche profiles on or after 27 August, when PC 1’s PEACE notes, Ms Fields’ witness statement and her DASH risk assessment had been uploaded, until 12 September, prior to her death. This could have enabled WYP and those individual officers or police staff to recognise the potential threat that Mr Crowther posed to Ms Fields and which could have enabled them to arrest Mr Crowther and safeguard Ms Fields.
635. On 20 August, PC 1 linked Mr Crowther to Ms Fields’ complaint of 19 August, which would have allowed any person checking either of their Niche intelligence profiles to be aware of Ms Fields’ complaint against Mr Crowther. After 27 August they would have been able to view PC 1’s PEACE notes, Ms Fields’ witness statement and her DASH risk assessment and allow the possibility for them to be compared together.
636. The evidence suggests that despite numerous Niche intelligence profile checks being made with regard to Mr Crowther and Ms Fields, no officer or police staff appear to have compared Ms Fields’ witness statement with her DASH risk assessment and noted the apparent inconsistencies. Had they done so, this could have resulted in the risk to Ms Fields being assessed as high or compared Mr Crowther’s previous history of mental health, suicide attempts and domestic violence history against previous partners. This may

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have been a missed opportunity to adequately assess the risk Mr Crowther posed to Ms Fields.

637. It could be argued that when dealing with Mr Crowther's, Mr Fields', Mr A's and Mr B's complaints, the WYP officer's primary focus when checking either Mr Crowther's or Ms Fields' Niche intelligence profiles would be those individual cases and that they may not have had the capacity or responsibility for interrogating Mr Crowther's or Ms Fields' Niche profile in more detail. Should they have had the opportunity to do so after 27 August and if they had interrogated each individual screen and read the document within those screens they may have been able to view and compare Ms Fields' statement and DASH risk assessment together. This may have allowed them to identify any inconsistencies and the potential risk Mr Crowther posed to Ms Fields.
638. As that information was available on the WYP computer systems, it could be that it was '*hidden in plain sight*' as it appears that, although it could be accessed, there does not appear to have been any credible efforts to 'drill down' further into Ms Fields' Niche profile by any WYP officer, once her witness statement had been attached alongside her DASH risk assessment. There was perhaps a missed opportunity on behalf of WYP to effectively interrogate and compare all of the known intelligence information in order to '*join the intelligence dots*' together in order to make a timely arrest of Mr Crowther and effectively safeguard Ms Fields.
639. According to information detailed in the SCRT report; '*The information on the Storm Logs was not recorded on the Niche OEL in relation to Bethany's complaint of domestic abuse. Had Webstorm been checked, the two Storm Logs relating Mr B and Bethany's Father would have been available to view. Non domestic related stalking and harassment should be recorded as a Niche Occurrence and a DASH risk assessment completed with the reporting person*'.
640. We have not identified any evidence to suggest any dynamic risk assessment was undertaken of the potential risk to Ms Fields following the completion of her DASH risk assessment by PC 1 on 19 August. This was despite her Niche profile being checked eight times and Mr Crowther's profile being checked 21 times between 20 August 2019 and 26 August 2019.
641. We have not identified any evidence to suggest any dynamic risk assessment was undertaken of the potential risk to Ms Fields following the completion of her DASH risk assessment and the uploading of her statement on 27 August up until her death on 12 September. This was despite her Niche profile being checked a further 17 times and Mr Crowther's Niche profile being checked a further 31 times. During that period, PC 1's PEACE notes, Ms Fields' witness statement and DASH risk assessment had been uploaded and available to view in addition to Mr Crowther's history of mental health, attempts to take his own life and his previous history of domestic violence. It should be noted that when checking Niche profiles, officers could easily log into individual screens such as previous occurrences, arrest records, statements and DASH risk assessment records in order to be aware of the full intelligence profile of the person concerned.
642. This investigation has not identified any evidence to suggest that at that time, there was any supervisory oversight of PC 1's decision making and his completion of Ms Fields' statement and DASH risk assessment form, to look for any errors or identify any 'hidden'

warning markers and escalate accordingly. Although not yet corroborated, information has been provided to this investigation that WYP now have supervisory oversight of such incidents to look for 'hidden' warning markers.


643. The IOPC DM may wish to consider that in all the circumstances there appears to have been a series of intelligence failings within WYP with regard to the identification and timely recording of known intelligence to the appropriate WYP computer systems and to Mr Crowther's intelligence profile. There also appears to have been a lack of supervisory oversight of PC 1's decision making accuracy in completing Ms Fields' statement and DASH risk assessment.
644. The evidence suggests that PC 1's apparent failures in not uploading Ms Fields' statement straight away, incorrectly completing the DASH and not circulating Mr Crowther for arrest may have also created a knock on effect. The impact of this was that Mr Crowther was not identified as posing a significant and potentially imminent risk to Ms Fields and was not arrested despite coming to the attention of WYP on several occasions from making her complaint on 19 August to her being killed by Mr Crowther on 12 September

> The decisions and actions of the officer dealing with Ms Fields' complaint against Mr Crowther on and after 19 August 2019

645. PC 1's decision making and actions have been detailed at the appropriate points in the chronology of this report.
646. The decisions and actions of the other officers, who had any involvement with Ms Fields, Mr Fields and Mr B's complaint against Mr Crowther have also been detailed earlier in this report.

> Whether the decision and actions of WYP were in accordance with local and national policies and procedures

647. Everyone involved in policing can be classed as a National Decision Model (NDM) decision maker. The CoP APP guidance for the NDM outlines that it can be used for '*spontaneous incidents or planned operations, by an individual or team of people, to both operational and non-operational situations.*' The decision maker can use the NDM '*to structure a rationale of what they did during an incident and why...in a fast-moving incident, the police service recognises that it may not always be possible to segregate thinking or response according to each phase of the model. In such cases, the main priority of decision makers is to keep in mind their overarching mission to act with integrity to protect and serve the public.*'
648. The NDM has six key elements. Each component provides the user with an area for focus and consideration. The element that binds the model together is the Code of Ethics at the centre.



649. When considering the grading of a DASH assessment, there are 15 high risk factors for officers to *'ALWAYS consider these and not treat incidents as isolated cases'*. Those risk factors include:

- The victim's perception of the risk
- Separation
- Escalation
- Stalking
- Credible threats to kill
- Use of weapons
- Controlling behaviour
- Trio of Mental health, drugs, alcohol
- Suicide or threats of suicide'

650. The DASH standard operating procedure identifies that:

'A discussion should take place between the officer and supervision whilst the officer is still at the scene. A supervisor should sign off the risk assessment and endorse the OEL of the Niche occurrence with rationale behind the level of risk stated.'

651. The WYP domestic abuse policy adopts the domestic abuse definition as:

'Any incident or pattern of incidents of controlling, coercive, threatening behaviour, violence or abuse between those aged 16 or over who are or have been intimate partners or family

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members regardless of gender or sexuality. The abuse can encompass, but is not limited to, the following types of abuse:

- *psychological;*
- *physical;*
- *sexual;*
- *financial; and/or*
- *emotional.'*

652. It defines coercive behaviour as *'an act or a pattern of acts of assault, threats, humiliation and intimidation or other abuse that is used to harm, punish or frighten their victim.'*

653. Under contact management centre staff responsibilities, the policy identifies they are responsible for consulting PNC, Niche and other systems to check:

'the domestic abuse history of all parties

the criminal offending history of all parties

criminal or civil court order, in particular, restraining orders (ROs), Domestic Violence Protection Notices/Orders (DVPN/DVPO) non molestation orders and residence/contact arrangement orders

- *injunctions*
- *bail conditions*
- *licence conditions*
- *sex offender registration; and*
- *any relevant intelligence'*

654. The staff should then pass any information to the attending officer before they get to the incident.

655. Before arrival at the incident, the attending officer is responsible for ensuring they have received all the relevant risk information and antecedent history and requested any appropriate checks if they have not already been done.

656. Whilst at the incident, the attending officer is responsible for considering the incident as a whole as many cases of coercive and controlling behaviour or stalking and harassment may not be obvious.

657. Before leaving the incident, the attending officer is responsible for consulting with their supervisor, or an officer who has domestic incidents oversight, in relation their actions and securing an agreement on the DASH risk assessment. Once that decision is confirmed, the DASH risk assessment is completed.

658. Supervisor responsibilities include overseeing the investigation in all cases by communicating with the attending officer and, if appropriate, directly with the victim, review all Niche domestic abuse occurrences and ensure the DASH risk assessment has been properly completed.

659. The safeguarding or DAT sergeant is responsible for reviewing all domestic abuse crimes in terms of threat, harm and risk, ensuring all crimes are recorded in line with HOCR and allocating the crime for investigation documenting their rationale and investigation plan on Niche.
660. In relation to uniformed officers investigating domestic abuse crimes, their responsibilities include investigating the incident once allocated after the safeguarding review and establishing and maintaining appropriate contact with victims and suspects.
661. The WYP policy for the process of handing investigations/allocations over to the DAT identifies the actions to be completed when someone has attended a police station appointment. This includes fully completing and updating the Niche occurrence, a victim account and a DASH risk assessment.
662. The patrol supervisor needs to have reviewed the DASH assessment confirmed the grading and verified that all actions have been completed with a satisfactory explanation if something has not been done. The supervisor should endorse this on the OEL.
663. The WYP demand management policy identifies that priority incidents *'must be attended as soon as possible, attendance must not be delayed unnecessarily, and in any event within 60 minutes.'* A standard incident should aim to be attended either *'as soon as a resource is available in a time frame that is agreeable to the caller'* or *'within 48 hours.'*
664. In relation to domestic abuse incident logs graded as standard and/or suitable for an appointment the *'DCH/TEL will consider:*
- *the risk of further harm occurring to the victim or children;*
 - *recent previous reported incidents;*
 - *the antecedence of the perpetrator;*
 - *the opportunity to secure and preserve evidence; and*
 - *the victim's availability.'*

> Analysis

665. WYP received a complaint from Ms Fields on 16 August, following a telephone call she made to Derbyshire Constabulary, which was forwarded to WYP in relation to Mr Crowther allegedly making threats to harm and kill her friend Mr B. This resulted in an appointment being made for Ms Fields to attend Pudsey police station to make her own complaint against Mr Crowther on 19 August. Mr Crowther had also visited Dewsbury police station earlier that day to admit the threats he had made to Mr B. Following that attendance, Mr Crowther made various complaints against Ms Fields and Mr A. Further complaints with regard to Mr Crowther's behaviour were made to WYP by Mr A, Mr Fields and Mr B.
666. The evidence suggests that WYP had known intelligence with regard to Mr Crowther, including a history of attempts to take his own life, a previous domestic violence related

conviction and a history of domestic abuse against former partners as well as known intelligence of him making threats to kill or harm people.

667. WYP contact staff management policies note that contact management staff are responsible for carrying out PNC, Niche and other system checks including identifying the domestic abuse history of all parties, the criminal offending history of all parties including criminal or civil court orders and any relevant intelligence before passing any information to the attending officer. This investigation has not identified any evidence that any WYP officer or police staff had undertaken any PNC checks on Mr Crowther or Ms Fields.

668. The NDM and the police code of ethics, outlines the behaviours and actions that WYP and their officers should undertake in spontaneous or planned situations. Although there was some evidence gathered at different stages by various officers, there appears to be little or no evidence to show that WYP or any WYP officers or police staff mentioned in this report took adequate steps to:

- **Effectively gather information and intelligence** – There appears to be relevant historical information already held on WYP systems in relation to Mr Crowther's previous mental health and domestic violence history, which was not uploaded to his Niche profile.

This investigation has found no evidence to suggest that any WYP officer or police staff checked Mr Crowther's PNC record.

- **Correctly assess the threat and risk and develop a working strategy** – The evidence suggests that PC 1 did not accurately record the risk to Ms Fields. This investigation has found no evidence to suggest any ongoing dynamic risk assessment of the potential threat Mr Crowther posed to Ms Fields.

This investigation has found no evidence to suggest that any WYP officer or police staff viewed and compared both Ms Fields' statement and DASH risk assessment together in order to correct any inconsistencies.

- **Consider powers and policy** – There is no documented evidence to suggest that Mr Crowther's arrest had been planned or the relevant police policy in terms of identifying and dynamically assessing risk to Ms Fields was followed or Mr Crowther's arrest considered as a result.
- **Identify options and contingencies and take action and review what happened** – There is evidence to suggest that WYP were aware that PC 1's initial actions did not meet the MSI and there is documentary evidence in respect of the supervisory directions given to PC 1. There are some supervisory notes to suggest PC 1 should have spoken to his supervisor if he was unsure or upon completion of obtaining Ms Fields' account and consent to prosecute Mr Crowther, however, he does not appear to have followed through on this request. There does not seem to have been any adequate supervision of PC 1 whilst he completed Ms Fields' statement and DASH risk assessment and that this failure to effectively supervise him may have diminished the opportunity to identify the available options, take action and review what had happened.

669. The DM may wish to consider that in all the circumstances the actions of PC 1 and WYP, may have fallen below the standards expected of them and which may be contrary to the SOPB.
670. The evidence shows that the DASH standard operating procedures and risk factors in terms of assessing risk, identifies the 15 high risk factors, which include; the victim's perception of the risk, separation, escalation, stalking, credible threats to kill, use of weapons, controlling behaviour, mental health, threats of suicide.
671. There appears to have been significant documentary evidence available to PC 1 to identify those high risk factors. However, the evidence suggests that despite that information being readily available, there appears to have been an apparent failure to correctly identify, record and respond to them by PC 1 and which may be contrary to the WYP DASH risk assessment policy and the SOPB.
672. The WYP domestic abuse policy definition includes that domestic abuse can be any incident or a pattern of incidents of controlling, coercive or threatening behaviour, violence or abuse between people over 16 who have been partners or family members. Also that coercive behaviour is defined as *'an act or a pattern of acts of assault, threats, humiliation and intimidation or other abuse that is used to harm, punish or frighten their victim.'*
673. The evidence suggests that Ms Fields' complaint of 19 August in relation to Mr Crowther and the potential threat he posed to her fell within the category of domestic abuse. The potential threat Mr Crowther posed to Ms Fields appears to have been high risk, with evidence of controlling coercive behaviour and threats to kill or harm Ms Fields or others.
674. The evidence suggests that this knowledge should have led to supervisory assessment of all of the circumstances including comparison of Ms Fields' witness statement and DASH risk assessment together with Mr Crowther's known previous history. This could have led to WYP passing this investigation to the SGU or DAT. Although there were noted staff issues within the SGU and DAT, it could be argued that WYP should not have allowed a circumstance to be created whereby a probationary police officer, not yet suitable for independent working, was left to deal unsupervised with such a potentially serious incident, which may be contrary to the standards expected of WYP and may significantly harm the public confidence in WYP to investigate and safeguard victims of domestic violence.

> Questions to be answered by the DSI investigation

675. To conclude this analysis, I, as lead investigator, will consider the following:
- What evidence is available regarding the nature and extent of police contact with Ms Fields prior to her death?
 - What evidence is available in relation to whether the police may have caused or contributed to Ms Fields' death?

> What evidence is available regarding the nature and extent of police contact with Ms Fields prior to her death?

676. I have documented the nature and extent of the police contact with Ms Fields prior to Mr Crowther killing her on 12 September, in the relevant sections of this report.

> What evidence is available in relation to whether the police may have caused or contributed to Ms Fields' death?

677. Whilst it is clear that Mr Crowther was the cause of Ms Fields' death, the evidence suggests that WYP did not update his intelligence profile with all relevant information. Had this information appeared on the correct system, WYP would have had more intelligence information concerning the potential threat Mr Crowther posed to Ms Fields and may have allowed any officers or police staff checking his intelligence profile to be aware of this relevant information, especially with regards to the intelligence concerning threats to 'stab' and 'kill' people.

678. The DM may wish to consider PC 1's actions and his admission that he did not follow the correct procedures when completing Ms Fields' witness statement and DASH risk assessment record correctly. Also, his apparent failure to adequately assess the risk to Ms Fields as well as his admitted failure to upload her witness statement to the police computer systems. This may have set in motion a chain of events that did not allow WYP to be aware of the full circumstances of the potential threat Mr Crowther posed to Ms Fields until 27 August 2019.

679. The evidence suggests that when checking Ms Fields' Niche profile there does not appear to have been:

- Any detailed analysis of the information held by WYP with regard to her statement and DASH risk assessment in order to identify any errors or potential intervention opportunities.
- Any significant attempt to take any pro-active action to arrest Mr Crowther or safeguard Ms Fields following further complaints from her, Mr A, Mr Fields and Mr B
- Adequately identify, record and dynamically review the threat Mr Crowther posed to Ms Fields.

680. The DM may wish to consider that in all of the circumstances detailed above, WYP may have contributed to the circumstances which led to Ms Fields' death by not correctly assessing the potential risk Mr Crowther posed to her and by failing to arrest him in a timely manner and safeguard Ms Fields. However, it should be noted, that it is not possible to say whether or not had the information been correctly recorded/risk assessed, the tragic outcome could or would have been avoided.

> Learning

681. Throughout the investigation, the IOPC has considered learning with regard to the matters under investigation. The type of learning identified can include improving practice, updating policy or making changes to training.

682. There are two types of learning recommendations that the IOPC can make under the Police Reform Act 2002 (PRA):

Section 10(1) (e) recommendations – these are made at any stage of the investigation. There is no requirement under the Police Reform Act for the Appropriate Authority to provide a formal response to these recommendations.

Paragraph 28A recommendations – made at the end of the investigation, which do require a formal response. These recommendations and any responses to them are published on the recommendations section of the IOPC website.

> Potential learning for the DM to consider⁵

683. I have identified the following area of potential learning for the DM's attention, to inform any recommendations they may wish to make:

- It is recommended that WYP ensure that all officers and police staff have the relevant training and knowledge in respect of identifying critical intelligence from incident reports that should be uploaded to individual Niche intelligence profiles. This may assist in identifying any 'hidden' warning markers in the overall intelligence profile.
- It is recommended that when officers fail to meet the MSI in relation to domestic abuse cases, i.e. failure to upload victim witness statements with DASH risk assessments which are sent to the SGU/DAT, there should be a system put in place for the SGU/DAT to request that such cases are automatically sent back to them when the MSI are met and not left to the individual officer to re-task the investigation back to them. This would enable WYP to correctly compare all known intelligence and identify the correct level of risk in all domestic abuse cases.
- It is recommended that WYP ensure that all probationary officers that are deployed have appropriate support in place to review and supervise their actions. This would allow WYP to be aware of the independent working of any probationary officer not yet suitably qualified and enable them to assess the decisions and actions of probationary officers, particularly in relation to domestic abuse or other serious investigations they may be working on without sufficient training.
- It is recommended that probationary officers have a clear line of supervision, whatever shift they are working on.

⁵ Learning recommendations must go through a consultation process before they are issued to the AA. The final version of wording will be published on the IOPC website.

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- It is recommended that WYP review their training modules in respect of domestic abuse, completion of DASH risk assessments, use of police information and systems, particularly in respect of completion of PEACE notes, witness statements, DASH risk assessments, Niche case file creation, and victim satisfaction. This may assist WYP officers to have as full a knowledge as possible of their responsibilities with regard to the above named processes and that domestic violence procedures are fully covered in WYP training packages.
- It is recommended that WYP re-enforce the standards expected of supervisory sergeants particularly in relation to domestic violence cases and their responsibility to review any statements and DASH risk assessments in order to agree and sign off the risk and identify any potential errors at the earliest opportunity in order to effectively safeguard victims of domestic violence.
- It is recommended that WYP undertake a review of their DASH risk assessment form. At present the form seems overly complicated with several high risk indicators such as, threats to kill, previous history of domestic violence and suicide attempts being hidden in the detail. Consideration should be given to these high risk indicators being given more prominence potentially at the start of the form which may alert officers at an early stage that the potential risk to domestic violence victims may be high.
- It is recommended that WYP review the DASH risk assessment form to potentially incorporate a section to mandatory detail any other linked events and PNC crime numbers of any convictions to ensure that linked events have been considered.
- It is recommended that WYP give consideration to adapting the DASH form so that when the 'other' option is ticked, an explanation is required.

> Criminal offences

684. On receipt of this report, the DM must decide if there is an indication that a criminal offence may have been committed by any person to whose conduct the investigation related.
685. If they decide that there is such an indication, they must decide whether it is appropriate to refer the matter to the CPS.
686. I have not identified any offences for the DM to consider.